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Abstract 
The objective of this work is to theoretically evaluate an important 
aspect of a Newly Industrializing Country (NICs): Korea. Namely, the 
behaviour of firms in Korea competing with firms in an industrialized 
country after all Government intervention of the former is withdrawn. 
This aspect is considered in the main part while a descriptive 
introductory part introduces the Korean economy as a NIC. 
We construct a simple asymmetric duopoly model where firms conjectures 
play an important role in deriving the Perfect Equilibrium for a two 
stage game. Different costs of production and first mover advantage 
form the basis of the asymmetry. We find that under Cournot 
conjectures assumption for the marketing stage and certain cost 
conditions, it is profitable for the incumbent firm to stay a leader 
and the follower to remain a follower. For some cost conditions and a 
credible threat at the disposal of the follower, the incumbent firm 
may be forced to stay a leader even though it is more profitable to 
became a follower. 
We examine possible licensing rules the leader may propose to the 
follower. The dominant strategy, we find, is a licence fee that is a 
function of the quality difference between the top quality of the 
market leader and the level of quality it is selling to the follower. 
There will be a cost to the leader in terms of a lower licence fee to 
prevent possible leap forgging. Once we allow for free copying, we 
find that the follower will copy closely the new product of the 
leadership. Under Bertrand conjectures assumption, we find that 
unless the firm with higher production cost remains the leader 
offering a higher quality product, it will be driven out of the 
market, i. e., either it has to innovate or-die. 
Ir-i-. r^c: rciL. c t oo-i 
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1. The Objectives 
The basic objective of this work is to develop a theoretical 
model to analyse aspects of industrial economics which are 
not only of close relevance to the characteristics of NICs 
but also very stimulating topics in themselves as regarding 
present and future strategic choices as well as economic 
theory. They are quality competition and market structure 
between firms in a newly industrializing country and a 
industrialized country. 
Insofar as its relevance to the characteristics of NICs are 
concerned, the analysis will address a particular aspect of 
problems a country may encounter at its maturing stage. We 
shall take Korea as a country representative of NICs. The 
problems will evolve around the following question: 
What is the optimal strategy for a firm in NICs when 
competing against firms in developed countries once all 
restrictions in trade has been abolished ? 
Industries in Korea have come into existence through 
extensive planning, financing and partial administration by 
the Government throughout the last three decades. The 
purpose of this quasi-laissez-faire approach was to promote 
an export led growth that would pull the economy out from an 
almost stagnant underdeveloped country into an 
2 
industrialized nation. Initially, investments were focused 
on textile industries since then required least skill and 
funds for take off. Then gradually, investments were 
diversified into semi-skilled manufacturing industries. 
During the second half of the 70s, heavy manufacturing 
industries were born leading finally to the electronics 
industries towards the end of the 70s. At present, Korea 
has reached a stage where it is now losing its comparative 
advantages, e. g., low wage rate, large number of semi- 
skilled workers and competitive exchange rate, to its 
neighbouring countries which include the potentially giant 
economy of China. Had it not been for the few large 
conglomerates in Korea which started to invest massively in 
the electronics industries a decade ago, the situation in 
which Korea might have found itself today would have been a 
very gloomy one. In addition to the loss of comparative 
advantages, its recent success in visible trade has meant 
that the argument for "Infant Industry", which served as a 
justification for high tariffs and import barriers became 
inappropriate and such protectionism has had to be 
abolished, at least gradually. Therefore, faced with the 
prospect of losing ground in the areas where economic growth 
has so far been enjoyed and having to compete without any 
shelters, Korean firms now have to engage in direct 
competition with firms in developed countries. In this 
competition, Korean firms still lag behind in terms of 
technology and know how. The question' is whether a Korean 
firm in this situation should behave as a follower in 
markets of advanced technology or attempt to overtake the 
foreign incumbent firms if possible. 
3 
The electronics firms in Korea have been so far enjoying the 
fruit of being a follower in the world of electronics 
industry. This was mainly inevitable as technology was 
lagging too much behind to engage*in quality competition and 
new product innovation. Nevertheless, the Korean 
electronics section has been able to take over 3% of the 
world electronics market and about one tenth that of Japan 
by producing colour TVs (7 million sets), VCRs (3.75 million 
sets) and PCs in 1988. On the other hand, active R&D 
projects are underway in Anyang Research establishments 
aiming at 16 mega bit d-ram, challenging the leaders of this 
market. This is a significant achievement for an economy 
that only two and a half decades ago was just able to 
produce a simple radio. 
We shall be concerned with one particular aspect of 
competition: investment into R&D and quality competition. 
Under an asymmetric duopoly, i. e., a market structure 
consisting only of two firms, we shall examine the optimal 
strategy with respect to product (quality) selection under 
various conjectures and competition for market leadership. 
It is an asymmetric duopoly firstly because firms in Korea 
have dual objectives; profit and sales maximization made 
possible by Government policies of promoting export to 
obtain greater world market share due to foreign reserve 
shortages which in turn are used to finance the import of 
raw materials. Secondly, lower wage rates are available to 
Korean firms compared to that of advanced countries. 
4 
As a prelude, we briefly describe the Korean economy within 
the framework of the NICs. Then we survey the economy in her 
own right with emphasis on past performances, the present 
state and future prospects. 
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2. Korea as a Newly Industrializing Country 
The criteria of categorizing a country as a NIC seem to be 
of a very imprecise nature but to involve some degree of 
industrialization, economic infra-structure, capacity level 
of production and current level of GNP. As these structural 
characteristics are in general difficult to measure, we show 
briefly the level of a few state variables of NICs that may 
distinguish them from the rest of the world. 
Countries usually termed as an NIC range from those which 
still largely have the characteristics of developing 
countries as well as those whose economic performances, if 
not their international influence, are ranked together with 
Industrialized countries. Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore are usually known as the Asian NICs while Mexico, 
Brasil and Argentina as the American NICs. These countries 
are so diverse in nature that it is difficult to derive any 
common characteristics except that their GNP per capita are 
between a quarter to a half of those of an advanced country 
and the fact that they have enjoyed rapid economic growth 
for the last twenty years. It is inevitable, therefore, 
that not all NICs fit into all of the following 
characteristics we have listed below. 
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2.1 Real GDP growth 
As it is obvious from the. date shown in table 2-1, the NICs 
enjoyed a sustained growth in real GDP relative to those of 
the LDCs and the Industrialized countries. The comparison 
with LDCs may provide a more realistic picture of 
performances of NICs as a growth rate of 2% in an 
Industrialized country, with its large size of economy, may 
in fact be comparable with about 10% growth of a NIC with 
its relative smaller economy. In many countries, growth was 
partly export led. Exports in Korea, for example, were 
contributing between 20 to 30 % of incremental growth each 
year during the 70s and early 80s. This consequently led 
many NICs to become heavily dependent on their foreign 
sector earnings. A study by Ezaki (1985) on the econometric 
link between various countries using international income 
multipliers is a good example which shows the high 
interdependent relationship among various economies (table 
2-2). As it is clearly evident from the income multipliers 
between NICs and other regions of the world, figures listed 
in row 2 are relatively larger than the reverse effect shown 
in column 2, i. e., if NICs increase their autonomous 
expenditure by 1 unit, the impact of this change on other 
countries' GNP will be less than vise versa. This asymmetric 
mutual cross effect can be described as due to the fact that 
shares of foreign trade of NICs in proportion to their 
domestic market are much larger than the industrialized 
countries. However, within a time span of 8 years, both 
multipliers have increased implying a greater role being 
played by NICs than before. 
7 
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A second reason for a relatively faster growth of GDP may 
have been the high rate of capital accumulation as can be 
observed from table 2-3. The average of Asian NICs amounts 
to about 32.2 as opposed to 26.6 for the rest of the Asian 
countries. Malkiel (1979) estimated the fixed investment 
ratio with respect to GNP in the U. S. A. between 1965 and 
1974 to be 10.4 while in 1977 it fell to 9.3. He argued 
that one of the reasons for low investment ratio towards the 
end of 70s was the fall in Tobin's q ratio. It is defined 
as the market value of a company divided by the replacement 
value of its assets. A high q ratio implies that 
corporations will be encouraged to invest in new equipments 
whereas if assets sell for less than their replacement 
values, corporations selling new securities to buy new 
capital goods will create capital losses to their share 
holders. 
Gross investment as a percentage of GNP for Korea in 
particular is shown in table 2-4. It shows that an average 
of 20 to 30 % investment ratio accompanied the GDP growth 
rate during this period. It is however, less clear whether 
the Tobin's q ratio would be able to provide explanations 
for such a ratio in NICs in absence of a well established 
stock market. 
2.2 Debt problem 
That domestic saving was unable to match the high investment 
level in most of Asian NICs can be seen from table 2-3. The 
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exception is Taiwan. This meant that NICs had to rely on 
borrowing from abroad. During the 70s, most of the external 
debt was long term borrowing as shown in table 2-5, such 
that it was expected that with the continuous growth and 
high investment ratio, NICs were' able to pay back in due 
course. From the NICs point of view, the long term 
borrowings were of no real concern, at least in the 70s as 
they were favoured by high inflation rates, low world real 
interest rates initially and steady expansion of their 
volume of export with relative constant terms of trade. A 
stable nominal world interest rate accompanied by a high 
inflation rate led to the low real world interest rate while 
the increase in the volume of export meant that the debt 
services as against total export earnings were low. During 
the same period however, the sustaining inflation pushed up 
world nominal interest rates and added to the burden of 
interest payment in return for eroding the real value of 
outstanding debt. This inflationary acceleration became an 
acute problem by 81/2 as the inflation rate fell with 
nominal interest rate sluggish to adjust immediately. The 
world recession in the early 80s meant a reduction in their 
volume of exports (at least in the growth rate of export). 
This caused serious Balance of Payment problems (refer to 
table 2-6) and NICs had to rely on short term borrowing, not 
so much for investment but to pay for net interest payment 
of the long term loans as well as the current Balance of 
Payment deficit. Since approximately two-thirds of 
developing countries' debt as of '84 was at floating 
interest rates tied to the London Interbank Offer Rates 
(LIBOR), higher current debt service had to be paid. The 
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deterioration of the debt crisis can be observed from table 
2-7. The debt burden became an acute problem more so for 
NICs than the rest of the developing countries. As Simonsen 
(1983) noted rightly, unless export earnings grow at a 
higher rate than interest rate payments, the country's debt 
burden becomes worse. An interesting calculation by W. R. 
Cline (table 2-8) shows possible causes of debt increase in 
non-oil developing countries. Since most NICs except Mexico 
are non-oil producing countries and have a high dependence 
on foreign trade, these figures may apply more so on the 
NICs than the rest of the developing countries. 
2.3 Unemployment 
At least in the Asian NICs, the problem of unemployment was 
not serious even during the recessions between 81/2 (refer 
to table 2-9). This was mainly due to the combination of 
sustaining real GDP growth and wage policies (or absence of 
it as is illustrated later). As in most Asian NICs, the 
total population in Korea grew steadily after the second 
world war and the Korean war as the political and economic 
stabilities were reestablished. The consequence of this was 
that the size of the active working population will be 
increasing at a rate of 3% each year for the next decade or 
so. Therefore, unless economic growth keeps its minimum 
rate to accommodate population growth, there is bound to be 
a continuous rise in unemployment. 
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Another important aspect to be noted is the set of 
characteristics of the labour market which may have kept the 
unemployment rate low and could keep it that way in whatever 
circumstances of the economy. As it is evident from the 
Korean example, the ratio of union member against the total 
number of employment in early 80s was still only 8% which 
was much lower than in most industrialized countries. The 
"Labor Union Law" and "Labour Disputes Adjustment Laws" 
which were revised extensively and repeatedly in the early 
70s in Korea for example granted the Government the right to 
order a union to change its decision or make the decision 
null and void. Such strong legal grip by the Government 
assured that enough wage flexibility was introduced to keep 
its economy competitive and in full employment. This is 
evident in the growth rate of real wages between 1970 and 
1986 in table 2-10 which exhibits no consistency. The real 
wage growth rate does not reflect a stable growth path with 
nominal wage rates adjusting for inflation. It is more 
closely correlated with GNP growth rate supporting the 
earlier claim that wages were raised or lowered according to 
the success or failure of economic performance. Since '86 
however, there have been serious strikes which have put 
Korea into a period of transition in terms of Unionization, 
forcing the Government to adopt a much more liberal attitude 
towards the labour movement. 
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2.4 Balance of Payments 
With few exceptions such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, most of 
the NICs suffered from Balance of Trade deficit (table 2-7) 
in spite of their rapid growth of export. This may have 
been the result of their large volume of import of petroleum 
and capital goods from abroad. In addition, Brazil and 
Mexico conducted an ambitious venture in the 70s investing 
heavily in reshaping their economy by constructing heavy 
industries with a long term perspective. Recession in the 
early 80s brought loss to the ambitious venture as the debt 
burdens of Brazil and Mexico show in table 6 while Taiwan 
and Hong Kong, with obviously smaller economic size, 
ventured much less ambitious investment and concentrated 
more on light manufacturing goods such that they were among 
the very few countries in NICs as well as in the rest of the 
LDCs who avoided the debt problem. Korea could be regarded 
as somewhere inbetween these two extreme cases. Another 
aspect of the Balance of Payment problem was the loss of 
terms of trade. The commodity export prices for NICs are 
sensitive to the business cycle of the industrialized 
countries in that in periods of recessions, export prices 
fall. This is due to the fact that NICs have to adjust their 
export prices with those of the industrialized countries so 
as to keep their export goods competitive and thereby keep 
their volume of export from falling. The import prices, 
however, do not always reflect the general inflation rate of 
the industrialized countries because the NICs with no real 
resources or advanced technology have to rely on their 
efficient and cheap labour force to import raw and 
intermediate materials and commodities, then manufacture and 
22 
assemble them for export. As the raw materials and 
intermediate commodities' prices do not necessarily reflect 
the inflation rate, the terms of trade worsen if inflation 
rate in industrialized countries are brought down sharply. 
This phenomena was felt even more so when there was the 
price rise of oil with falling inflation in industrialized 
countries in the early SOs. 
Invisible trade has played a relatively insignificant role 
in NICs until the mid 80s when gradual deregulation in 
financial markets were observed. One of the main reason for 
this was that there was no stock exchange such as can be 
found in New York and London except in Hong Kong Since 
Governments are more devoted in finding the right funds for 
industries in the exporting markets, industries never really 
felt the necessity to generate such a stock exchange 
Foreign investors on the other hand saw too much risk in 
investing in NICs of which they had so little information. 
This lack of foreign investment has its advantages in that 
the exchange rate was responsive only to real changes such 
as net values of trade and not subject to volatility of the 
exchange rate as some industrialized countries experienced. 
In countries such as Korea and Taiwan, financial transfer to 
abroad was strictly controlled by the Government. In other 
words, the domestic interest rate was independent to world 
interest rates. The importance of the world interest rate 
lies in that it determines the cost of net debt service. 
Therefore, as rightly noted by M. Ezaki (1985), the only 
transmission channels are the actual trade volumes, export & 
23 
import prices, controlled financial flows and human and 
technological communications. 
24 
3. The Korean Economy: A Survey 
3.1 Macroeconomic Aspects 
Since the early 60s, the structure of the Korean economy has 
changed dramatically as is most evident from the changes in 
the sectoral production pattern. In 1961,60.6% of the 
total working population were employed in the agricultural 
sector producing only 38.7% of the total national product, 
8% and 28.2% were employed in the manufacturing and in the 
service sector producing 13.8% and 45.9% each. By the end of 
the 70s, these figures changed to 32.3% producing 18% of 
GNP, 21.7% producing 29.5% and 44.5% producing 59% of 
national product each. The GNP grew on average about 8.3% 
p. a. during the same period. There has been also a large 
growth in the foreign sector. Taking 1975 as the index year, 
imports increased from 5.8 in '62 to 357.7 while export 
increased from 1.1 to 417.5 during the same period. The 
ratio between import and export in '75 were 6.6: 5 (table 3- 
1). 
Another aspect to be noted is the role of foreign finance in 
Korea. There has always been a maximum ceiling of foreign 
direct investment in Korea which in the fourth plan it was 
$100m at current price and the ratio of foreign direct 
investment against borrowing from abroad never exceeded 10% 
(table 3-2). Since the late 70s, however, the GNP growth 
rate has been on average 6.6% p. a.. Export grew steadily 
reaching on average a growth rate of 13.6%. This steady 
growth meant that Korea was finally able to enjoy a trade 
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surplus since 1986 and an invisible trade surplus in 1987. 
The most dramatic change in the SOs was probably the 
development of the financial market in Korea. First came 
the deregulations on the commercial banks followed by 
establishments of new financial institutions funded by the 
private sector and the crack down on the curb market which 
led to an upsurge of the stock price index as funds were 
channelled into official financial markets. The inflation 
rate, which once reached as high as 287% in 1980 reflecting 
the political turmoil during that period, was kept down to 
below 3% after 1983. 
3.1.1 The Five Economic 
It is a well establisr 
Development plans since 
force of the growth of 
clear, however, how the 
table 3-3). 
Development Plans 
Led belief that the five Economic 
1962 have been the major driving 
the Korean economy. It is less 
actual mechanism worked (refer to 
The first Economic Development Plan was between 1962 to 1966 
The main objectives of the plan was to establish some basis 
on which to build the economy. Investments were made in 
textile industries and radio manufacturing firms while 
imposing import bans on many foreign items. 
The Second Plan (1967 to 1971) was based on three main 
principles; export-led strategy, import substitution and 
self-sufficient policy rather than an open economy. An 
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important issue during this period was whether to adopt 
domestic or foreign manufacturing machinery. The former 
would lead to boost of domestic machinery industry while the 
purchasers would have had to be contented with less 
efficient capital goods whereas the latter would have 
increased import but would have provided better quality. It 
turned out that the latter was favoured by most industries. 
The goal during the Third Plan (1972 to 1976) was to achieve 
a self sufficient agricultural sector. The notion of 
harmony was introduced for the first time in the plan 
whereas only growth was the sole target. The harmony was 
referred to, at least in theory, as giving more attention to 
the overall economic performances as well as economic 
structure to include problems as income redistribution, 
welfare and sectoral discrepancies in income. The 
Government intervention on the allocation of resources, 
however grew even larger and investment in heavy and 
chemical industries were made. The share of investment to 
heavy and chemical industry as against light industry rose 
from 74% in 1976 to 82% in 1979. After the oil crisis in 
1973, two plans were drawn up; export of manpower and a 
vigorous exploitation of new market. As a consequence, many 
trading companies were born during this period. 
The Fourth Plan (1977 to 1981) focused its policy on 
eliminating foreign direct investment while domestic saving 
was hoped to exceed total investment. In fact, by 1977, net 
borrowing from the rest of the world was negative (table 2- 
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4). This was, however, a short lived hope as in 1979 and 
1980, higher oil prices drove the economy to borrow more 
heavily than ever before except in the 1973 oil shock. The 
ratio of Research and Development to GNP was doubled to 
reach 0.9% of the GNP in 1980 while investment were 
channelled to more sophisticated products. The aim of this 
plan was i) to intergrate into the world market excluding 
the foreign capital market, ii) to increase saving while 
keeping interest rate low for industrial investment and 
iii) to reduce Government involvement in the economy while 
making massive subsidies to industries under the Heavy and 
Chemical Industry Plan (1972). This plan identified six 
leading industries for export; steel, chemical, non-ferrous 
metal, machinery, shipbuilding and electrical products. 
Imports were liberalized to a certain degree to avoid 
central banks issuing more currency as inflow of dollars 
remittance from overseas construction workers increased as a 
measure against domestic inflation. This meant that trade 
surplus goal had to be abandoned. 
Due to high inflation in the late 70s (figure 2-10), the 
dominantly Keynesian type of government policies were 
weakened and a shift occurred to a more monetary approach. 
In 1980, interest rate were increased greatly while the 
Korean currency Won was devalued; it had been pegged to the 
U. S. Dollar since 1974. 
During the Fifth Plan (1982 to 1986), priority was given to 
economic stability and the target for inflation was below 
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10% while the market mechanism was left without intervention 
to adjust the excess demand at that time. Structural reform 
of economic institutions and policies were called for; 
liberalization of the economic mechanisms, autonomous 
banking operations, efficient industrial incentive scheme 
and competitive market mechanism were encouraged. Import 
substitution was abandoned and only comparatively 
advantageous products were encouraged while the energy 
intensive industries were to be positively discouraged. R&D 
investment reached 2% of GNP in 1986. 
3.1.2 Export-led Growth 
The Korean economy as a whole was more or less centrally 
planned and controlled by the Government until recently. 
Imposing restrictions on import since the early 60s and 
devaluing the exchange rate in 1964 sheltered the Korean 
industries in their infant stage. A complicated list system 
was devised to allow rebates to export industries. The 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry was anxious to build up 
firms to a size which could compete with foreign 
multinationals. As a consequence, large conglomerates were 
born building new industries where the state dictated the 
nature, location of the plants and also provided the bulk of 
the investment (table 3-4). Export items were selected and 
a rationed credit system was conducted as a consequence of 
which the economy developed a dual structure; the export 
sector which was close to free trade and the domestic sector 
hemmed with restrictions. A maximum was reached in 1976 
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when 80% of export was by top 20 items while in 1980, the 
figure went down to 70%. 
Korean industries were advantaged not only by having been 
supported by Government but also by the fact that Korea was 
a late comer to world trade. By investing in new plants 
with the knowledge of those in the developed countries, they 
were able to overcome overmanning problems, e. g., the steel 
mill POSCO in Korea required manpower per ton half of that 
in the U. K. Hyundae, the largest conglomerate in Korea 
estimated that building a car plant of a certain size in 
Korea would cost only about 60% of a plant build by 
Volkswagen or Toyota. 
The industries in Korea were initially also blessed with 
abundant availability of human capital and sufficient 
financial capital organized by the Government. Any 
inflationary effects on trade were continuously overcome by 
adjustment of the exchange rate. The biggest devaluation was 
probably in 1960 when the Won was devalued by 50%. 
The favourable international situation during the 60s and 
early 70s meant continuous high demand of products in 
developed countries. Japan and the U. S. were looking for 
offshore basis for labour intensive manufacturing processes 
and found Korea an attractive place to invest. This helped 
the diffusion of technology from the advanced countries to 
the Korean economy (Table 3-5). 
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3.2 Microeconomic Aspects 
There are two types of Korean Export industries; labour 
intensive industries employing predominantly women and the 
heavy industries (i. e., steel,, iron and shipbuilding) 
producing with cheaper capital equipment and modern design. 
Focus in this paper will be on the labour intensive 
industries, especially on the textile industry and the 
electronic industry. From table 3-5, we observe the high 
level of contribution of the labour force in economic 
development of Korea when compared with that of the United 
States and Japan. The reason why these Korean industries 
employ more female workers is because the average wage of a 
female worker doing the same job against a male worker is 
about 50 to 70%. 
of female workers (1979) 
textile 69 
clothing 77 
foot wear 57 
electric Machine 55 
consumer electronics 65 
domestic appliances 34 
rest 28 
total 42.9 
Female workers in total produce about 46.8% of total exports 
implying that they are contributing about 17% more to 
exports than male workers, 
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3.2.1 The Textile Industry 
The initial take off was by heavy investment by semi- 
government organizations which' conducted a vigorous 
expansion program since 1956. The first problem they 
encountered was in 1961 of over capacity. Only 86% of 
spindles and 56% of looms were in operation while import of 
textile remained high. This was partly because cotton 
products were using the U. S. imported cotton P. L. 480 as its 
raw material. It was not until 1969 that export was able to 
attain the level of imports of textiles. The second problem 
was trade barriers. The U. S., which was importing the major 
part of the textiles Korea exported, imposed restrictive 
covenants on Korean cotton exports; any export earnings 
should be used to purchase further U. S. cotton P. L. 480. 
Furthermore, the Kennedy administration placed a quota on 
Korean Textile products in 1962. The third problem was that 
of silk exports. A considerable silk market in West existed 
but only if the price could be lowered. This required 
increases in productivity, new management techniques and 
lowering other running costs. However, increases in 
garment export produced with imported fabrics was profitable 
enough to outweigh the less successful cotton industry due 
to restrictions on exports. In the early 60s, domestic 
demand was dominant until early 70s for woollen and cotton, 
1975 for silk, viscose, synthetic in fabrics and 1971 in 
chemical fibre at which time the export began the lead. 
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Cotton Industry 
Product differentiation and decline in spinning capacities 
in advanced countries and constant low price contributed to 
gradual yarn export increases. Constant low price, however, 
was difficult to maintain as raw materials were imported and 
simple depreciation would not have cured the problem as 
would have made the imported raw materials even more 
expensive. However, continuous increase in productivity was 
able to keep the price constant and marginally escape 
unprofitability (table 2-10). 
Chemical & Synthetic Fibres 
In 1966, Rayon plant was created under the public ownership. 
Raw materials were imported from Japan. In order to replace 
the Japanese material, refining and petrochemical industry 
was created which replaced the import dependence from 83.8%% 
in 1967 to 9.1% in 1979. However, since the domestic 
products were more expensive, they had to be subsidized by 
the Government. 
3.2.2 The Electronics Industry 
Gold Star Radio factory was built in 1959 at Pusan and 
import of small radios were banned in the following year. 
Two additional plants were built in '61 and '62 each with 
technical guidance of Japanese companies. The first exports 
of the small radios were made to New York and Hong Kong. 
However, low productivity, unskilled management, higher 
interest rate and higher electricity cost meant higher price 
and a lack of competitiveness in the foreign market. 
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Inspite of these facts, export was possible through the 
Government making up for the higher cost. The U. S. regarded 
Korea as a good offshore assembly base and Motorola (1966), 
Signetics Fairchild Semiconductor, Data control (1967) moved 
into Korea followed by a Japanese joint venture with Korea. 
As a result, 80.8°ä of total bonded process was in the hands 
of foreign enterprises in the late 60s. In 1969, 
Electronics Industry Promotion Law was introduced 
recognizing this industry as a "strategic export industry" 
with its own eight year plan. 
One interesting phenomena (which was also observable in the 
textile industry) was that medium size firms employing 400 
to 500 workers suffered from insufficient economies of 
scale. They were less efficient by 50% compared with bigger 
firms but at the same time 25% less compared with smaller 
firms. However, the total number of employees in the 
industry grew 919% in less than 10 years. Gradually, foreign 
enterprises withdrew due to higher labour cost and domestic 
investment grew with Government backing. (table 3-6) 
Additional to its support in terms of finance and various 
other policies, the Government also created the Korea 
Institute of Electronics Technology in 1976 which develops 
and designs circuits and maintain a branch institute in 
Silicon Valley in the U. S.. In 1987, Korea's total output 
of electronic equipment and components amounted to $10.6 tin 
(ex-factory prices). It also claims to have about 20% of 
the US market for VCRs. The Government hopes to obtain 7% 
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of the world electronic equipment market by the end of next 
decade. Korea has already started building production 
plants abroad. Goldstar has a plant in the US making TVs, 
microwaves and VCRs. In West Germany, it produces TVs and 
VCR while Samsung will soon open"a production plant in the 
D. R. for microwaves and possibly VCRs. 
T. Michell (1984) describes the development of the 
electronic industry in four stages. 
Stage 1: Assembly for local market 
Stage 2: Direct Foreign Investment 
Stage 3: Domestic mastery of existing process technology 
licencing 
Stage 4: Producing at the frontier of existing technology. 
If we use these stages to describe the development of the 
whole industry, Korean industries must be distributed 
between stages 2 and 3 facing now the real challenge of 
competing with firms in developed countries. 
3.3 The Financial Sector 
The Korean financial market consists of three different 
groups. The official banking sector consisting of the five 
commercial banks and special banks such as the Korean 
Exchange Bank and the Medium and Small Industry Bank. This 
official banking sector was highly controlled until 1982 
when a gradual deregulation program was adopted. The 
commercial banks were given policy guidelines on which they 
assessed the worthiness of any loan to be made. This meant 
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that credit rationing was severe in some non-export oriented 
sectors leading to some general distortion of the economy. 
The second group consisting of Non-Monetary Financial 
institutions were less severely controlled. These comprise 
Development institutions like the'Korea Development Bank and 
the Export-Import Bank of Korea, Savings Institutions like 
the Credit Unions, Mutual Savings and Finance Company, Life 
Insurance Companies, and finally Investment companies like 
the Korea Securities Finance Corporations. Thirdly, there 
exists a securities Market consisting of the Korea Stock 
Exchange and Securities companies. Unofficially, a fourth 
group exists in the Korean financial sector, the unorganized 
curb market. The securities market played little role until 
the mid 80s whereas the curb market and the Non-Monetary 
Financial institutions added much needed flexibility to the 
Korean financial market. Their respective interest rates 
are shown in table 3-7. 
3.3.1 Deregulation in the Financial Market 
Since 1982 when the Government embarked on gradual financial 
deregulation, partly forced by a financial scandal where 
high officials were found to be involved, the curb market 
shrunk while Non-Monetary Financial Institutions were 
greatly encouraged to grow. Only the official banking 
sector was left sitting with all the bad loans and ailing 
companies as a by product of Government intervention in the 
financial market. The insignificant role played by the 
Stock Market in Korea meant that private funds were 
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channelled to highly speculative property markets. The rapid 
changes of ownership within the Korean property market not 
only provided an evidence of this speculative behaviour but 
also raised the price of properties to such an extend that 
it became very difficult for average income group workers to 
buy their own houses. This led the Government to impose 
strict regulations at various stages in the early 80s on the 
property market in an attempt to reduce distortion within 
the market. Policies included high taxes on ownership of a 
second property. 
The reduction of the size of property market and the curb 
market meant that funds had to find another outlet; the 
official financial market. The bond market has been growing 
rapidly in recent years. The total listed public sector 
bonds rose from W 2496 bn in 1982 to W 8638 bn at the end of 
last year. Corporate bonds grew from W 3303 bn to W 10028 bn 
over the same period. The Government is also committed to 
expand the Korean equity market, even to the point of 
virtually forcing companies to go public. In 1986,13 
companies obtained new listings on the Korean Stock Exchange 
followed by another company in 1987. The stock price index 
rose from 79.85 in 1975 to 924.3 in March 1989. In fact, 
the stock price index in 1985 was only 163.37. It then 
increased to 272.61,525.11 and 831.12 in the following 
consecutive years. Therefore, the actual significant take 
off of the stock price level began in 1986 when Korea began 
to experience significant trade surplus. The exchange rate 
(won/US $) went up from 890.2 in 1985 to 861.4 and 792.3 to 
reach 680.6 in January 1989. With the interest rate 
44 
relatively fixed at 10.0% (on time deposits), the 
improvement in international political situations, 
especially with Russia and China reducing the threat from 
the North, brought an optimism to the stock market in Korea. 
On top of these positive political circumstances, Korea 
announced that it had accepted the obligation of Article 
VIII, section 2,3, and 4 of the IMF's Article of Agreement 
on Nov 1988. Members accepting the obligations of Article 
VIII undertake neither to impose restrictions on the making 
of payments and transfer for current international 
transactions nor to engage in discriminatory currency 
arrangements. Free international capital flow, gradually to 
be accepted in stages until 1992 implies that foreign 
investors may greatly increase their participation in the 
Korean stock market, raising its price index still further. 
This expectation has its roots in two grounds. First, the 
price earnings ratio (which is defined as the closing price 
of a stock divided by its earning usually of the most recent 
twelve months) is still much lower in Korean stock market 
(only 13.5) as against 60 in the Japanese stock market and 
about 20 in New York and London markets. Secondly, with 
Hong Kong's uncertain future, some funds may be channelled 
partly into the Korean stock market out of Hong Kong. 
These inflows of capital will put even higher pressure on 
the Government monetary policy to keep down inflation. 
Already, the Government has issued bonds known as the 
"Monetary Control Bonds" and made mandatory sales to 
institutional investors. The Monetary Control Bonds already 
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amounts to US $ 6.8 bn in January 1989 and are expected to 
grow further with the continuing trade surplus. 
3.3.2 Two Sources of Inefficiency 
Two of the characteristics of the Korean stock market has 
been the existence of "Otte", a word derived from Japanese 
meaning "Big Hands" and Government intervention. The former 
is a group of investors who have unofficial links among 
themselves shifting jointly their portfolio holdings from 
one to the other such as to affect the price level. They 
buy heavily a particular type of shares only to resell 
quickly once the market is set in motion. Table 3-8 shows 
the different shareholders and their respective holdings 
while table 3-9 shows the distribution of share-ownership in 
size. We observe that a mere 1.3% of the total agents have 
almost 70% of the total market share. If there is some 
unofficial collective link even between some of the 10246 
shareholders holding 10000 shares and more, we will observe 
a large change in the stock price level. 
Now that the stock market has become an important financial 
institution in the economy and that free capital movement is 
expected in few years time, the level of Government 
intervention is reduced gradually the problem of Big Hand 
remains. As the volume of total wealth in the stock market 
increases, their influence will diminish. However, their 
existence in the stock market for the last two decades are 
bound to leave traces behind. Furthermore, investors who 
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joined the stock market forced out of the highly speculative 
curb market and the property market will be determined to 
continue their old practices of making quick profit in a 
short time, in the stock market. These factors will push 
investors into myopic behaviour, highly speculative of what 
other investors will do at the next instance. 
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4. Conclusion 
We first outlined four characteristics of NICs in terms of 
the state variables: real GDP growth, foreign debt, 
unemployment and Balance of Payment showing that Korea 
qualified as a representative country of NICs. NICs have 
enjoyed a relatively high GDP growth rate while being left 
with large foreign debt, low unemployment and a Balance of 
Payment deficit. In line with some other NICs, Korea enjoyed 
a rapid economic growth as a result of centrally planned and 
controlled Government policy and a firm grip of the 
authorities on limited financial resources. Export oriented 
firms were encouraged with low or even negative real 
interest payments on borrowing to finance new investments. 
Strategic industries were chosen, set up and promoted under 
various legistlations. First target industry was textile, 
then light manufacturing industries, heavy and chemical 
industries and finally electronic industries were greatly 
encouraged. Each industry took about five to ten years to 
establish itself. The economy continued to change in the 
80s. First came the deregulation of the financial market 
followed by a trade surplus in 1986, The former led to an 
extensive expansion of the financial market while the latter 
led to more open competition with foreign firms. The size 
of the economy has become too large for the Government to 
centrally control all aspects of the economy, and a trend 
towards a more laissez-faire attitude became inevitable. 
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This thesis attempts to provide a theoretical model on one 
aspect of the economy it encounters under this new trend. 
It will attempt to address the question of optimal strategy 
for a firm in competition against a firm in an 
Industrialized country. In particular, it will examine 
various licensing rules and possibility of leap frogging 
under different conjectures. 
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5. Strategy and Competition 
The extensive study of the theory of oligopoly has not 
only been the result of an attempt to describe the real 
market structure but also the realization of the 
importance of individual firm's strategic decisions on 
the market equilibrium-and the dynamics of evolution of 
the market structure itself. Based on such three-fold 
findings, the fundamental problem theorists encountered 
was what assumptions to make on an individual firm's 
conjecture on others, which variable to choose as the 
firms' strategic variable and how to accommodate the 
evolving market structure, thus intrinsically dynamic 
model, into a certain static model. 
The two most frequently used strategic variables were 
quantity and price levels associated with the names of 
Cournot (1838) and Bertrand (1883) respectively. Their 
contribution was, however, not so much their particular 
choice of strategic variable but the introduction of the 
notion of firms' conjecture of other firms behaviour as a 
response to their own actions. 
Using a symmetric duopolyl) model where goods are assumed 
to be homogeneous, Cournot assumes that firms determine 
their output level taking the prevailing output level of 
its rival as constant. In other words, a firm's 
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conjecture about its rival's reaction in response to its 
own action, expressed in terms of a conjectural 
variation, is zero. Bertrand, on the other hand believed 
that entrepreneurs controlled prices while using 
inventories to smooth sales. This means that each firm 
will try to undercut each other leading to a price war. 
The only stable equilibrium price level for both firms 
would be at their marginal cost level. When prices are 
equal to their marginal costs for a homogeneous 
commodity, one unit increase in the quantity supplied by 
one firm must lead to an one unit decrease in the 
quantity supplied by its rival. This may be denoted as a 
conjectural variation of minus one. This shows that in 
whatever strategic variable the value of the conjectural 
variation of a model is expressed, it may be translated 
in terms of another strategic variable yielding a 
different value of conjectural variation for the same 
modelt). It turns out to be that both Cournot and 
Bertrand competition are each extreme cases within 
noncooperative competition3) with respect to their choice 
of conjectural variation since the former assumes zero 
while the later assumes minus one implying a conjecture 
of one to one replacement of commodities by a firm in 
response to the other. Under Cournot competition, price 
level will be higher than the marginal cost with a 
smaller output supplied to the market. While under 
Bertrand competition, price level will equal to the 
marginal cost with a larger volume supplied to the 
market, given a downwards sloping demand curve. The 
reason for this difference is because under Cournot 
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competition, each firm behaves like a monopolist with 
given residual market share after deducting other firms 
shares while under Bertrand competition, the "price war" 
leads to the same outcome as the perfectly competitive 
equilibrium. 
Vives (1985) examined the efficiency of Bertrand and 
Cournot equilibria under a differentiated product market. 
His findings was that given a symmetric demand structure 
and unique Bertrand and Cournot equilibria, the Cournot 
competition yields a higher profit and price with a 
smaller quantity level. He also found that as the number 
of differential products grew, both equilibria converge 
to the efficient outcome. From a different aspect, 
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) argue that failure to 
explain industrial concentration arose from the almost 
exclusive attention given to quantity setting models 
rather than prices. The latter, yielding an upwards 
sloping reaction functions, provide a better theoretical 
justification as why merging may lead to higher price and 
profit levels. They state that the quantity setting 
models are useful only in that they provide a better 
insight into complex price setting model as shown by 
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). 
With the development of a wider usage of conjectures, the 
notion of Equilibrium had to evolve to accommodate the 
different circumstances of the market. A conjectural 
equilibrium is obtained when solving simultaneously the 
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first order conditions of firms' objective functions 
obtained under the assumption of profit maximization4). 
The Cournot equilibrium is characterized by a vector of 
output levels upon which no single firm can unilaterally 
improve its profit. Therefore, a conjectural equilibrium 
is the Cournot equilibrium if conjectures in terms of 
output levels are zero. 
The Nash equilibrium, on the other hand, is characterized 
by a vector of any of the possible strategic variables 
upon which no single firm can unilaterally improve its 
profit level by altering the strategic variable over 
which it maximized its profit in the first place. 
Therefore, a Nash equilibrium, obtained under the 
strategic variable of output level corresponds exactly to 
a Cournot equilibrium. 
5.1 Consistent Conjectures 
In an attempt to reduce this potentially many equilibria 
into a narrower band of equilibria, possibly into a 
unique equilibrium, rationality has been imposed on the 
behavioural assumptions of firms. This requires that a 
firm's conjecture about its rival's response to changes 
in its own decision variable must be equal to the actual 
responses of its rivals. Therefore a consistent 
(rational) conjectural variation is said to prevail if 
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this rationality assumption is imposed on firms 
behavioural assumption. 
Laitner (1980) in an attempt to reduce the multiplicity 
of equilibria under conjectural models of oligopoly 
proposes two notions of rationality. The first notion, 
based on a static analysis is called rational at a 
certain output vector if predictions firms make on each 
others reactions in response to small changes in their 
own actions are satisfied. In other words, a firm will 
expect its rival to change its output level only in the 
direction of higher profit for itself. Therefore, the 
definition is satisfied as long as changes in each output 
levels brought increase to both profit levels. The second 
notion is based on a discrete dynamic model with positive 
cost of adjustment such that initial conditions as well 
as the evolution of output levels become important and 
nontrivial. A rational conjecture is said to prevail if 
the anticipation of a firm brought by an output change 
over time under profit maximizing objectives with the 
anticipation of its rival's dynamic output changes as a 
response to its own action is satisfied. Laitner proves, 
that under such a dynamic equilibria, multiplicity is 
further reduced but uniqueness of existence still not 
obtained. 
Ulph (1983), on the other hand, claims that the problem 
of multiplicity of solutions under rational conjectures 
rests fundamentally on the weak specification of the 
definition of rationality. He begins his model by 
56 
defining a general notion of conjecture where an 
equilibrium is an output vector at which neither firm 
would be able to increase profit by changing their 
output given their "beliefs" about their rival's 
response. Since the equilibrium is based on beliefs, it 
leaves the possibility that it may be a false belief. In 
an attempt to verify their beliefs, each firm would have 
to engage in real changes to see the response of their 
rivals. An improvement in their belief of conjecture is 
obtained if firm i, say, can verify that firm j would be 
willing to produce the output level that firm i 
conjectures as a response to firm i changing its output 
level. This would only arise if firm j obtains at least 
as high a profit level by moving to the new output level 
given its conjecture about how firm i would then in turn 
respond. The implication of this definition is that firm 
j does not play strategically against i. If it were so, 
then firm j should have chosen a particular response 
which could lead i to hold conjectures favourable to j 
rather than respond passively. Therefore, if conjectures 
were to take such strategic considerations, the formation 
of conjectures would have to be altered and the 
definition of rationality correspondingly re-formulated. 
The extreme side of the argument comes from Bresnahan 
(1981) and Perry (1982) who claim that the solution is 
unique under rationality assumption. Bresnahan, by 
equating the conjectural variation of a firm with the 
reaction function of its rival, showed that under 
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homogeneous product and constant marginal cost, Bertrand 
equilibrium is the unique consistent conjectures 
equilibrium (CCE). If on the other hand, the assumption 
of perfect substitutability is relaxed, CCE lies between 
Bertrand and Cournot but could still be unique. 
Therefore, under any given model structure, consistent 
conjecture will yield a unique equilibrium, although not 
identical in each case. 
Perry (1982) examines consistent conjectural variation in 
a duopoly model with a homogeneous product. He defines 
consistency to prevail if the conjectural variation of 
one firm about its rival's response is equivalent to the 
derivative of its rival's reaction function with respect 
to its own output at equilibrium. He then examines the 
various cases of model structure with respect to cost and 
number of firms in the market: constant marginal cost, 
increasing and falling marginal cost and finally fixed 
and free entry situations. Not surprisingly, with 
identical definition of consistency as Bresnahan, he 
obtains the result of uniqueness too. 
Kamien and Schwartz (1983) also derive the result that 
under homogeneous products and linear demand function, 
the Bertrand solution is the consistent solution in a 
symmetric duopoly model. Then, generalizing the demand 
functions, they show that each different formulation of a 
demand function yields a different conjectural variation 
with homogeneous products. This result is compatible 
with the result obtained by Perry and Bresnahan that 
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under each given unique model structure, there is only 
one conjectural variation which is consistent. 
The problem evolving 
not only restricted 
equilibrium but also 
itself. As just 
conjectures equilibr 
Bertrand equilibrium. 
from unanimous. 
around consistent conjectures was 
to multiplicity or uniqueness of 
to the nature of the equilibrium 
illustrated, unique consistent 
ium is usually associated with 
However, even this seem to be far 
Daughety (1983) claims that there are actions other than 
the rational conjecture each firm can take, which will 
guarantee them higher profit. He claims that if firms 
are rational, then their rationality should be expressed 
in choosing an action which guarantees positive profit 
[e. g., Stackelberg followers)) rather than zero profit 
which would result under consistent conjecture. His 
argument is based on his definition of consistent 
conjectures equilibrium. He defines a consistent 
conjectures equilibrium to be an equilibrium at which no 
individual changes in a decision variable is profitable. 
Therefore, the Bertrand conjecture is not a consistent 
conjectures equilibrium. By setting up a model where 
each firm has to solve an infinite regress problem, i. e., 
firm i maximizes its profit level subject to the 
maximizing behaviour of firm j, which in turn will be 
based on the maximizing behaviour of firm i and so on. 
He then proves that the Cournot equilibrium is the 
consistent conjectures equilibrium. 
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5.2 Choice of Strategic Variable 
Returning to the former part of the question as to which 
variable to select as the strategic variable, recent 
development in oligopoly theory have provided some degree 
of advances in this matter. There has been a general 
trend away from a single stage game and towards multi- 
stage games in the analysis of firms' behaviour under 
oligopolistic market conditions. A multi-stage game 
arises when firms have to consider more than one 
strategic variable when maximizing their objective 
functions. Each stage game usually involves determination 
of the level of one strategic variable. The outcome of 
one stage within a multi-stage game may influence the 
equilibrium of other stages as the decision in each stage 
of the remaining game will influence a firm's strategic 
position in the remaining stages in relation to other 
firms. 
This general trend appears to have arisen due to the 
gradual realization of the complexity of the real 
structure of industries and the weakness of oligopoly 
theory to explain the behaviour of firms only in terms of 
a single stage competition involving the determination of 
only one strategic variable. Therefore, recent works have 
focused their analysis not only on the traditional 
strategic variables such as price or quantity level but 
also on the determination of capacity and the choice of 
product, one element of which is the quality level. This 
means that the timing of decisions and information 
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receptions are as important as the nature of the 
decisions themselves, leading to changes in the outcomes 
of duopoly analysis precisely because each stage of a 
multi-stage game is not independent of outcomes of other 
stages. 
A multi-stage game gave rise to a new notion of 
equilibrium known as "Perfect Equilibrium"s). Since most 
multi-stage games used in oligopoly theory do not revise 
their planned strategy after each stage have been 
played, they are open loop strategies. Therefore, a 
Perfect Equilibrium in a open loop strategy is defined by 
Shaked and Sutton (1982) as follows: 
"An n tuple of strategies is a Perfect Equilibrium, if 
after any stage, that part of the firms' strategies 
pertaining to the game consisting of those stages which 
remain, form a Nash Equilibrium in that game. " (Shaked 
and Sutton (1982) P3) 
The definition of Perfect Equilibrium requires that the 
last game be planned first, working recursively backwards 
and that it does not allow non-credible threats to be 
made. The equilibrium at each stage of the game, if 
Perfect Equilibrium is to prevail for the multi-stage 
game, is said to be sub-game Perfect Equilibrium. The 
difference between a single period game and multi stage 
game lies in that the former requires simultaneous 
equilibria in, all relevant variables while the latter 
considers the equilibrium of each variable in sequence 
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such that the first stage game equilibrium serves as the 
initial condition of the next stage game. Therefore, a 
multi stage game equilibria may be regarded as refinement 
of Nash equilibrium of a single period game. 
We have categorized some of the recent literatures using 
multi-stage games in their analysis of firm's behaviour 
into two groups. The first group assigns the capacity 
level as the strategic variable for the first stage of 
the multi-stage game while the later stage considers the 
levels of the product quality. But first, we outline a 
two stage game under imperfect information which differs 
from other works in its characterization of the different 
stages. 
Among the literature on imperfect information assumptions 
(e. g., Schmalensee (1982), Wolinsky (1983), Shapiro 
(1982) and Klein & Leffler (1981)). Schmalensee is unique 
in introducing a two stage game. His work is based on 
empirical findings, in which later entrants to a market 
must be able to offer distinct benefits, and not just 
lower prices, if they are to overcome the pioneering 
brands. Unlike a standard duopoly analysis, he 
introduces two stages where each firm passively 
participates in turn, i. e., they lack active game 
theoretic interaction in product competition. The first 
firm introduces a pioneering brand in the first stage of 
the game while the second firm enters the market in the 
second stage. Both brands are assumed to have identical 
cost structures. It is the imperfect information of the 
62 
consumer on the quality of the product that plays a 
decisive role in giving the pioneering brand an advantage 
over the second brand. Since consumers are uncertain 
about the second brand being introduced into the market, 
they have strong inclination to-keep to the pioneering 
brand. This result is obtained despite the fact that 
consumers have initially some subjective probability that 
a new brand may yield higher than their expected quality 
level for each price level. To be more precise, he 
categorizes products either as "work" or "don't work". 
Therefore, a high value of expected quality level for 
each price implies that a product "works". The fact that 
consumers have tested the quality of the pioneering 
product and found out that it works is sufficient for 
them to keep their initial choice of brand. Elimination 
of this assumption of imperfect information would lead 
the model in its second stage back to the standard 
duopoly equilibrium. 
Other works have two strategic variables in their model, 
e. g., price and quality level. Instead of adopting a two 
stage game, their analysis are based on one period 
competition determining a combination of price/quality 
level. In particular, Wolinsky provides a model in which 
firms are capable of producing products at different 
quality levels. Consumers are assumed to have imperfect 
information. They have only partial knowledge of the 
quality of a firm's product. Then a notion of fulfilled- 
expectation equilibrium is introduced at which all price 
signals are such that each firm's profit maximizing 
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quality is what is being signalled by its price. This is 
attained because the availability of the information on 
the quality of firms, though imperfect, would enable some 
consumers to detect lower quality. A firm with 
sufficiently high mark up even under the fulfilled- 
expectation equilibrium condition would then want to 
avoid the consequent loss of sales by not providing a 
quality level signalled by its price level.. Perfect 
information would reduce this model back to a standard 
vertically differentiated oligopoly market. 
Under the perfect information assumptions, Kreps & 
Scheinkman (1983), Eaton & Grossman (1984) and Ireland 
(1986), introduce two stage games. It is a perfect 
information model in the sense that consumers know the 
quality level of the product while demand functions are 
fully revealed to firms. The former two articles assign 
the capacity level as determining the marginal cost (or 
productive efficiency) in the first stage, which in turn 
provides the basis of competitiveness in the next stage 
game of marketing the product. The last article, 
however, introduces the capacity level as a restriction 
on the potential quantity supplied at the next stage game 
of price competition. 
Ireland (1986) introduces a two stage game in which firms 
decide on R&D expenditure in the first stage, the level 
of which will then determine the unit variable cost of 
production. At the second stage, product marketing takes 
place. He then argues that i) firms will choose price 
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level rather than quantity as their strategy variable, 
because of the assumption of unlimited capacities and 
differentiated product, ii) the possibility of a Nash 
equilibrium is minimal while a price-setting Stackelberg 
leader will emerge. The result of the second argument is 
obtained due to a specific assumption on consumers which 
give rise to a discontinuous demand system. He defines 
one group of consumers as r-class who simply buy the 
cheaper product irrespective of quality difference. A 
price war occurs as firms attempt to attract this r-class 
group until the firm with a slightly high cost function 
will opt for a smaller sales volume at a higher price. 
This will then lead other firm to raise the price level 
until another price war sets in, i. e., an Edgeworth 
cycle7). This disequilibrium cycle of price competition 
prevails unless a certain condition, e. g., a particular 
pair of marginal costs, necessary for the existence of 
Nash equilibrium in this model is attained. Then, in a 
repeated game, a Stackelberg leader may emerge as this 
would benefit both firms compared to remaining in a 
disequilibrium cycle. Suppose one firm has a lower cost 
of production. The other firm will realize that once a 
price war sets in, it would not win due to the higher 
cost. Therefore, despite knowing that a slight reduction 
of its price would yield higher profit, it would not do 
so because of its conjecture of the other firm's 
reaction. 
Eaton and Grossman (1984) present a model with two stages 
of game in which firms invest in a level of capacity 
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other than that which minimizes cost. This is attained 
as they assume that capacity investment behaviour in the 
first stage will determine the total cost of production 
in the second stage. Therefore, in order to alter the 
nature of the second stage competition, a particular 
level of investment is chosen which does not necessarily 
correspond to a minimizing cost level. The level of 
investment serves implicitly as a signal of each firm's 
strategy. Thus, they identify two motives for this 
divergent behaviour; to obtain a better strategic 
position at the next stage and to effect a reduction in 
capacity investment by rivals. They find that firms have 
incentives to overinvest as the conjectured response by 
their rivals in the marketing stage exceeds the actual 
response or if they believe that overinvestment itself 
will induce their rivals to opt for smaller capacity. As 
special cases of their work, conjecture based on Cournot- 
Nash will lead to overinvestment in capacity as shown by 
Brander and Spencer (1983) while a Bertrand conjecture 
will lead to an underinvestment as shown by Bulow, 
Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1983). Finally, only if both 
firms rightly perceive each other's conjectures will they 
revert back to the cost minimizing level of capacity 
investment. 
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) employ a two stage 
competition in an attempt to reinterpret the notion of 
Cournot as against Bertrand competition. By expressing 
their view that a realistic view of competition contains 
more than one stage of competition, they introduce the 
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capacity level as their strategic variable 'in the first 
stage followed by the second stage competition in price 
determination. Since firms cannot produce more than 
their capacity level decided upon in the first stage, the 
choice of capacity level determines the outcome of the 
second stage game. With an increasing cost function for 
capacity installation, each will attempt to set their 
price such as to sell nearest to its capacity level but 
at the same time, high enough to cover the capacity 
installation cost. With product homogeneity assumption, 
it follows that the firm with lowest price will sell the 
minimum of full capacity output and demand at its price 
level, while the other firm will sell the minimum of full 
capacity output and the maximum of zero and demand at its 
price level minus the full capacity output level of the 
other firm. The level of capacity is determined under 
zero conjectures. Unlike the standard Cournot 
assumption, however, the price level is not determined by 
an auctioneer, but by a Bertrand competition where actual 
production of products are assumed to take place at zero 
cost. They then prove that when capacities correspond to 
Cournot competition in the first stage, price levels in 
the second stage will in fact be the Cournot price, i. e., 
the price level they would have obtained under an 
auctioneer. As special cases of this work, Levitan & 
Shubick (1972) proved the existence of a subgame 
equilibrium for symmetric capacity levels while Dasgupta 
and Maskin (1982) established the existence of subgame 
equilibrium for all pairs of capacity levels. Kreps and 
Scheinkman did not escape criticisms, particularly with 
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respect to their strong findings that a subgame perfect 
equilibrium of their two stage game corresponds to an one 
stage Cournot competition. Eaton and Harrald (1988) 
points out that their result is sensitive to the 
rationing rule of the second 'stage game they employed. 
By comparing their analysis with that of Edgeworth, they 
show that under a linear demand function and small 
marginal cost relative to the price level at zero 
quantity, there is no rationing rule as such. 
Brander & Spencer (1983) and Shaked & Sutton (1982) 
suggest the quality level of the product as their 
strategic variable for the first stage of the competition 
prior to the marketing stage game. The former adopts a 
Cournot approach while the later uses a Bertrand approach 
in their duopoly model at the final stage of the game. 
Although their approaches to the analysis of supply 
exhibit similarities, their objectives have a number of 
differences. Like the work by Eaton and Grossman, 
Brander and Spencer show that strategic use of R&D will 
increase the total amount of R&D undertaken. By 
introducing a symmetric two-stage Nash duopoly model, 
they also show that firms output will be higher, 
accompanied by a lower profit compared to a non-strategic 
use of R&D and simple cost minimizing behaviour of 
firms. If one firm alone uses R&D strategically, it 
can increase both its output and profit at the expense of 
other firms. However, if all firms attempt to influence 
the final outcome, there is a tendency for output to be 
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higher and profit and prices to be lower than in a 
corresponding industry without strategic R&D. 
Shaked and Sutton (1982) presents an analysis based on a 
three stage non-cooperative game. Stage one involves 
decision of individual firm's entry. The second stage 
involves choice of quality level while the last game is 
on price determination. They apply the concept of a 
Perfect Equilibrium to the three stage game. They 
introduce a continuum of consumers homogeneous except in 
income t while income itself is assumed to be uniformly 
distributed on some support 0<a _< t5b. Each consumer 
is supposed to buy exactly one unit or nothing while 
firms produce one product quality each. Assigning a 
parameterized utility function u(t, k) = ui t to consumers 
where uk represents the utility level obtained by 
consuming product k supplied by firm k, they prove that 
under the restriction 2a < b< 4a, exactly two firms will 
have positive market share at the equilibrium which will 
exhibit two distinct product qualities and prices. This 
result for the third stage of the game (price 
competition) is obtained as competition between high 
quality products drives down the price level such that 
even the lowest income group would not purchase the lower 
quality products and the fact that consumers with income 
t> tk strictly prefer good k at price Pk to k-1 at Pk-i. 
Assuming subgame perfect equilibrium, the second stage 
game on quality competition is equivalent of finding a 
Nash Equilibrium in qualities on the basis of payoffs 
determined by the subsequent price level competition. 
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They show that firms will produce different quality 
product from each other by using two properties of the 
Revenue function: the revenue of the firm producing 
higher quality product is greater than the other and the 
revenue of both firms increase if the firm. producing the 
higher quality product increases its quality' level 
further. They then proceed to prove that for more than 
two firms in the market, there will only be one firm left 
producing top quality product at zero mark-up, i. e., zero 
because cost of production is assumed to be zero. The 
reason is that for more than two firms in the market, 
competition in the quality choice will drive all firms to 
set the same top quality while price will therefore be 
driven to zero. It follows that the most efficient firm 
will survive. 
Hung and Schmitt (1988) continue the subject of vertical 
product differentiation and introduce additional features 
to Shaked and Sutton, namely production costs and 
sequential entry of firms. Their cost function are such 
that the first entry firm pays only a fixed amount F1 to 
produce a product of a quality 8i. The second entry firm 
will have to pay Fz(Oi). F2 is an increasing function of 
8i. The existence of positive cost of entry and the 
quality choice implies that b> 2a is no more a 
sufficient condition because firms may not cover their 
costs and secondly, the first entry firm may deter entry 
of other firms. The degree of deterrence is determined in 
the second stage of the game. tinder the same restriction 
of 2a <b< 4a, existence of only two firms in the 
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market, quality level chosen by each firm is such that 
the second entry firm will have zero profit. For 
situations of more than two firms, the choice of quality 
by the second entry firm is to equate its revenue to its 
cost of entry. In other words, the quality choice of the 
second entry firm is such that no other firm can enter 
while the first entry firm can influence other followers' 
quality choice to its advantage. Furthermore, they prove 
that once the first entry firm opts for entry- 
accommodating equilibrium, (i. e., it chooses a level of 
quality such that other firms can afford to enter), it 
selects the highest product quality. Once threat of 
entry is introduced, they find that the highest product 
quality is not necessarily available on the market but 
depends on the cost structure of potential entry firms. 
This result is attained by examining conditions 
sufficient to adopt an entry-deterrence strategy by the 
first entry firm. 
5.3 R&D and Market Structure 
Developments in the evolutionary process of market 
structure were examined from various different aspects. 
They involved market structure changes due to new entry 
and exit of firms. As initially developed by Bain (1956), 
Modigliani (1958) and Sylos-Lambini (1962) with their 
Sylos Hypothesis based on the theory that the incumbent 
firm will behave in such a manner as to maintain a high 
pre-entry cost level for potential entry even if this may 
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not be a profit maximizing behaviour. Therefore, Sylos 
hypothesis implied an irrevocably-committed policy of 
fixed output. An alternative model, as developed by 
Wenders (1971) and Spence (1977) was based on the Excess 
Capital Hypothesis which allowed the incumbent firm to 
vary its output assuming that the potential entry firms 
base their decision on the capital employed by the 
incumbent firm whereas the incumbent firm adopts a 
capital level above the entry deterring-level. More 
recent articles on this topic includes work by Hung & 
Schmitt (1988) as already discussed before. 
Our attention is focused here, however, on the 
alternative approach to the evolution of market structure 
centering on investment into R&D leading to product or 
process innovation. 
The analysis of innovation and market structure is a long 
standing problem dating back as far as Schumpeter (1943) 
with his remarks on evolutionary processes to include the 
statement: 
., Capitalism, then, is by nature a form or method of 
economic change and not only never is but never can be 
stationary. ... The fundamental impulse that sets and 
keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new 
consumers' goods, the new methods of production or 
transportation, the new markets, the new forms of 
industrial organization that capitalist enter'pr"iso 
create" (Schumpeter 195,9, p 82-83) 
72 
During the last decades, many studies have concentrated 
on this issue, namely around the key concepts of 
preemptive patenting, market leadership and R&D 
competition. Until recently, studies in this area have 
been confined to a single period analysis, leaving market 
structure as endogenously determined by the behaviour of 
the incumbent firm(s) and (would be) followers. 
For example, Scherer (1976) and Kamien & Schwartz (1975) 
explored the causal connection between the degree of 
concentration and R&D efforts on empirical findings. 
Galbraith (1973), on the other hand, examined the long 
run structural changes of industries to depend on 
technology of research and the nature of capital market 
endogenizing even the demand conditions. Dasgupta & 
Stiglitz (1980a) analysed theoretically the positive 
association between industrial R&D expenditure and the 
degree of concentration. They found that the market 
equilibrium sustains an unwarranted number of firms such 
that industry wide, R&D expenditure is excessive despite 
each firm undertaking less than the socially optimal 
level of R&D activity. In Dasgupta & Stiglitz (1980b), 
they develop their model further and examine the effect 
of competition in R&D on the level of research'as well as 
the effect of R&D competition in the product market. 
They found that competition always leads to more research 
than in a pure monopoly and that a monopoly will persist 
by deterring new entry, if the R&D technology is also 
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available to the present monopolist in the product 
market. 
Still on the same subject of R&D competition and first 
mover advantage, Reinganum (1981) adopts a more game 
theoretic approach to this topic. She develops a theory 
of optimal resource allocation to R&D under the 
assumption of uncertain technical advance and in the 
presence of game-playing rivals. In this framework, it is 
assumed that the firm which first perfects the 
innovation, takes the whole market share, i. e., becomes a 
monopolist. Uncertainty in the timing of successful 
innovation induces firms to make contingent plans for R&D 
investment. She then derives the conclusion that Nash 
equilibrium and the socially optimal rates of investment 
in R&D do not coincide. 
As for the specific question of the incumbent firm 
dominating the market persistently, Gilbert and Newbery 
(1982) show that a firm can maintain a monopoly through 
preemptive activity even under many potential entrants. 
As long as the monopoly profit after introducing a new 
product is larger than the total industry profit given a 
rival patents, the monopoly profit from preemptive 
patenting will strictly exceed the monopolist's profit 
with entry of a rival. Given threat of entry, monopolist 
will preemptively patent a substitute and put it even 
into sleep, i. e., innovate but not use it in order to 
prevent potential firms entering the market and making 
use of the substitute. 
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John Vickers (1985), on the other hand, considers the 
case of several incumbent firms. He points out that the 
basis for preemptive patenting leading to persistence of 
monopoly lies in asymmetry of 'incentives between the 
incumbent and the potential entrant. He suggests that 
several incumbent firms may serve as a source for 
breaking this asymmetry of incentives for two reasons. 
Firstly, if there are more than one incumbent firm, the 
gain in preemptive patenting may not exceed the cost 
involved. Secondly, unless incumbent firms have some 
kind of a collusive agreement, there may be a tendency of 
firms opting for a free-rider as entry deterrence may be 
regarded as some sort of a public good. 
Recent attempts to develop a sequential model of a patent 
race include works by Beath, Katsoulacos and Ulph (1987, 
1988), Harris and Vickers (1985,1987), Reinganum (1985) 
and Vickers (1986). Beath, Katsoulacos and Ulph (1988) 
in particular, claim that single period formulation is 
simply incapable of accommodating the dynamic process of 
market leadership or an exchange of leadership. They 
postulate that models which incorporate an explicit 
sequential structure could truly explain the dynamic 
market competition with respect to innovation. They 
argue, for example, that if a firm wins a succession of 
patents, it may then be able to operate as a monopolist 
whereas if it loses, the market may become more 
competitive. Anticipation of such an accumulation of 
market power will have a critical bearing on each firm's 
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valuation of any patent. If there is product innovation 
and only two firms engage in innovation, then increasing 
the patent protection to three periods can result in an 
equilibrium with persistent Bertrand competition while 
increasing the number of firms- in innovation competition 
will lead back to persistent monopoly. 
Reinganum (1985) develops a model based upon a sequence 
of innovations with finite period. Then solving 
recursively from the last sequence and assuming subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium, she shows that there is no 
single persisting dominant firm. This result is obtained 
due to the finite sequence assumption. In the last 
sequence, the incumbent firm has less incentive to invest 
in R&D to speed up new innovation as it is enjoying a 
monopoly profit already. Its rivals, however, have 
nothing to loose when innovating earlier. This will lead 
to a change of leadership. Solving recursively under 
subgame perfect equilibrium then results in 
action/reaction of leadership. 
Vickers (1986), on the other hand, points out that in 
Reinganum's (1985) model, the dynamics of the model does 
not play any role in altering market structure. He 
develops a model in which asymmetry of market structure 
gives rise to asymmetric incentives in each patent race. 
The outcome of each sequence determines the asymmetry of 
market structure of the following sequence. He derives a 
surprising result that greater degree of competitiveness 
in each sequence leads to persistence of monopoly. Since 
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innovation is assumed to arise in the process rather than 
in the product, i. e., cost saving innovation, the 
incumbent firm at one sequence has better position to win 
the next race due to a lower cost of production as this 
will enable the incumbent firm to'change to a lower price 
level. 
5.4 Modelling the Duopoly 
In view of these recent developments in the theory of 
oligopoly, we adopt subgame perfect equilibrium of a two 
stage game to analyse the behaviour of firms in an 
asymmetric duopoly. Each firm is to represent a firm in 
NICs (Korea in particular) and OECD respectively. The 
lack of evidence concerning the behaviour of the Korean 
firm in particular with respect to its conjecture, lead 
to the view that an asymmetric Nash duopoly serves better 
to analyse the real world than a Stackelberg leader and 
follower analysis. 
The asymmetry of the duopoly is based on the following 
findings. Firstly, firms in Korea have enjoyed a lower 
wage rate and production costs due to restrictive 
Government policies on union movements. Being a newcomer 
to the industries has meant that it has been able to 
construct plants in a more efficient manner. Secondly, 
heavy Government subsidies and incentives, such as almost 
free access to financial resources, suggest that 
Government actively encouraged firms to maximize revenue 
77 
rather than profit. The underlying objectives were not 
only to obtain a larger world market share but also to 
obtain foreign currency to finance imported raw materials 
which they needed to produce the export commodities in 
the first place. Thirdly, firms in Korea still lag 
behind in the level of technology and innovation. The 
firms we attempt to describe in this work may resemble 
most closely an electronics firm in Korea, perhaps 
established only one or two decades ago. 
Therefore, in modelling the duopoly, we will assume that 
the firm in Korea has lower cost of production, dual 
objectives and a lower level of quality. Furthermore, 
the exchange rate is assumed to be fixed to unity such 
that price levels do not have to be converted in terms of 
the other nor to a common currency unit. Since some 
firms in Korea, especially those designated as export 
oriented firms, were discouraged or even restricted to 
supply to domestic market, we will assume that the market 
for both firms is restricted to consumers in the 
industrialized country. 
In view of the circumstances firms face in Korea as 
illustrated in the introduction, we will analyse the 
problem of product (quality) selection of the firm in 
Korea and the behaviour of the firm in the industrialized 
country in response to a challenge to its market 
leadership. In the first stage game, we shall assume 
that firms engage in the selection of quality level 
corresponding to which they have to determine their level 
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of investment into R&D. In the second stage of the two 
stage game, we analyse the marketing competition between 
the two firms. 
In chapter 6, we present a basic' duopoly model based on 
Ireland (1987). At this stage, we assume the cost of 
development and innovation to be zero. Since we want 
subgame perfect equilibrium to prevail, we shall first 
analyse the outcome of the second stage of the game, 
namely marketing. 
The problem we outlined before remains, i. e., the choice 
of strategic variable for the marketing stage. Although 
it may be true that Cournot competition, thus the choice 
of quantity as the strategic variable is the dominant 
strategy8), this does not mean that firms in the real 
world will adopt this. 
The outcome of this marketing stage will be different 
depending sensitively on what conjectural variations we 
assume firms to believe. We therefore derive the outcome 
of the second stage game under Cournot competition in 
chapter 7. In the following chapter, we repeat the 
marketing stage in terms of Bertrand competition and 
compare the outcome. The first stage game is analysed in 
each section with and without positive cost of 
development. In chapter 9, we propose an alternative 
solution to this problem; the consistent conjectural 
assumption. We find that given full information and 
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rational firms, the Cournot conjectures equilibrium is 
likely to prevail after all adjustment has taken place. 
In chapter 10, we consider the relationship between the 
leadership and quality competition. We show that the 
decision to stay a leader or a follower depends on 
certain cost conditions. Under Bertrand conjectures in 
the marketing stage, either the incumbent firm keeps its 
leadership or it will be driven out of the market due to 
its higher cost of production. 
In chapter 11, as an extension of the previous chapter, 
we set out various licensing rules and derive a dominant 
strategy. Given such a strategy, we examine the 
possibility of lead frogging and the corresponding market 
structure. 
Finally, the last chapter examines the optimal timing of 
new innovations still under the same topic of market 
leadership. We show that optimal timing depends on the 
initial levels of quality, efficiency in R&D techniques 
and the planning horizon of both firms. 
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6. An Asymmetric Duopoly Model 
We consider a market adapted from Irelands) (1987), where 
consumers have identical tastes and identical information on 
all relevant aspects of the market including the quality 
levels of all products. The only element that distinguishes 
consumers from each other is their level of income. Income 
is assumed to be uniformly distributed with a density of 
unity on the support defined by the interval b? y? 0 where 
y denotes income. Therefore, the total number of consumers 
in the market is b. Furthermore, no two consumers have the 
same level of income while the difference between income 
levels in the ordered sequence of consumers is constant. 
The ordered continuum of consumers with respect to their 
income is such that the ith consumer has a higher income to 
the i-1th consumer. Consumers have perfectly inelastic 
demand functions at unity. In other words, each consumer 
buys only one or zero unit. All products are indivisible 
and can be ranked in terms of a commonly agreed quality 
parameter a such that al > a2 implies product 1 of higher 
quality than product 2. A higher quality level may be 
obtained from a better design, performance or improved 
specification. Therefore, the market in question is a 
vertically differentiated product market. 
Ü1 
6.1 The Consumers 
We assign a utility function to each consumer as follows: 
w(a, p: y) =a (y - p) (6-1) 
Thus, in the (a, p) space, the utility function is a 
rectangular hyperbolic. Note that -under (6-1), we may 
interpret (y-p) also as a composite commodity measured as a 
continuous variable. 
We limit the number of firms in the supply side to two firms 
and exclude the possibility of potential entry of other 
firms. Each firm is producing only one type of product the 
quality of which may vary. Firm 1, to denote the firm in an 
industrialized country, maximizes profit while firm 2, a 
firm in Korea, has dual objectives: maximization of profit 
and revenue as already justified in the introduction. We 
endow firm 2 with a lower cost of production relative to 
that of firm 1. The cost functions are assumed to be linear 
in cost and quantity space with the marginal cost equal to 
the average cost for both firms. 
The objective functions of both firms are thus defined as 
follows: 
Firm 1 Max ni = (pi - ci) qi (6-2) 
Firm 2 Max U2 =s n2 + (1 - s) R2 (6-3) 
where pi : price level of firm i 
ci : cost of production of firm i 
qi : quantity supplied by firm i 
0: s51 
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n2 = (P2 - c'2)q2, R2 = P2q2 and cl > c'2 
Rearranging (6-3) yields 
U2 =S [(1/S)p2 - C'2] q2 
or equivalently as 
Uz = (p2 - c2) q2 
where c2 =s c'2 < cl 
(6-4) 
A fall in s implies that firm 2 is shifting its priority to 
revenue maximization relative to profit. This has the same 
effect as scaling down the cost parameter in its objective 
function. While we assume c'2 < ci (and it follows that c2 
< cl because s <_ 1), we endow firm 1 with a first mover 
advantage into the market such that it may produce its 
product at a higher quality level than- its rival. This 
specification follows from the fact that firms in NICs are 
late comers into markets where firms in industrialized 
countries have already established themselves for a long 
time. At this stage, we assume the cost associated with 
quality improvement to be zero. 
If al represents the quality index of firm 1's product and 
az that of firm 2's product, then for price levels (pi, p2), 
two consumers with income yi and yz such that yi> yz, the 
following must hold: 
1) If pa > pi, both consumers will prefer qi to q2 because 
wi(ai, pi: yi) > wi(a2, p2: yl) and W2(al, pi: y2) > w2(a2, 
p2: y2). This is obvious under the particular specification 
of the utility function, namely that wi(ai, pi: yi) = ai(yi- 
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p1) and w2(a2, p2: y1) = a2(y1-p2). Therefore, if p2 > p1, 
then wi(ai, pi) > wi(a2, p2) for any y. 
2) If a consumer with yz prefers qi, then a consumer with yi 
will prefer qi also. This follows from the fact that if 
al(y2-pi) > a2(y2-p2), then small increase in y2 to yi will 
hold the inequality sign for al > a2. 
3) If consumer with yi prefers qz, then consumer with yz 
will prefer qz also because if a2(yi-p2) > ai(yi-pi), then a 
fall in yi to y2 will hold the inequality sign for al > az. 
Finally, note that if there exists a continuum of consumers 
with respect to their income distributed uniformly with 
density one and the particular utility function as specified 
above, we may define an individual with an income of y* such 
that he is indifferent between good 1 at (ai, pi) and good 2 
at (az, p2). In other words, the following holds: 
al(y* - pi) = a2(y* - p2) (6-5) 
The intuition behind this is that quality may be regarded as 
a general superior good such that higher income groups 
desire higher quality products. Refer to figure 6-1 where 
wi, w2 and w3 represent one particular contour each of the 
utility functions of three consumers with income yi, y* and 
Y2 respectively such that yi < y* < y2. As these contours 
will become perfectly inelastic at their respective income 
levels, the contours with lower income will correspondingly 
be steeper. Suppose that good 1 and good 2 are 
characterized by (pi, al) and (p2, a2) respectively. The 
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contours of the three consumers are chosen such that all 
three pass through (a2, p2). Under (6-5), it follows that 
y* must be such that w2(y*) passes through point (ai, p*) as 
well. Note that the consumer with yi would only choose good 
1 if pi : pil while consumer with income y2 would choose 
good 1 as long as p12 ? p*. Therefore, this tells us that 
for any combination of (ai, p*) and (a2, p2), there must 
always be some individual with income y* such that (6-5) is 
satisfied. 
6.2 The Demand Function 
The endowment of a higher quality for firm 1 allows it to 
take up the share of the market consisting of the higher 
income group. Depending on its combination of quality and 
price level, there will be b-y* consumers who would be 
willing to buy good 1 while the rest of the market is left 
for firm 2 depending on values of (a2, p2). 
In order to derive the demand functions, we first derive y* 
from (6-5) which is given as follows: 
al p1 - a2 P2 
-------------- (6-6) 
al - a2 
Therefore, the sales of firm 1 is given as below: 
al pi - a2 p2 
qi =b- ---------------- (6-7) 
al - a2 
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Note that b denotes the total number of consumers in the 
market. As for firm 2, which is left with a market share of 
y*, it will be able to supply q2 for given values of az and 
p2 where qz = y* - pz. This follows directly from the 
utility function in (6-1) where a2(y*- p2) must be weakly 
positive for consumers to participate in this particlar 
market at all. Therefore, consumers with an income y? pz 
will participate in this market such that the demand for qz 
becomes as follows: 
al pl - a2p2 
q2 - --------------- - P2 (6-8) 
al - a2 
For notational convenience, we define ß= a2/(al - a2) such 
that the demand function (6-7) and (6-8) may be rewritten as 
below: 
ql =b- (1+ß) pi +ß p2 
q2 = (1+ß) (P1 - P2) 
The inverse demand functions are accordingly given by: 
pi =b- ql - 0/(1+ß)q2 
p2 =b- qi - q2 
(6-7') 
(6-8') 
(6-9) 
(6-10) 
Note that the inverse demand functions diverge by the 
difference in the quality level and that they will collapse 
to the same function as a2 approaches a1, i. e., 0 W. If 
this occurs and ci = C2, then we have the standard duopoly 
solution of either a Cournot10) or a Bertrand11) 
competition. Cournot solution will yield pc >c and qc 
where pe = p1 = p2, c= ci = c2 and qc = q1 = q2 whereas 
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Bertrand solution will yield pB =c and qB such that qc < 
qB. We shall consider this case when 13 is finite in the 
following two sections. 
6.3 Two Stage Game 
In particular, we shall consider a two stage non-cooperative 
game to analyse the outcome of this duopoly in which there 
are two strategic variables; price or quantity and quality 
level. In stage 1, firms decide on their value of ai which 
will then provide them with different degrees of 
competitiveness for their next stage game of marketing. 
Since firms' competitiveness depend on the relative quality 
level as is evident from (6-10), we shall use the variable 0 
in the first stage of the game, which is equivalent to using 
al keeping a2 constant or using a2 keeping ai constant. 
As we propose a Perfect Equilibrium to prevail in the 
market, we require a Nash equilibrium under given strategies 
for the second stage competition after firms have determined 
their respective quality levels. We define a Nash 
equilibrium to exist if neither firms could increase their 
own payoffs by deviating from their equilibrium strategies 
given other players use their equilibrium strategies. Stage 
2, will be considered first. In section III, firms will 
maximize their respective objective functions with respect 
to their quantity. We derive a non-cooperative Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium. Then the first stage is analysed where firms 
now predict the choice of quantity in the second stage as 
88 
the Nash outcomes of that game. In chapter 8, firms will 
maximize their objective function with respect to their 
prices in the marketing stage. A Bertrand non-cooperative 
Nash equilibrium is derived. Then, as in the Cournot case, 
the first stage is analysed. -In both the Cournot and 
Bertrand model, the second stage is analysed under the 
assumption that A has already been determined in the 
previous stage. 
6.4 Conclusion 
We have introduced a demand function derived from consumers 
differentiated only by their income level. By restricting 
the income distribution to a constant density function, we 
simplified the demand functions of firms. A non constant 
unitary density function would have required the integral of 
the density function from b to y* for firm 1 of which b- y* 
is a special case. By imposing different endowment 
characteristics to each firm, (higher cost function for firm 
1 relative to firm 2, first mover advantage to firm 1 
allowing first choice of market segment, we have derived the 
inverse demand functions for both firms. 
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7 The Quantity-Setting Model 
The second stage of the game is considered first on the 
assumption that al, a2 and thus ß are already determined. 
Firm 1 and firm 2 maximize ni and U2 with respect to qi 
for i=1,2 respectively. We obtain the first order 
condition for firm 1 as follows: 
dni/dql = (pi-ci) + (dpi/dql) ql =0 (7-1) 
where dpi/dql = 8p1/8ql + (Sp1/Sg2)dq*2/dql 
and dq*2/dq1 is firm 1's conjecture on firm 2's 
response 
In other words, the net change in its own price level (as 
a response to a change in its quantity supplied) is equal 
to the sum of the change of its price level (as a 
response to its own quantity change), and the change in 
quantity of its rival (due to a change in its own 
quantity) multiplied by the change in its own price level 
(due to its rival's change in quantity), which it 
conjectures would be the rival's response to the change 
dql. Under a Cournot competition, dgzc/dql = dgic/dqz = 
0 where superscript c is used to denote Cournot 
conjectures. In other words, the conjectural variation 
expressed in terms of quantity is zero. 
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7.1 The Second Stage Game 
7.1.1 The Demand Function 
Substitute the inverse demand functions (6-9) and (6-10) 
into the objective functions (6-2) and (6-4). From the 
first order condition (7-1), we-obtain for firm 1 the 
following: 
[b-ql-(ß/1+ß)q2-C1]gl =0 
Solving for qi gives us the optimal response quantity by 
firm 1 for each given values of firm 2's output, i. e., 
the reaction function of firm 1. It is given by; 
ql =3 (b-C1) - 3i(0/1+13) q2 (7-2) 
Likewise, for firm 2, we derive the first order condition 
izf -0io obJ+ otive function U2 and solve for qz to obtain 
the reaction function given by: 
q2 = P2 (b-c2) - }2 ql (7-3) 
The reaction function of a firm is the profit maximizing 
output level defined as a function of its rival's output 
level and the slope of which represents the rate at which 
the firm's profit maximizing output will change as a 
response to a change in its rival's output. 
An equilibrium will be established, given these two 
reaction functions, where (qic, q2C) satisfies both (7-2) 
and (7-3), i. e., (q1c, q2C) is the solution to the two 
simultaneous equations. (qic, qzc) is the Cournot Nash 
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equilibrium as qic is the best reply given q2c and vice 
versa. They are given as follows: 
13(b-2ci+c2) +2 (b-ci) 
qic - ------------------------ (7-4) 
4 +313 
(1+13)(b+ci-2c2) 
q2c = ----------------- (7-5) 
4 +3p 
The asymmetry in the cost of production and the first 
mover advantage to firm 1 of this duopoly model are the 
causes of such asymmetric demand functions. If we 
restore the asymmetric assumptions to the standard 
duopoly model, i. e., al = a2, s=1 and ci = C2 = c, 
then qic = q2c _ (b-c)/3 which is the well known 
solution to symmetric Cournot competition. Our 
asymmetric duopoly has infinitely many outcomes depending 
on the relative values of al and a2. We assume at this 
stage that the cost of innovation is zero. 
The possible values of Nash Equilibrium for each value of 
ß is shown in figure 7-1 as the line NN'. The line ri 
denotes the reaction function of firm 1. If the quality 
difference between the two firms is infinite (13 = 0), 
then the reaction function of firm 1 is perfectly 
horizontal implying that the optimal quality level for 
firm 1 is independent of that of firm 2 because of the 
infinitely large quality gap. Irrespective of how much 
firm 2 is willing to supply, firm 1 is not affected as 
all consumers will be trying to buy the product of firm 1 
or else not participate in the market at all. On the 
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other hand, if the quality gap approaches zero, (0 = w), 
the slope of the reaction function of one firm will be 
equal to the inverse of the other. Perfect symmetry of 
reaction functions will not be attained as the different 
cost functions of production - will yield different 
intercepts between the reaction functions and the 
quantity axis. Since ci > C2, we obtain q2c > qic at the 
Nash equilibrium (point N'). r2 denotes the reaction 
function of firm 2. We note that it is not independent 
from the quality differences: the market share of firm 1 
is determined by the value of y* which in turn is 
determined by the values of al, a2, p1, and p2. Firm 2, 
on the other hand, is left with a market share determined 
by y* or b-qi. Therefore, q2 is a function of b, qi and 
p2. But qi is determined by al, a2, pi, and p2. Thus, 
qZ is not only dependent on qi but also dependent 
indirectly on the quality gap via qi. This is why in 
figure 7-1, it appears that r2 is independent of A. This 
is so as ß is expressed via qi and therefore p does not 
appear as a shift parameter of r2. All points along the 
NN' line are possible equilibria for the second stage 
game depending on the actual outcome, al and a2, in the 
first stage game. 
7.1.2 The Price Level 
The corresponding price levels at each potential Nash 
equilibria are then determined by substituting into the 
Cournot quantity levels in (7-4) and (7-5) the inverse 
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demand functions as given in (6-9) and (6-10) 
respectively. They are as follows: 
0(b+ci+c2) + 2(b+ci) 
Pic - ------------------------- (7-6) 
(4 + 30) 
0(b+ci+c2) + (b+cl+2c2) 
p2C - -------------------------- (7-7) 
(4 + 313) 
7.1.3 The Utility Levels 
The utility levels of the firms at possible values of 
Nash equilibria are given by 
[ß(b-2ci+cz)+2(b-c1)J2 
n1 = (pi-cl)gi = ------------------------ (7-8) (4 + 33)2 
. [(1+13) (b+cl-2c2)]2 U2 = (P2-c2)g2 = ----------------------- (7-9) 
(4 + 3ß)2 
Although it is not essential to the main argument, we 
illustrate below a convenient way of reading off the 
utility levels at each possible Nash equilibria 
(corresponding to each difference in the quality levels) 
in the quantity space. The utility levels can be viewed 
as functions of 0 and can also equally well be 
represented on the same diagram as firms' reaction 
functions. By substituting the indirect demand function 
(6-9) into the utility (profit) function (6-3), we obtain 
the utility level of firm 1 in terms of 13, qi and q2 
given by 
n1 = (b-ql-(13/1+13)qz-cl)ql (7-10) 
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Refer now to figure 7-2 where we assume an equilibrium 
value of (qi°, q2°) at point A and a given constant value 
of b. The quantity and price spaces are overlapped in 
such a way that the distance b-D is equal to DOq. This 
does not convey any intrinsic meaning except that it 
simplifies the diagram in a sense we can map the sum of 
q1 and qz into the Pi axis by means of a negatively 
sloped 450 line. In other words, we are trying to denote 
the term in bracket in (7-10) in terms of a distance in 
the Pi axis such that the area represented by that 
distance and the quantity level associated with that 
price level will represent the utility level of firm 1. 
Suppose 0= co or 13/1+0 = 1. This implies that changes in 
q2 are directly offset by a corresponding fall in Pi 
since Pi =b- qi - q2. Therefore, the slope of AB line 
is to represent such a degree of impact on the price 
level. To have an infinitely large value of 13 implies 
that the quality between firm 1 and firm 2 are equal. 
Therefore, a change in q2 is offset by an equal amount of 
fall in Pi. The price level of firm 1 given 13 =w is 
denoted by the distance B'0p. The corresponding profit 
which is obtained by subtracting CiOP from B'Op and then 
multiplying it by EOq is represented by the shaded area 
tt11. On the other hand, if the quality gap between two 
firm's product is infinite, then the line AB collapses to 
AE. The price level is now denoted by E'0F. The 
corresponding price level is represented by the shaded 
area nie. Therefore, given an equilibrium value of 
(glO, qzo), the profit level of firm 1 may vary from nil 
to 712 depending on the quality gap between two products. 
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The analysis changes slightly under the Cournot-Nash 
equilibria where (qic, q2C) themselves are functions of 
13. However, using the figure (7-2), we may show the 
corresponding utility levels of firm 1 for different 
values of A. As already obtained earlier, for ß=0, the 
equilibrium is obtained at (qic, qzc) at point N in 
figure (7-3). For 13 = co, equilibrium is obtained at 
(glcc, q2CC) at point N'. Applying the same analysis as 
before, in figure (7-3), the corresponding utility levels 
at each point may be denoted by the area N"BDF and 
N'B'D'F' respectively. Therefore, firm 1's utility, at 
maximum attains NBDF if its quality level is infinitely 
superior to that of firm 2 while if the quality gap is 
reduced to zero, it will earn a profit of N'B'D'F'. The 
same analysis may be carried out on firm 2. 
We now focus our attention on how each utility level 
changes for different values of quality gap. The 
functions ni and U2 for 13 ?0 are characterized as 
below: 
i) The slope of each function is given by 
dni -4[13(b-2ci+c2)+2(b-ci)](b+ci-2c2) 
----------------------------------- <0 (7-11) 
dA (4 + 3ß)3 
dU2 2(b+ci-2c2)2 (1+0) 
--- - ---------------------- >0 (7-12) 
d(3 (4 + 3ß)3 
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We now assume that b> (5ci -2c2)/6, a necessary 
condition for the following analysis to hold. Then we 
obtain the following inequalities: 
d2ni/dp2 >0; d2U2/dfi2 <0 
where 
d2ni 8(b+cl-2c2)[6(b-2ci+c2)+(6b-5ci-2c2)] 
----- - -------------------------------------- 
dß2 (4+3ß)4 
and d2U2/dA2 =- 2(b+ci-2c2)2(5+63)/(4+33)4 
ii) The limiting values of ni and U2 are as follows: 
lim ni = (b-ci)2/4 
A-J-0 
lim ni = (b-2ci+c2)2/3 
(3-. w 
lim 132 = (b+ci-2c2)2/16 
R-. 0 
lim U2 = (b+cl-2c2)2/3 
Aico 
Therefore, we derive the curvature of utility levels of 
each firm with respect to 0 as in figure 7-4. For Firm 
1, it is optimum if 0-. 0 and for firm 2 if ßý w; i. e., 
widening and closing the gap of quality differentials 
respectively. Firm 1 wants to extend lead and firm 2 to 
catch up. 
As already mentioned earlier, subgame perfect equilibrium 
in a two stage extended game is said to prevail if no 
firm wishes to revise its second stage strategy after the 
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first stage has been completed. For any given values of 
ai and a2, firms correctly anticipate the second stage 
output equilibrium, which is resolved as a Nash quantity 
game as described so far. The first stage equilibrium on 
the other hand is assumed to arise from a Nash game in al 
and a2. Therefore, we obtain a subgame perfect 
equilibrium for this two stage game if the choice of 
optimal strategy as given in (7-4) & (7-5) for the second 
stage game is not reversed depending on the outcome of 
the first stage game. In other words, the Cournot 
equilibrium in quantity will not be reselected after the 
first sub-game on quality choice has been completed. 
7.2 First Stage Game 
Consider now stage 1 of the game. We have already found 
that it is optimal for firm 1 if p tends to zero and to 
infinity for firm 2. A Non-cooperative Nash Equilibrium 
exists if the following four conditions are satisfied; 
(Friedman 1977, chapter 7) 
Al) Number of firms is finite 
A2) The strategy set for each firm is compact, convex 
subset of Rm 
A3) The scalar valued payoff functions are defined over 
all strategic space and is continuous, bounded everywhere 
A4) The payoff functions are strictly quasi-concave with 
respect to strategy space 
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Al) is satisfied as we assume duopoly. A3) and A4) are 
satisfied as we have shown that by differentiating 
equation (8), we obtain as shown in equation (9) and (10) 
that payoff functions (utility levels) are strictly 
concave. A2), however, is not satisfied as the strategy 
set for each firm is from zero to infinity in R1. It 
violates the compactness. Therefore, without any further 
structural assumptions, there does not exist a Nash 
equilibrium for the first stage game.. 
7.2.1 The Reaction Functions 
The reaction function of each. firm is obtained from the 
first order conditions of the objective function as given 
in (7-8) and (7-9) with respect to a1 and 012 
respectively. This is possible as subgame perfect 
equilibrium is assumed to prevail. These first order 
conditions are given by: 
(AA + B)ß 
---------------- =0 (7-13) 
(4+30)3(ai-a2) 
2(1+ß)D2ai 
---------------- =0 (7-14) 
(4+30)3(al-a2) 
where A=b- 2ci +c2 
BB - ci 
D=b+ cl - 2c2 
The corresponding reaction functions of firm 1 is derived 
from 7-13 as al = [(-b+3ci-2c2)/(b-ci)]az where ai is not 
equal to az, ai '_ 0, az ? 0. Otherwise, 7-13 is not 
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defined. Since al > 0, we require 3ci - 2c2> b which is 
not satisfied given sufficiently large value of b. 
Therefore, the reaction function will be the ai axis in a 
(al, az) space. Since ai t a2, ai -'_ 0, a2 2 0. 
Therefore, the reaction function of firm 2 is the a2 axis 
in the (ai, a2) space. Since al t a2, there is no 
equilibrium as already stated above. 
To solve for an equilibrium for the first stage, we 
introduce two alternative restrictions: limiting bounds 
on a and positive cost of quality improvement. 
7.2.2 Limiting Bounds on a 
Suppose that there exist limits in potential development 
capabilities in technology at each given point in time 
such that ai E [. i , ail for i= 1,2 where al > az > al > 
az and al > a2. This comes from the assumption that firm 
1 has first mover advantage over firm 2 in terms of 
technology. As long as cost of innovation is zero, firm 
1 will always choose al while firm 2 will always choose 
a2. In other words, as it costs nothing to produce 
higher quality product, and because relative higher 
quality product will always grant them higher payoff, 
each will choose a higher level. Therefore, the reaction 
function of firm 1 will be the vertical axis in figure 7- 
5 for ai < al < ai and the horizontal lines at al for al 
? gi and at Qi for al < gi while the 450 line will be the 
reaction function of firm 2 for for a2 < a2 < a. 2 and the 
vertical axis at s. 2 and a2 respectively. There exists a 
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Nash equilibrium at a. This implies a positive finite 
value for 3, say B. Then the corresponding quality 
levels are represented by a point somewhere between N 
and N' in figure 7-1. Note that under subgame perfect 
equilibrium, removing the - restrictions on firms 
characteristics, first mover advantage and different cost 
structure, will lead to a standard duopoly result where 
profit levels are shown in (7-8) and (7-9) will revert to 
(b-2ci+c2)/3 and (b+ci-2cz)/3. For ci > c2, and 
homogeneous product, both firms will set their price 
equal to (b+cl+c2)/3 while profit level of firm 2 will be 
higher than that of firm 1 due to a lower cost. 
7.2.3. Positive Cost of Innovation 
Suppose now that firms face cost functions of innovation 
specified as ki = aiai for i=1,2 where ki is the total 
cost of innovation and ai is the marginal cost where ai < 
a2. This specification implies that cost depends on the 
absolute level of technology development and that there 
is no spill over effect, i. e., innovation of technology 
of one firm is not transmitted to the other firm and 
perfect patenting applies. We rewrite the cost function 
in terms of 13 as ki = ai(1+0/j3)a., for i, j=1,2 and i=J. 
Consider the optimal value of innovation ' for firm 1 
first. We keep a2 fixed while we examine the optimal 
level fo r firm 1. This then enables us to work i n terms 
of A as it will be a scalar valued function of'ai. It is 
obtained at ß* (thus at al* for some given value of cx2) 
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where the marginal cost of innovation is equal to the 
marginal benefit, i. e., dni/dß = dki/dp. 
Let A=b- 2c1 + c2 
B=b- cl 
D=b+ci -2c2 
as before, where A=D if cl = c2. 
The marginal condition yields the following: 
-4D[Aß+2B] = (3P+4)3(-aia2/A2) (7-15) 
which may also be expressed as 
(27aia2-4AD)03+(108aia2-8BD)52+36aia2ß+64aia2=O (7-16) 
For each given value of a2, there is an optimal value of 
al which will satisfy equation (7-15). In order to solve 
for al, rearrange (7-15) as 
aia2 = 4D(Aß+2B)02/(3ß+4)3 (7-17) 
The reaction function of firm 1 with positive cost of 
innovation is shown in figure 7-6. Below, we discuss the 
curvature of the reaction function. 
For positive values of 13, aia2 goes to zero as 0-0 
and from the coefficient of 03, we note that it 
approaches 4DA/27 as 13- (n. Furthermore, note that 
differentiating equation (7-17) yields 
da2 4DA(Eß + 16) 
al ----- - ----------------- >0 (7-18) 
d13 (3ß + 4)4 
where E= 6b - 18ci + 12 c2 
The second derivative is obtained as 
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d2a2 - BED{3f32 + 680 - 32} 
al ----- - ----------------------- <0 (7-19) 
d12 (313 + 4)5 
for positive values of ß. The optimum value of 13 for 
firm 1 depends on al and a2. Let ß*i(a2, al) be the 
optimal value of 0 (for firm 1) for each given value of 
al and a2. If we now keep al fixed, then 0* 1= ß* 1 (a2 ) 
since ß1*(a2)=a2/(ai-a2). The reaction function of firm 
1 is obtained by rearranging it as 
ai = {[ß*1(a2) + 17/13*1(a2)) a2 
It is no longer a vertical line. In fact, the slope of 
the reaction function gradually falls; it is a concave 
function with respect to az between the interval 0< a2 <_ 
4DA/27ai as shown in figure 7-6. The concavity arises 
from the fact that dzai/da22 = -[(d(3*)2/da12la2 -2 
dß*/dal < 0. Intuitively, firm 1 will invest more in 
innovation to widen the quality gap as this yields higher 
profit even taking into account the cost of innovation. 
However, as firm 2 increases its quality level further, 
it becomes less profitable for firm 1 to increase its 
investment into innovation as the cost of innovation 
begins to offset the gain from innovation due to the 
higher a2. The potentially maximum quality gap given the 
optimal behaviour of firm 1 for each given level of firm 
2's quality level is obtained at (al', a2') where a2' 
satisfies ß' = a2'/[a1(ß') - a2'], and dai/dß > d2ai/dß2. 
Then for values of a2' < a2 < 4DA/27ai, we have 
deal/da22 < dai/dal while for values of 0< a2 < a2', we 
have deal/daze < daida2. In other words, for each value 
of a2 for 0< a2 < a2', firm 1 invests more in its 
innovation as to widen the quality gap against its rival. 
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The marginal increment in profit due to a small rise in 
the gap is greater than the marginal increment of 
innovation cost. For values of a2 such that a2' < a2 < 
4DA/27ai, the situation is reversed. 
Consider firm 2. Analogous to the case of firm 1, firm 
2's marginal condition states: 
2D2(1+0)3 - azal(4+3ß)3 (7-20) 
which may also be expressed as 
(2D2-27a2ai)133+(6D2-108a2ai)ß2+(6D2-36a2ai)13+2D2-64a2ai=0 
(7-21) 
In order to solve for a2, rearrange 7-20 as follows: 
a2al = 2D2(1+3)3/(33+4)3 (7-22) 
Now, ala2 approaches 2D2/27 as 13--fco and it approaches 
2D2/64 as 0--#0 keeping a2 constant. We obtain the 
optimum value 0*2 as a funtion of al. 
Therefore, the reaction function of firm 2 can be derived 
as a2= {ß*2(a1)/[ß*2(a1)+1]}a1 as shown in figure 7-7. 
For values of 05 al 5 2D2/64a2, a2 is negative which is 
due to the fact that anal = 2D2/64a2 at ß2* =0 and that 
32* becomes negative for values of anal below 2D2/64a2. 
The reaction function of firm 2 is a convex function with 
respect to al. Firm 2 does not invest anything in quality 
improvement of its product until its rival's quality 
level is 2D2/64a2. This is due to the fact that for 
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given values of al < 2D2/64a2, we have a situation where 
the first mover firm 1 has too low a quality such that 
under al> a2 condition, it is not profitable for firm 2 
to invest anything into innovation. The cost of 
innovation will outweigh the corresponding benefit. 
We now prove the above statement algebraically. For ai < 
2D2/64a2, we find that dU2/dal > dU2/dal + dki/dal. In 
other words, a small increase in the quality of firm 1's 
product lowers the utility level of firm 2 by less than 
any compensatory movement by firm 2 in which it will 
incur cost of innovation. 
Consider the following differentials 
dU2/dal =- 2a1D2(1+ß)/[(4+3ß)3(m-a2)2] 
dU2/da2 = 2a2D2(1+0)/[(4+3ß)3(«i-a2)2] 
dk2/da2 =- a2a12/[(1+p)2(a1-a2)2] 
Then 
dU2/dal-dU2/da2=-2a2D2(1+0)(al+a2)/[(4+313)3(al-a2)2] 
(7-23) 
We have to show that equation (7-23) is smaller than 
dk2/da2 (the cost of innovation for firm 2) at a2 = 0. 
-2a2D2(1+13)(a1+az)/[(4+3p)3(ai-a2)2] 
< -a2al2/[(1+ß)2(al-a2)2] (7-24) 
Multiply both sides by (al- a2)2 and write 0 in terms of 
ai and az to yield 
2D2(ai+a2)/azai2 > [(4a1-a2)/ai]3 (7-25) 
Substitute a2 =0 into (3-25) to obtain 
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al < 2D2/64a2 
Therefore, for values of ai < 2D2/64az, the cost of 
innovation for firm 2 is greater than any loss in the 
utility level caused by an increase in al. 
For ai > 2D2/64a2, firm 2 will gradually increase its 
investment into innovation for increasing values of its 
rival's quality level until it reaches 2D2/27a2. At that 
point, firm Z's investment into innovation is equal to 
its rivals. The reason for its gradual increase can be 
explained by the same reason as above where for 2D2/64az 
< ai < 2D2/27a2, it is more profitable for firm 2 to 
invest in innovation to improve its product quality so 
as to not widen the quality gap with firm 1. The 
investment into innovation is less costly than the loss 
of not doing so as al increases steadily. 
7.3 A Numerical Example 
We assign arbitrary values to the exogenous variables 
satisfying condition b> (5c1 - 2c2)/6. The values are 
given as b= 10, cl = 2, c2 =1 and al = a2 = 1. This 
gives A=7, B=8, D= 10 and 4DA/27ai = 8.3,2D2/64a2 = 
2 and finally 2D2/27a2 = 4.8. The following is the 
result of a simple simulation deriving the reaction 
functions: 
Reaction Functions of 
Firm 1 Firm 2 
k, , 
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ai a2 a2 "ai 
00 0 0 
0.1 0 0.1 3.1 
0.6 0 0.6 3.5 
1.1 0.1 1.1 3.9 
1.6 0.3 1.6 4.2 
2.1 0.5 2.1 4.5 
2.6 0.8 2.6 4.8 
3.1 1.2 3.1 5.1 
3.6 1.5 3.6 5.4 
4.1 1.9 4.1 5.6 
4.6 2.4 4.6 5.9 
5.1 3.0 5.1 6.2 
5.5 3.6 5.6 6.5 
6.1 4.3 6.1 7.0 
6.6 5.0 7.1 7.2 
7.1 5.9 7.4 7.4 
7.6 6.8 
8.0 7.8 
8.3 8.3 
They. are plotted in figure 7-8 and approximated into a 
continuous line. This numerical example confirms our 
analytical finding s on both the curvature as well as the 
terminal points of the two reaction functions. 
7.4 Comparative Statics 
By definition, a Non-cooperative Nash Equilibrium is 
attained at the point where reaction functions intersect. 
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The existence of Equilibrium is guaranteed if the 
following condition is satisfied 
4AD/27ai > 2D2/27az (7-26) 
In fact, for ai < az by the assumption that firm 1 has 
the advantage in technology, (7-26) is satisfied. The 
proof is given as follows: Firstly, (7-26) may be 
rewritten as 2a2A > a1D. Substitute for A and D to 
obtain 2a(b-2ci+c2 - ai(b+ci-2cz) > 0. Rewrite it as 
(b-ci)(2a2-ai) + 2c2(a2+al) > 0. Therefore, a2 > ai is 
the sufficient condition for the existence of an unique 
Non-cooperative Nash Equilibrium for this game. One 
particular solution Z is shown in figure 7-8 where ri 
and r2 represent reaction functions of firm 1 and firm 2 
respectively. Below we consider the following cases where 
i) c2 increases and ii) a2 increases. 
7.4.1 An Increase in the Cost of Production 
If c2 increases due to a genuine rise in the cost of 
production or as a result of a shift towards profit 
maximization relative to revenue, the value of D falls 
while that of A rises. Given that b> 5ci - 4c2, the 
reaction function of firm 1 as shown in figure 7-9 will 
shift towards the origin from ri to ri' because dD/dc2 A 
+ dA/dc2 D<0 while the reaction function of firm 2 will 
shift downwards from r2 to r2' because dD/dc2 < 0. We 
note that the shape of both reaction functions guarantee 
that higher cost of production of firm 2 will result in 
narrowing the quality gap. The intuition of this result 
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is that higher production cost of firm 2 will, given the 
demand function as in (6-8), reduce the optimal level of 
q2 for each value of 13 (refer to equation 7-5 where 
dq2/dc2 > 0). The corresponding price level as given in 
equation 7-7 rises, i. e., dP2/dc2 < 0. The utility level 
of firm 2 falls. In order to compensate for the 
reduction of its sale's volume, firm 2 increases the 
quality level of its product for each given value of its 
rival, i. e., 13 increases. The price level corresponding 
to this new quantity supplied will also increase. We may 
infer this from the reaction function of firm 2 where for 
each given value of ai, we obtain a larger value of a2 
under r'2 than under r2 in figure 7-9. Therefore, profit 
of firm 2 will rise relative to zero change in the 
utility increase. The marginal increase in the profit 
level as a consequence of an increase in a2 is larger 
than the additional cost spent to raise a2. For a given 
value of ai, this may be shown by the following result: 
d2U2/dc2dß - dU2/dc2 >0 (7-27) 
which is given as 
4(333+7ß+2)(1+ß)(b+ci-2c2) 
------------------------------- >0 (3ß+4)3 
Therefore, expenditure on improving a2 will increase 
until the marginal expenditure equals the marginal 
increase in the quality level. Consider the effect of an 
increase in c2 on firm 1. As q2 falls, the optimal value 
of qi will rise. Note that the increase in the volume of 
sales by firm 1 is less than the fall in q2 as the 
corresponding new price level of firm 1 will be higher 
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than before. Furthermore, For each given value of a2, 
firm 1 will lower its quality level as it could 
marginally increase its profit level using its improved 
competitiveness given the present gap in the quality 
level is greater than A* where p*satisfies the following 
equation: 
3Fß*2 + 2(2F+G)ß* - 4F =0 (7-28) 
F= ß(b-2ci+c2)+2(b-ci) 
G= (b+ci-2cz) 
(7-28) is obtained from d2ni/dc2dß = dni/dc2. 
For ß< ß*, we have 
d2ni/dc2dß - dni/dc2 <0 (7-29) 
Therefore, we obtain the result that the quality gap has 
narrowed due to both firms' maximizing behaviour as a 
response to an increase in the level of production cost 
of firm 2. 
7.4.2 An Increase in the Cost of Innovation 
Consider now the second situation where the cost of 
innovation increases. The reaction function of firm 2 
will shift downwards as 2D2/64a2 will fall if a2 rises. 
The concavity property of firm 1 will ensure that the 
quality gap will widen while at the same time quality of 
both products will fall. In figure 7-10, this change in 
equilibrium may be represented as the original 
equilibrium Z changing to Z". The reason is that as firm 
2 lowers its investment in innovation due to its higher 
cost of innovation, firm 1 finds itself in a better 
i 
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position to compete. Firm 1 will lower its quality level 
such as to cut back in cost of innovation, but only to 
such an extent as to leave a wider quality gap. In this 
way, firm 1 will be able to enjoy both the benefit of 
wider quality gap as well as lower cost of innovation due 
to the fall in absolute level of quality, and thus 
reduction in the cost of innovation. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Under the Cournot assumption, we have examined a two 
stage game where quality choice and marketing are 
considered sequentially. A Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 
was obtained as we considered the second stage game 
first. There were potentially many equilibria each 
corresponding to given values of ßß, i. e. , the outcome of 
the first stage game. The equilibrium corresponding to ß 
_w was identical to a single period quantity game. 
We found that the equilibrium of the second stage game 
did not exist without further structural restrictions as 
firm 1's optimal response in its quality choice as 
against that of firm 2 is to attain a large a quality gap 
as possible while firm 2 tries to close the gap. We 
introduced two alternative restrictions: potential upper 
and lower bounds of each quality level and positive cost 
of innovation. The Nash equilibrium under former 
restriction is attained at the upper limits of both firms 
potential quality levels. tinder positive and increasing 
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cost of innovation with respect to quality levels, we 
required an additional assumption that the cost of 
innovation by firm 1 is less than that of firm 2 to 
attain an equilibrium. 
We conducted comparative static exercises by varying each 
of two exogenous variables of firm 2. These were the 
cost of production, or a shift in the objectives from a 
simple profit maximization behaviour to a dual objective 
of profit and revenue and cost of innovation. These two 
variables were chosen as they best represent the 
empirical facts of firms in Korea; the problem of wage 
increases, ever increasing cost of innovation and 
Government policy in NICs to earn foreign reserves. We 
obtained the result that a higher wage rate in firm 2 
will lead to a fall in both firms' quality level. 
However, the quality level of firm 2 will fall 
proportionally by less than its rival's, thus narrowing 
the quality gap. Price of both product will rise while 
firm 1 will increase its sale's volume. For an increase 
in the cost of innovation, we obtained that the quality 
gap will widen. At the same time, quality of both 
products will fall. Therefore, q2 falls while qi rises. 
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8 The Price - setting Model 
Consider the model as outlined in chapter 6. We now 
examine this behaviour under a different form of firms' 
conjectural variation. In the previous chapter, we 
assumed that each firm conjectures that its rival's 
output response to changes in its own quantity was zero. 
We now modify this assumption and propose Bertrand 
competition. The Bertrand model of duopoly describes a 
situation in which each firm conjectures that its rival's 
price level will not change in response to changes in its 
own price level. Avinash Dixit (1984) constructs a 
duopoly model with outputs as the choice variable and 
shows that equilibria other than Cournot are defined 
readily in the same analysis by defining appropriate 
forms of conjectural variation dqj/dqi=vi(gi, qj). vi is 
defined as -(dpj/dqi)/(dpj/dqj) for Bertrand competition 
and as zero for the Cournot competition where pi and qi 
represent the price level and the quantity supplied by 
firm i respectively. 
8.1 The Second Stage Game 
As before, we first consider stage two of the 2-stage 
game. In order to maximize the objective functions ni and 
U2, we may either differentiate them with respect to qis 
each and assume conjectures v1 = -1 and v2 _ -0/(1+0) for 
firm 1 and firm 2 obtained from (iv) of Appendix A 
respectively or differentiate them with respect to pis 
each and assume vi = 0. 
8.1.1 The Demand Function 
Below, we derive the demand function under Bertrand 
conjecture in two alternative ways to demonstrate that 
they yield the same result. 
From the first order condition dni/dql =0 and dU2/dq2 = 
0 as shown in ii) Appendix A, we may obtain the reaction 
functions for each firm in (qi, qz) space as follows: 
(1+5)(b-cl) 13 
qi = ------------- - ------ q2 (8-1) 
(2+13) (2+13) 
(1+ß)(b-c2) (1+13) 
q2 = ------------ - ------ ql (8-2) 
(2+13) (2+p) 
The corresponding quantities of sales in an equilibrium 
are obtained from (8-1) and (8-2) by solving 
simultaneously for qi and q2. 
-(c1-c2)132+(2b-3ci+c2)0+2(b-c1) 
qBl = --------------------------------- (8-3) 
313+4 
(cl-C2 )ß2+(b+2ci-3c2)ß+(b+ci-2c2) 
qB2 = ---------------------------------- (8-4) 
3ß+4 
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Substituting (8-3) and (8-4) into demand functions as 
given in equation (iii) Appendix A yield the following 
price levels for the Bertrand equilibria, as functions of 
a. 
(2cltc2)ß+2(btcl) 
pBl = ------------------ (8-5) 
3p+4 
(cl+2c2)ß+(b+c1+2c2) 
pst = --------------------- (8-6) 
3p+4 
Secondly, if we take pi as the strategic variable, we 
anticipate same equilibrium as obtained above. We 
differentiate the objective functions with respect to pi, 
to obtain the first order conditions of the objective 
function for firm 1 as 
dni/dpi = ql + (pi - cl) dql/dpi =0 (8-7) 
where dqi/dpi = Sqi/Spi + 6gl6p2 (öp2/5dpi) (8-S) 
(ö denotes partial differentiation) 
Then Spe/Spl =0 under Bertrand assumption and Sql/bpi = 
-(1+3) from equation iv), Appendix A. Therefore, (8-6) 
reduces to dqi/dpi = -(1+13). The first order condition 
(8-7) and substituting for qi gives the optimal value of 
pi as 
pi = b/2(1+0) + cl/2 + A/2(1+0) p2 (8-9) 
Likewise for firm 2, we obtain dq2/dp2 = -(1+13) and the 
first order condition q2 - (p2 - c2)dq2dp2 = 0. 
Therefore, the optimal price level for each given price 
level of its rival is given by 
125 
P2 = 3z(P1 - C2) (8-10) 
Solving (8-9) and (8-10) simultaneously for pi and p2 
yields 
(2c1+c2)ß+2(b+c1) 
pBl = ------------------ (8-11) 
3p+4 
(c1+2c2)f3+(b+c1+c2) 
pB2 = --------------------- (8-12) 
313+4 
Note that equation (8-11) and (8-12) are identical to 
equations (8-5) and (8-6) demonstrating the earlier 
statement that Bertrand solution may be obtained either 
by maximizing with respect to qis or pis as long as we 
adopt the correct conjecture. In appendix B,. we 
illustrate the comparative static results obtained under 
both the Bertrand and Cournot conjectures. 
8.1.2 Nash Equilibrium of Stage Two Game 
The loci of possible Nash Equilibria in Non-cooperative 
Bertrand Competition is shown in figure 8-1 as the MM' 
curve. The figure shows four reaction functions in all. 
ri represents firm i's reaction function if the quality 
gap between two firms is very large. The equilibrium is 
obtained at point M. Note that for cl = c2 and b> ci, Pi 
> P2. This is a necessary condition for firm 2 to attain 
positive market share. Otherwise, consumers would all 
prefer the higher quality product. 
On the other hand, as the quality gap begins to get 
smaller (i. e., f3 ---)c0), ql initially increases only to 
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collapse to zero as 13 tends to infinity. We note that 
given the constraint that firm 1 has a higher quality, 
segmentation will not be defined if firms have same 
quality levels. It is apparent from (8-3) that for small 
values of 0, the coefficient of 13 dominates the 
coefficient of 02. As the value of ß increases further, 
the coefficient of 02 begins to dominate. The intuition 
is that under a small "quality difference, firm 2 with 
lower cost level will reduce its price level sufficiently 
low as to drive firm 1 out of the market. Even if cl = 
c2, note from (8-3) and (8-4) that qi will be twice the 
amount of q2. This is because under Bertrand 
competition, the price level will be equated to marginal 
cost. This means that given consumer demand as in chapter 
6, the total market demand will be b-c. Since firm 1 is 
a first mover into the market by assumption, it will take 
2(b-c)/3 amount of the market share while the rest is 
left for firm 2. (This is only true if we assume 
consumers have perfect foresight of what each firm will 
charge irrespective of the time of product supply into 
the market). 
8.2 Utility Levels 
Consider the corresi 
of these equilibria. 
against ß as shown 
assumption on the 
variables, namely, 
>onding outcomes for firms' utilities 
The utility levels can be graphed 
in figure 8-2 given an additional 
relative values of the exogenous 
b> 3ci - C2. We assume this 
1 L8 
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inequality to hold throughout the following analysis 
where we derive the curvature of the utility levels. 
Firstly, in order to express utility levels in terms of 
ß, we substitute equation (8-3), "(8-4) and (8-5), (8-6) 
into the objective functions ni and U2 in equations (7-8) 
and (7-9) respectively to yield the following utility 
levels: 
fi 133 - f2 ß2 + f3 ß+ f4 
ni = --------------------------- (8-13) 
(3[3+4)2 
where fl = (c1-c2)2 >0 
f2 = (ci-c2)(4b-5ci+c2) >0 
fa = 4(b-ci)(b-2ci+c2) >0 
f4 = 4(b-ci)2 >0 
g1ß3 + g2132 + g313 + g4 
U2 = ------------------------ ($-14) 
(3j3+4)2 
where gi = (cl-c2)2 >0 
g2 = (cl-cz)+(2b+3c1-5c2) >0 
g3 = (b+cl-2c2)(b+3c1-4c2) >0 
g4 = (b+cl-2C2)2 
Having derived the utility levels for firm 1 and firm 2 
respectively for each given value of , we differentiate 
the utility levels in terms of p to study their 
curvatures more clearly. 
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din 36(33+12f2ß2-(9f3+8f2)13+2(2f3-3f4) 
---- ----------------------------------- (8-15) 
d3 (3[3+4)3 
dUi 3g1ß3+12g1ß2+(8g2-3g3)ß+(4g3-2g4) 
---- ----------------------------------- (8-16) 
dß (3ß+4)3 
The limiting values of ni and U2 are given as 
lim ni = f4/16 >0 
13-t0 
lim rti = Co 
13 -*0 
lim U2 = g4/16 >0 
p-. o 
lim U2 = IM 
pf0 
The limits of the first derivatives are given as follows 
for: 
lim dni/d13 = (2f3-3f4)/32 <0 
A->o 
because -4(b-cl)(b+2ci-2c2) <0 
lim dni/d3 = fi/9 >0 
p4° 
lim 02/0 = 2g3-g4/32 <0 
p-to 
because -(b+ci-2c2)(b-5ci+6c2) <0 
lim dt2/dß = gi/9 >0 
p-to* 
Compare f4 with g3. Given b> 3ci - c2, we know that f4 < 
g3. 
The second order derivatives are given as follows: 
d2ni -36(fi-f2)ß2+9(8f2+3f3)0+6(8f2-6f3+9f4) 
---- - --------------------------------------- (8-17) 
dß2 (3ß+4)4 
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d2U2 3(16g1-892+393)13+2(24g1-1883+994) 
---- - ---------------------------------- (8-18) 
dß2 (3p+4)4 
where fi - f2 >0 
8f2 + 3f3 >0 
8f2 - 6f3 + 9f4 >0 
because 9f4-6f3 = 12(b-ci)(b+ci-2c2) >0 
and 16gi- 8g2 + 3g3 >0 
24gi - 1893 + 9g4 <0 
because -(b+cl-2c2)(b+5ci-6c2) <0 
These results imply that for small value of 13, the second 
derivatives of ni and Uz are convex and concave 
respectively while for a large value of p, their 
curvature changes to concave and to convex respectively. 
We note two differences in the utility levels obtained as 
solutions between those under Cournot and Bertrand 
conjectures. Under the former, the maximizing value of ß 
was 0=0 for n1 and ß=co for U2. We now seem to have a 
situation where we attain maximum values of ni and U2 at 
13 = CO . However, under Bertrand competition, two 
restrictions on the value of p are required to guarantee 
firm 1a positive market share anda non-negative mark-up 
on its cost of production. For ql>O, we require that 0< 
where 
(2b-3c1+c2)+[(2b-3ci+cz)2+8(c1-c2)(b-c1)]% 
4= ------------------------------------------- (8-19) 
2(ci-c2) 
132 
This is obtained from (8-3) where we solve for the value 
of ß given qi = 0. As for positive mark up, (pi-ci)>0, 
we need 0< 0- where ß= 2(b-ci)/(ci-c2). Suppose further 
that at the value of 0= 0', MI = 0. 
8.3 A Numerical Example 
In order to compare p', ß, and 4, we substitute simple 
numerical values. They are chosen such that they do not 
violate the assumption b> 3ei - c2. We define the 
values of the exogenous variables as 
b= 10 
ci =2 
cz =1 
Then the coefficients of the profit function ni is given 
as below: 
fi =1 
f2 = 31 
f3 = 224 
f4= 256 
The values of A are given by 
0= 26.62 
4= 16 
Since 4>Q, fl is the binding constraint. In fact, for A 
_ 01, ni = 0. This implies that p' _ 3. This is easily 
explained by the fact that izi = (Pi - ci)qi and tti is 
zero if Pi - cl =0 or qi = 0. We know that . 
is the 
only binding constraint on the profit function of firm 1 
and that at 0=0., Pi = cl. In other words, there were 
initially two possible reasons firm 1 could be forced out 
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of the market; zero market share or negative mark up. 
This simple numerical example shows however, that the 
price war under Bertrand conjecture will force firm 1 
into a negative mark-up situation unless it succeeds to 
obtain an advantage in the quality of a product by ai >_ 
(1+13j0-) a2 for each given value of a2. Firm 1 attains 
its maximum profit level at p=0, i. e., if the quality 
difference between the two products are very large. This 
result rests on the following reasons. The demand 
function is parameterized with respect to the price and 
the quality level. In order to sustain a fixed market 
share, a fall in the quality level must be accompanied by 
a corresponding fall in the price level. But the 
Bertrand conjectures assumption implies price competition 
and therefore the price level has a lower bound, i. e., 
constant cost of production level beyond which it must 
not fall. The only way that firm 1 can increase its 
profit level is by an increase in the quality level. 
Since the cost of innovation is assumed zero, firm 1 will 
be able to attain its maximum profit level as it 
increases the quality differences between the two 
products. 
8.4 The First Stage Game 
The optimal value of p, denoted as ßi*, is obtained by 
the first order condition dni/dp = (dPi/dß) qi + 
(dqi/dp)(Pi-c1) = 0. Thus 01* satisfies the following 
condition: 
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3fip3 + 12f2ß2 - (9f3+8f2)ß + 2(2f3-3f4) =0 (8-20) 
In order to have an internal solution, ß must be 0 <_ ß <_ 
ßi' where ni at ßi' is zero. For a numerical solution 
for a value of ß, we substitute the same numerical values 
as given in the above example into (8-20) to yield 
303 + 372ß2 - 22640 - 640 =0 (8-21) 
For 13 < 131 = 16, the LHS of (8-21) is negative. 
Therfore, ßi* > ßi' implies that 131* is not the 
optimizing value. In fact, the second order condition 
proves that 131* is the minimizing value. Therefore, as 
shown earlier, the optimum value of A is attained when 
the quality gap is infinite, i. e., 13 = 0. The reaction 
function of firm 1 in the first stage game is the 
vertical axis, i. e., whatever value of a2, firm 1 will 
always wish to maximize the gap in the quality level, 
This is shown in Figure 8-3. 
Similarily, firm 2's marginal condition is obtained from 
the first order condition of the utility function U2. 
dt)2/dp=(dp2/dß)g2+(d2/dp)(p2-c2) =0 (8-22) 
It may be rewritten as 
3g1ß3+12g1ß2+(8g2-3g3)0+(4g3-2g4) =0 (8-23) 
Substituting our numerical values into 8-20 yields 
3ß3 + 1202 - 3180 - 280 =0 (8-24) 
for gi =1 
g2 = 21 
g3 = 120 
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g4 = 100 
We find that 132' = 1.2 satisfies equation (8-24). For 
02' z 1.2, d2U2/dß > 0. Therefore, 02' is the 
minimizing value of 13 where U2 attains its minimum. In 
fact, from figure 8-2, we have shown that U2 is maximized 
as 13 M. Therefore, the reaction function, which is 
given as a2= [13*2/(13*2+1)]al where 132* represents the 
maximizing value of U2, approaches a2 = al as A2* M. 
Thus, the reaction function is the 450 line as shown in 
figure 8-3. 
Consider the mark-up level of firm 2. It is given as 
(ci-c2)0 + (b+ci-2c2) 
(p2-c2) - ---------------------- (8-25) 
3ß+4 
Note that for cl = c2 and ß co, we return to the 
symmetric duopoly solution under the Bertrand conjectures 
that firms are operating at zero mark up level. For cl > 
c2, as the quality gap narrows, we have a positive mark- 
up. 
8.5 The First Stage Game Equilibrium 
Given no constraints on the value of ais and no cost of 
innovation, the equilibrium is not attained as it 
violates the compactness assumption defined in chapter 7. 
As before, we impose a restriction on levels of quality 
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ai E [gi , sei] where al > g2 > al > Qz. The equilibrium 
is attained at z=(sLi) a2) as shown in figure 8-4. If, on 
the other hand, the al = g2 , then firm 1 will be driven 
out of the market as firm 2 will push its price level 
down such that the mark up of firm 1 becomes negative. 
8.5.1 Positive Cost of Innovation 
Suppose that the cost function of Innovation introduced 
in the Cournot model also applies to this Bertrand 
competition. Then for firm 1, the marginal condition, 
dni/dß + dki/dß = 0, states that 
-[3fii33+12f2ß2-(9f3+8f2)ß+2(2f3-3f4)]ß2 
ala2 = ---------------------------------------- (8-26) 
(4+313)3 
As for firm 2, its marginal condition dU2/dß + dkz/df3 =0 
yields 
(l+ß)2[3g1ß3+12g1ß2+($g1-3g3)f3+(4g3-2g4) 
a2a1 = ----------------------------------------- (8-27) 
(3p+4)3 
Equation (8-26) and (8-27) each show the optimal value of 
al and az for a fixed value of its rival's quality level. 
Therefore we obtain firms' reaction functions from these 
equation. Firm 1's reaction function now becomes al = 
{[3*1(a2)+1]/0*s(a2)} as as shown in figure 8-5. The 
reaction function ri is concave to the origin and 
terminates at al = a2(a). 
Likewise, firm 2's reaction function r2 becomes a2 = 
1A*2(ai)/Cß*2(ai) + 111 ai. Initiating from (g3- 
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g4)/32a2, it converges towards the 450 line. Comparing 
reaction functions derived under the Cournot conjectures 
assumption, we observe that r2 is now convex to the 
origin while before, it was the concave to the origin. 
The convexity of the reaction function implies that as 
the value of ai rises, it is optimal for firm 2 to 
increase a2 at a faster rate than the increase in ax, 
i. e., 0 increases. The reason is that the profit level 
of firm 2 increases at a slower rate than the increase in 
the cost of innovation with respect to an increase a2. 
Therefore, for each incremental value of ai, the 
proportionate increase in a2 will fall. 
The reason for the 
firm 2 can be obtai 
with respect to ß. 
d2U2 d2P2 
---- _ ---- q2 + 
dß2 dß2 
convexity of the reaction function of 
. ned 
from the second derivatives of U2 
d2q2 dq2 dP2 
---- (P2-c2) +2 ---- ---- (8-28) 
dß2 d13 dß 
The corresponding signs of the derivatives under Bertrand 
competition and Cournot competition are shown below as 
Bertrand Cournot 
dq2/dß +- 
dp2/dß -+ 
d2g2/dp2 ?- 
d2p2/dß2 +- 
Note that under Cournot competition, 
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d2P2 d2q2 dq2 dP2 
----q2 + ---- (P2-c2) <2 ---- ---- (8-29) 
dß2 dß2 dß dß 
This is because the left hand side of 8-29 is negative as 
we can infer from the table above. 
Under Bertrand competition, however, due to the relative 
low value of P2, and large q2, we obtain 
d2p2 d2q2 dq2 dP2 
---- q2 > ---- (P2-c2) +2 ---- ---- (8-30) 
dß2 dß2 dß dß 
for small values of ß while the inequality sign is 
reversed for large values of ß. Thus, we obtain the 
convexity of the utility function under the Bertrand 
competition. 
Having demonstrated the difference in the reaction 
function of firm 2 under Cournot and Bertrand 
conjectures, we examine the intuition for the difference. 
Under the Cournot conjectures assumption, an increase in 
p is accompanied by an increase in the price level and 
the quantity supplied. The marginal increases, however, 
are falling. This implies that the utility level, with 
respect to 13 is increasing at a falling marginal rate. 
Under Bertrand conjectures assumption, however, the price 
level falls initially at a decreasing rate with respect 
to ß and rises in an increasing rate while the quantity 
supplied falls after a brief initial rise yielding a 
utility function which is decreasing for small values of 
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A and increasing for large values of ß while the marginal 
values are positive throughout the argument of A. 
Since the marginal utility level under the Cournot 
conjectures is decreasing while that of Bertrand is 
increasing with respect to quality differences, an 
increase in the quality level of firm 1 will lead firm 2 
to increase its quality level by more under Bertrand 
conjectures than it would under Cournot for low values of 
ai. The Bertrand conjectures equilibria are less 
sensitive to changes in the quality differences than the 
Cournot conjectures, e. g., as they engage in "price war". 
8.5.2 Upper Limits on Investment into R&D 
The existence of the first stage game may not be 
sustainable, i. e., the intersection point of the two 
reaction functions may occur at a point at which profit 
levels of firms may be negative. Therefore, there is an 
additional restriction on possible values of quality 
level each firm can take. The cost of innovation can not 
exceed the net profit, i. e., total profit net of the 
production cost. The restrictions for ai and a2 are 
given as al" and a2" where they each satisfy the 
following condition: 
ni[ß(ai, a2)] - ki[ai, 0(ai, a2)] =0 (8-31) 
U2[0(ai, a2)] - k2[a2, A(ai, a2)] =0 (8-32) 
These restrictions are denoted in figure S-5 as ti and 
t2. The intersection point between ti and ri will be the 
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maximum value of al firm 1 could choose while the 
intersection point between t2 and r2 will be the maximum 
value of firm 2. For a Nash equilibrium for the first 
stage to exist, the intersection points of the two 
reaction functions must be below the upper limit values 
of al and a2. Then a sustainable Nash equilibrium will 
exist, the precise nature of which will be determined by 
the specific values of the exogenous variables including 
al and a2. One particular equilibrium is shown in figure 
8-5 denoted as Z. 
8.6 Comparative Static Analysis 
We now examine the two cases as in the Cournot model; i) 
increase in c2 due to an increase in the wage rate or in 
the shift of priorities and ii) increase in a2. 
8.6.1 An Increase in the Cost of Production 
Consider the second stage of the game given an increase 
in the cost of production. We observe for (i): 
dpl/dc2 = ß/(3ß+4) >0 
dpz/dcz = (20+2)/(3ß+4) >0 
dql/dc2 = ß(ß+1)/(3ß+4) >0 
dq2/dc2 = -(ß+1)(ß+2)/(313+4) <0 
dnl 12(cl-c2)ß3+2(2b-2c1+c2)02+4(b-c1)ß 
---- = ----------------------------------- (8-31) 
dc2 -3 
and dnl/dc2 >0 for 13 <ß "' where 
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(2b-2ci+c2) + [(2b-2ci+c2)2+8(ci-c2)(b-ci)]2 
------------------------------------------- (8-32) 
2 (cl-c2) 
dü2/dc2 = (dP2/dc2 - 1)q2 + (P2 - c2)dg2/dc2 (8-33) 
_ [-(p+1)/(3ß+4)][q2+(13+1)(P2-c2)] <0 
We obtain that firm 2 will raise its price level as to 
guarantee a positive mark up on the increase in 
production cost. The price increase means that quantity 
sold will decline., The net profit will fall. Firm 1, 
on the other hand, will increase its price level but only 
to such an extent as to leave the relative price level, 
Pi/Pz lower than before. This will increase its quantity 
being sold in the market. Therefore, firm 1 will be able 
to enjoy a rise in its profit level. 
Consider now the effect on (i) in the first stage game. 
Firm l's quality reaction fuunction contracts downwards 
towards the origin. This implies that for each given 
value of a2 the value of al will be lower than before the 
change. The same argument applies as before when we 
considered the Cournot competition. As for firm 2, an 
increase in c2 implies a downwards shift of the reaction 
function. This is obtained due to 
2dg3/dcz - dg4/dc2 <0 
Therefore, both quality level will fall except that firm 
1 will let its quality fall proportionately more than a2. 
The intuition is that as c2 increases, the price level of 
firm 2 increases while the investment on innovation 
falls, lowering quality level, in order to compensate for 
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the increase in the cost of production. Firm 1, on the 
other hand, will lower its product quality level as well, 
but only to such an extent as to leave the relative 
quality level ai/a2 higher than before. This will 
guarantee firm 1a greater market share at a higher price 
level. 
8.6.2 An Increase in the Cost of Innovation 
Consider an increase in the cost of innovation by firm 2. 
The first stage game will yield a similar result as 
before. Firm 2's reaction function will shift downwards 
from ra to r2' as shown in figure 8-6 while that of its 
rivals will remain. Firm 2 will lower its level of 
quality. Firm 1 will thus have a greater advantage in 
terms of quality level. It will also lower its quality 
such as to gain from cost cuts which will offset the 
corresponding fall in the price level. The equilibrium 
of the first stage game will change from Z' to Z". A 
fall in 13 implies a fall in q2. The sale's volume of 
firm 1, however, depends on the present value of p. If ß 
was such that the present values of qi, q2 were given as 
between M and and M" in figure 8-1, dq2/dß will be 
positive while between M" and M', it will be negative. 
The implication of this result is that an increase in the 
cost of innovation will lead both firms to lower their 
product quality levels. 
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8.7 Cournot vs Bertrand Equilibrium 
Using the same numerical values used so far, we compare 
the results obtained under the Cournot and Bertrand 
conjecutres. They are summarized in Appendix C. 
8.7.1 The Price and the Quality Level 
The price level of firm 1 is higher under quantity 
competition than under price competition for all argument 
of ß. The price level of firm 2, however, is higher 
under quantity competition only for values of ß greater 
than 7/4. For smaller values of ß, Bertrand competition 
attains a higher equilibrium price level for firm 2. The 
intuition is that under the Cournot competition, for 
small values of 0 (i. e., large product quality gap), the 
sales volume of firm 1 is large. Since the price level 
is a linear function of both firm's sale's volume (as 
shown in equation 6-10), the price level of firm 2 will 
be low. A second reason for a low price level is that 
firm 2 is trying to maximize revenue with respect to 
quantity supplied. In order to attain the maximum 
quantity level with large quality gap, the only possible 
option is to lower its price level. 
Under Bertrand competition, firm 2 will face a situation 
where it has to undercut the price level of firm 1 given 
a large quality gap. The price level need not, however, 
be as low as in the Cournot competition as it is 
maximizing with respect to the price level and does not 
have to attain any maximizing output level. As the 
quality difference is reduced, we obtain the general 
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result that price competition yield lower price level and 
a larger sales volume than under quantity competition. 
8.7.2 The Utility Level 
The utility level of firm 1 is always greater under 
Cournot competition for values of p between 0 and 45. We 
found that the maximum permissible value of p (under 
Bertrand competition) is 16 below which firm 1 is forced 
out by firm 2 and at which the profit level of firm 1 
becomes negative. The profit level of firm 2 is not bound 
by the value of ß= 16. The Cournot equilibrium yields a 
higher utility for firm 2 for 1<5< 78. For values of 
(3 < 1, i. e., a very large difference in the quality 
level, the Bertrand conjectures equilibrium yields higher 
utility level because of the low price level of firm 2 as 
explained above. For values of 13 > 78, i. e., as the 
quality difference is very small, firm 1 will be driven 
out of the market under Bertrand competition due to its 
higher cost of production (i. e., qi = 0). 
8.8 Conclusion 
We have shown that under Bertrand 
Equilibrium of the first stage game 
that of the Cournot competition 
innovation and difference in the coi 
result is obtained as we assumed 
competition the Nash 
is not different from 
under zero cost of 
3t of production. This 
identical upper and 
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lower bounds on potential quality levels to prevail in 
both the Cournot and Bertrand cases. Given positive cost 
of innovation, we observed one difference. The reaction 
function of firm 2 is now convex to the origin whereas 
before, it was concave. This was. caused by the shape of 
profit function of firm 2. Under Cournot competition, 
the profit function was concave to the origin tending to 
a certain limit as ß- co. Now, we have a convex profit 
function with respect to 13. This difference in the 
shape of firm 2's profit function has roots in the 
different assumptions of the strategic variables firms 
choose in the competition. An increase in the cost of 
production of firm 2 will result in an increase in P2, 
then accordingly, a fall in q2 will arise. However, this 
fall will be partly compensated by an increase in a2. 
Firm 1, on the other hand, will increase its price level 
also while lowering its quality level such that it will 
lose some market share. The profit of firm 1 will have 
risen due to the rise in the price level and savings from 
the investment cuts. An increase in the cost of 
innovation, as it was the case under Cournot competition, 
will lead to a fall in both quality levels but dal > dal. 
Finally, a fall in s, i. e., a shift in the objectives 
towards revenue maximization relative to profit, will 
have exactly the opposite result as when there was an 
increase in the cost of production. 
150 
9. Consistent Conjectures 
We examine alternative approaches to the two second stage 
games adopted so far. We consider how different results 
are produced as we change the behavioural assumptions of 
firms, e. g., conjectural variations. In particular, we 
impose 'rationality' assumption on firms behaviour and 
show that Cournot equilibrium is a consistent conjectures 
equilibrium. We derive the consistent conjectures 
equilibrium according to the definition given by Perry 
(1980,1982) and Bresnahan (1981), (to be denoted as P& 
B) and show that in absence of infinite regress problem, 
the consistent conjectrues equilibrium will be between 
the Cournot and the Bertrand equilibrium for each given 
value of 03. We then include the infinite regress problem 
as defined by Daughety (1983) and show that the 
consistent conjectures equilibrium obtained under the 
more general definition of Daughety attains the Cournot 
equilibrium as a solution. 
One cannot justify theoretically, why firms should agree 
on choosing some common variable as their strategic 
variable and even less so if it comes to determining 
their conjectures. However, these two problems are not 
independent from each other. For whatever strategic 
by an appropriate assumption on 
firms conjectures, any feasible outcome may be obtained. 
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In other words, the outcome of a competition with 
respect to a strategic variable based on some particular 
conjecture, may be sustained if one would change to 
another strategic variable by modifying the conjectures 
accordingly. Therefore, choice- of strategic variable 
plays little significance if no rationale for some 
particular conjecture is given. Here, we assume that qis 
are the strategic variables and focus our attention on 
the values of conjectural variations. 
The two cases of the second stage game considered "so far 
differ in that we introduced two alternative assumptions 
on conjectural variations. Let v1 represent the 
conjectural variation of firm 1 and v2 that of firm 2. 
By definition, under the Cournot and Bertrand conjecture, 
the values of vl was given as 0 and -1 respectively while 
v2 was given as 0 and -3/1+0 respectively. 
9.1 Uncertainty and Nash Equilibria 
Consider now the case of uncertainty where neither firm 
knows the conjectural variation of their rival when 
rationality and full information are not assumed. Below, 
we illustrate the multiplicity of Nash equilibria of the 
second stage game even if we restrict the possible 
behaviour of firms to be between Cournot and Bertrand 
conjectures. In other words, the possible conjectural 
variation is confined to some strict subset [0, -1], 
i. e., 
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vi r= [0 , -1] (9-1) 
This simply implies that a firm does not expect that a 
one unit change in its own output will lead to more than 
one unit change of its rivals. No positive reactions 
prevails which could be the case if products are 
complements. Then conjectural variations of firm 1 could 
be anywhere between 0 and -1 while firm 2 could choose 
between 0 and -13/(13+1). These values are derived from 
the definitions of Cournot and Bertrand competition as 
shown in equations v) and vi) in the Appendix A. We 
ignore cases of positive conjectures and collusion 
although Ireland and Hviid (1986) points out that even a 
positive conjecutre may be consistent if the increase in 
optimism is sufficiently large within a model of demand 
uncertainty. Consider the extreme cases of {0, -11, {O, 
-ß3/(P+1)} for firm 1 and firm 2 respectively i. e., 
Cournot and Bertrand competition. The possible outcomes 
are as follows. 
First, firm 1 conjectures that firm 2 will not respond to 
its own change in quantity, i. e., Cournot competition, 
while firm 2 conjectures that firm 1 will respond by 
exactly the same amount, but in opposite direction, as 
its own change in quantity, i. e., Bertrand competition. 
We then have an equilibrium for each given value of p, 
which is obtained from mutually different beliefs on 
conjectures of firms. This is represented as the OS line 
in figure 9-1. As before, rig and riB denote the reaction 
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functions of firm i under Cournot and Bertrand conjecture 
respectively given R=0. riec and riBB are the same 
reaction functions except that they are obtained given 0 
_ Co. Therefore, point 0 is obtained for A=0 while 
point S is obtained for ß= co. 
Secondly, we could have the opposite case where firms' 
conjectures are each reversed. The possible outcomes. are 
represented by the OR curve. Point R is obtained for ß= 
co and point 0 when 13 = 0. If we include the other two 
cases when firms both engage in Cournot and in Bertrand 
competition, we obtain in total four possible loci of 
non-cooperative Nash Equilibria as shown in figure 9-2. 
ON represents the Cournot-Cournot solution while OM 
represents the Bertrand-Bertrand solution. If we now 
allow all intermediary cases between the extreme four 
cases of C-V considered above, we obtain a whole area of 
possible Nash Equilibria as shown by the shaded areas in 
figure 9-2, i. e., it is a Convex Hull of all possible 
outcomes of the extreme cases. 
9.2 Rationality and Nash Equilibria 
If firms are rational, i. e., they have the capacity to 
analyse the market structure as well as infer the 
behaviour of other agents given that firms' rationality 
is a common knowledge, then the market must obtain a 
conditional rational Nash equilibrium at which their 
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expectations of each other's conjectures must be equal to 
the actual conjectures. We define such conjectures as 
'consistent conjectures' and the corresponding 
equilibrium as conditional Rational Non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium. It is conditional in that all information 
must be correctly perceived by both firms. We now define 
consistent conjectural variation formally as vl(qi, giJJ3) 
= rj(qi, qjJß) where vi is firm i's conjecture on firm 
j's reaction in response to changes in qi for each given 
values of ß and rj to be the actual reaction of firm j 
on changes in qi for each given values of 13. In fact, ri 
is the slope of the reaction function of firm J. 
The notion of consistent conjectures first appeared as an 
attempt to give some rationale on the determination of 
firms' conjectures on each other. Initial attempts on 
this subject led to the uniqueness solution, whereas 
before, any feasible solution could be explained as a 
conjectues equilibrium by suitable choice of conjectures. 
These earlier findings were not without criticisms. 
Below, we illustrate the notion of consistent conjectures 
by P&B and examine the corresponding weaknesses. 
9.2.1 Definition of Consistent Conjectures (P & B) 
We define the objective function of a firm in oligopoly 
as 
ni = pi(q)qi - ci(qi) (9-2) 
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where pi, qi and ci represent the price level, the 
quantity level and the cost of production' by firm i. The 
corresponding first order condition for a profit 
maximization is given by 
gi(Öpi/Öqi+Öpi/Sqj vi) + pi - Sci/dqi =0 (9-3) 
(as before, 8 represents partial differentiation) 
where vi represents the conjectural variation of firm i 
and is defined as Sqj/Sqi for i=1,2, and i4j. 
Equation (9-3) is an implicit function of qi and qj. We 
define it as 
qi = ri(qj) (9-4) 
Therefore, (9-4) solves (9-3). An oligopoly equilibrium 
is defined as q* _ (qi*, q2*) where 
qi* = ri(g2*) and q2* = r2(gi*) (9-5) 
A consistent conjectures equilibrium is a pair of 
quantities q* and of conjectures (vl, v2) such that 
qi* = ri(q2*), q2* = r2(gi*) 
and for some T>0, 
vl(gi) = Sri(gl)/Sql 
v2(g2) = 6r2(g2)/8q2 
for all qi*-r < ql < ql*+T 
(9-6) 
for all q2*-r < qz < q2*+T 
In other words, a consistent conjectues equilibrium is 
attained at which the conjectures of firm i on firm j is 
equal to the actual behaviour of firm J. The uniqueness 
of consistent conjectures equilibrium is obtained under 
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certain assumptions on the specifications of demand and 
cost functions. 
9.2.2 Parameterization and Consistent Conjectures 
The crucial point to guarantee a unique equilibrium seem 
to rest on the way vis are derived. The generalization 
of demand and cost function will lead to a change in the 
way the vis are derived and thus eliminate the uniqueness 
result of P&B. Therefore, under full information 
assumption, i. e., each firm knows the values of all the 
exogenous variables and the objectives of firms (given 
that all information is a common knowledge), the 
specifications of demand and cost functions play a 
crucial role in determining the way the vis are derived. 
An example will illustrate this point. 
Given such a full information structure, equation 9-6 may 
be rewritten as 
vl(gi, v2) = 6ri(gl, v2)/5ql 
(9-7) 
v2(g2, vl) = 6r2(g2, vi)/5q2 
The solution to this simultaneous equations are given as 
vl = Srl[gi, 6r2(g2, vi)/6q2)1/6ql (9-8) 
V2 = 6r2[g2, Srl(gl, v2)/6ql)]/6q2 (9-9) 
Thus, uniqueness is obtained for various possible 
specification of demand and cost functions as long as the 
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right hand side of (9-8) and (9-9) are both linear 
functions of v1 and v2 respectively. 
9.2.3 Dynamics and Consistent Conjectures 
One weakness of the P&B model is that it lacks any 
dynamic adjustment property. Under a dynamic framework, 
if firms start off from a position which may not be the 
consistent conjectures equilibrium as defined by P&B, 
the uniqueness result may not be attained as shown by 
Laitner (1980). 
Ulph, on the other hand, acknowledging this finding, 
argues that to produce a properly formulated criterion 
for rationality would require a host of additional 
rationality criteria, which would require the correctness 
of conjectures about the consequences of output changes 
from points other than the equilibria relative to a given 
belief. 
Most recent criticism on this aspect comes from Makowski 
(1987) where he adopts basically the same argument as 
Ulph's reinterpretation of the definition of consistent 
conjectures by P&B. He points out that the equations 
in (9-6) should be written as: 
vi(q) = dri(q)/dqi = Sri(q)/Sqi + 6r2(q)/6q2 v2 
(9-10) 
v2(q) = dr2(q)/dq2 = 6r2(q)/6q2 + öri(q)/bqi vi 
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We note that the second term on the right hand side was 
assumed to be zero in P& B's definition. 
The fundamental source that produces (9-10) as against 
(9-6) is that in the former, the function r is given as 
ri = ri(qi, qj) whereas in the later, it is given as ri = 
ri (q i, qj (q i)) for i=1,2, and i+J. But then, the 
argument would be why the function ri should stop -there 
instead of ri = ri(qi, gj(qi(qj(....... )))) which would 
require an infinite number of repetition. In other 
words, not only is the initial starting position of firms 
important, but also how they come to be where they start 
off. 
9.2.4 Infinite Regress of Expectation 
The problem of infinite repetition just mentioned above, 
has not escaped attention in the past. Daughety (1985) 
solves an infinite regress problem where firm i chooses 
an output level to maximize its profit subject to a model 
representing its rival j, which in turn maximizes its 
profit subject to a model of its rival, firm is model. 
This is repeated infinite times. Under a fundamentally 
the same definition of consistent conjectures to that of 
P&B, he shows that the Cournot equilibrium is the 
consistent conjectures equilibrium. 
The strength of his approach lies in that there is no 
initial versus final position in the model but only one 
single move. Given full information about all the values 
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of the exogenous variables, the infinite regress is a 
thought experiment carried out in one move, thus 
eliminating the problem of how to determine the initial 
position as considered above. 
It appears to be counter intuitive, first, that a Cournot 
equilibrium should be the consistent conjectures 
equilibrium. After all, the definition of consistent 
conjectures equlibrium requires that the expected 
response of one's rival is in fact the actual response. 
Cournot conjectures, however, assumes the rival's 
response to be zero. But this is exactly what a 
consistent conjectures equilibrium requires. Given a 
consistent conjectures equilibrium is attained, there is 
no reason why a firm should attempt to change its 
position, even less so as a response to its rival's 
change if it knows that the rival's move is contrary to 
profit maximization behaviour by the definition of 
consistent conjectures equilibrium. 
Therefore, Cournot equilibrium is consistent with the 
definition of consistent conjectures equilibrium. 
9.3 P&B Consistent Conjectures Equilibrium 
We now examine the model presented in chapter 6 under 
consistent conjectures as defined by PA B. The reaction 
functions which are solutions to the profit maximizing 
first order conditions are given as follows: 
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(1+ß) ß 
qi = --------- (b-cl) - ---------- q2 
ß(v1+2)+2 13(vi+2)+2 
q2 = (2+v2)-i (b-c2) - (2+v2)-1 ql 
(9-11) 
(9-12) 
For one particular value of ß, say 0=1, (9-11) and (9-12) 
is given as follows: 
2(b-ci) 1 
qi' = --------- - ------ qz' (9-13) 
4+vl 4+vl 
(b-c2) 1 
qz = -------- - -------- ql' (9-14) 
2+v2 2+v2 
The equilibrium is obtained at values of ql* and q2* 
which are obtained from (9-13) and (9-14'). 
ql* _ [2(v2+2)(b-cl)-(b-c2)]/[(vl+4)(v2+2)-1] (9-15) 
q2* _ [(v1+4)(b-c2)-(b-cl)]/[(v1+4)(v2+2)-1] (9-16) 
We observe, as Laitner (1980) claims, that there are many 
possible values of vl and v2 for each given value of - qi* 
and q2*. 
Under rational conjecture, two restrictions are imposed 
as given in (5-6): 
v1 = 6q2/Sqi and v2 = 6qi/6q2 (9-17) 
From (9-11) and (9-12), we obtain the value of dqi/dqj 
respectively. 
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Solving this simultaneously for vl and v2 yield the 
followings 
vl = C-(ß+1)±(ß+l)yJ/ A (9-18) 
V2 = C-(A+1)±(ß+l)J/(1+A) (9-19) 
Since the right hand side of equations in (9-17) are not 
linear functions of v1 and v2 respectively, we obtain in 
(9-18) and (9-19) two possible conjectures confirming our 
earlier findings. Let 
vl+ = C-(ß+l)+(ß+l)7/ß 
Vl- 
The values of vi+ and vi- for each given value of ß is 
represented in figure 9-3. 
Substituting v1 and v2 back into the above reaction 
function (9-2) and (9-3), we obtain the following: 
(1+ß) ß 
ql - ------------ (b-ci) - ------------- q2 (9-20) 
(1+ß)±(1+ß)3 (1+ß)±(1+ß)Y2 
(1+A) (1+3) 
q2 = ------------ (b-c2) - -------------- qi (9-21) 
(1+A)+(1+ß)% (1+ß)±(1+ß)4 
The equilibrium for each given value of ß is obtained 
from solving equations (9-20) and (9-21) simultaneously. 
They are given as 
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(1+ß)((l+p)±(1+ß)'(b-c1)-ß(b-c2)} 
ql = ---------------------------------- 
[ 
(9-22) 
(1+A)±(1+A)=]2-(1+ß)A 
(1+13){(1+13)±(1+ß)3(b-c2)-ß(b-ci)} 
qi = --------------------------------- (9-23) 
[(1+ß)t(1+ß)y272-(1+ß)A 
Note that in the limit (ß -- o, ß4 0), the consistent 
conjectural variation collapses to the Bertrand 
competition. Note that this uniqueness corresponds to 
the result obtained by Perry and Bresnahan for when ß4 
Co . This implies that under homogeneous product 
assumption, consistent conjecture results in uniqueness. 
As for ß40, we get two solutions for each given value 
of ß although the products are differentiated. The 
possible Nash equilibria for each given level of ß is 
shown in figure 9-4. The curve OT and 0'T' represent the 
Nash equilibria under vi+ and vi- respectively for each 
given value of ß. ON and OM represent,, as before, the 
Cournot-Nash and Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. 
Below, we illustrate why the consistent conjectures 
equilibria under vi+ should be as shown in OT. 
For 0 <_ 13 < w, compare the denominator of all the 
coefficients of the reaction functions obtained from 
Bertrand competition with consistent conjectural 
variation, i. e., (2+13) and (1+ß)+(1+ß)j respectively. 
Rewrite the former as (1+0)+1. Let x= 1+0 and y= l+x. 
Then the former is given as yl = x+1 while the latter as 
y2 =x+ x4. We note that dy2/dx > dyl/dx >0 for all 
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argument of x? 1 since ß'_ 0. Therefore, inspite of the 
converging limiting cases between Bertrand and consistent 
conjectural variations, the loci of Bertrand equilibria 
will lie above the loci of consistent equilibria. 
Therefore, one possible loci of equilibria of stage two 
game under consistent conjecture will lie between the 
Cournot and Bertrand competiton. 
9.4 Cournot Equilibrium as the Consistent Conjectures 
Equilibrium 
So far, we have derived the consistent conjectures 
equilibrium of our model according to the definition of P 
& B. We found that there are two possible equilibria for 
each given value of ß. There is, however, inconsistency 
in the definition as it stands. The reaction functions 
of firm 1 and 2 as given in equation (9-14) and (9-15). 
The slope of the reaction function should be equal to the 
conjectures. But in our case, they are not. Such 
inconsistency in the definition of consistent conjectures 
has led to other more refined notions as already 
discussed earlier. We also mentioned that solving 
infinite regress problem yield Cournot equilibrium. We 
now give the intuition for this result. 
A consistent conjectures is defined at a point (qi, q2) 
if firm 1's conjectures about the response of its rival 
to a small change in qi represent change in q2 with which 
firne 2 would itself be satisfied. Therefore, if there is 
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a particular point q* _ (qi*, q2*) at which changes in qi 
away from ql* would not result in increase in firm 1's 
profitability for all 'feasible reaction from its rivals 
and vise versa, then q* is defined as the consistent 
conjectures equilibrium. Feasible reaction means any 
change in q2 as a response to qi which would lead to an 
increase in firm 2"s profitability. 
Given this definition, consider solving the infinite 
regress problem played in a single move. There may be 
more than one such point q* at which the definition is 
satisfied. However, we consider one particular point, 
the Cournot equilibrium qc _ (qic, q2C). We know that 
the Cournot equilibrium was obtained in chapter 7 under a 
zero conjecture. In other words, at qc, firm 1 will not 
change qi because it knows that firm 2's reaction within 
its feasible set will not improve firm 1`s profitability. 
Likewise, firm 1 knows that firm 2 faces the same 
situation. Therefore, firm 1 conjectures that firm 2's 
conjectural variation is zero at qc and that in the 
neighbourhood of this point, there is no reaction 
function to neither firm. Thus Cournot equilibrium 
satisfies the P&B as well as solves the infinite 
regress problem. 
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9.5 Conclusion 
We have shown various possible outcomes of stage two game 
under uncertainty, full information and rationality. 
Under uncertainty of conjectural variations, there are 
infinitely many possible solutions as shown in figure 9- 
2. Any of those solutions may be obtained by an 
appropriate assumption of firms conjectures. 
We then illustrate the various attempts in reducing this 
multiplicity of solutions. The common notion in question 
was termed as consistent conjectures. The controversy 
surrounding the definition included the derivation of 
vis, dynamics and infinite regress problems. 
We first derived consistent conjectures equilibrium 
according to the definition of P&B. We found that for 
each given values of ß, there. were two equilibria. The 
dominant strategy for each given value of p will be 
determined by the values of the exogenous variables, b, 
cl and c2. We found that the consistent conjectural 
variation, however, differed from the slope of the 
reaction function, implying inconsistency in the 
definition. Thus adopting a more general definition by 
Laitner, Ulph and Daughety, we were able to locate at 
least one equilibria which was consistent with the 
definition of consistent conjectures equilibrium: the 
Cournot equilibrium. Although we did not prove the 
existence of other consistent equilibria, we found that 
the Cournot equilibrium is a solution under consistent 
conjectures. 
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Rationality is said to prevail when firms use all 
information they have including expectations on its 
rivals responses to its own changes in quantity when 
maximizing profit. Full information is defined as 
information about not only on its own firm but also that 
of its rival as well as knowledge of all exogenous 
variables. In this respect, given rationality prevails, 
Cournot equilibrium may be the unique solution to the 
duopoly competiton. 
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10. Competition for Market Leadership 
In chapter 7 and in 8, we have considered the Nash 
equilibrium under Cournot and Bertrand conjectures given 
that the market leadership in terms of quality level is held 
by firm 1. It is an interesting question as to whether in 
reality, a firm in NICs may overtake the leadership in some 
markets or even decide to remain a follower. In this 
chapter, we shall analyse these possibilities within the two 
stage game framework adopted so far. 
Given an increase in the cost of firm 1 (both production 
cost and/or innovation cost), firm 1 may decide to give up 
the leadership and become a follower. In some cases, it may 
be forced to stay a leader. One of the concerns of 
industrial economists has been the effect of innovation on 
market structure, As already elaborated in the introductory 
chapter, a key question that has been constantly been 
addressed is persistent dominance as against action-reaction 
of firms changing leadership in turn. Various findings have 
been reported based on different model structure, e. g., 
single vs sequential game, product vs process innovation and 
finally, Bertrand vs Cournot competition in the marketing 
stage. 
Initially, works by Dasgupta (1982) and Gilbert & Newbery 
(1982) were based on unconditional once and for all 
commitments of R&D efforts at the outset of a race lacking 
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behavioural dynamics. Fudenberg et al (1983) on the other 
hand introduced strategic interaction to yield a race for 
patents. Firms compete vigorously if they are nearly even 
while if one firm pulls far enough, the other drops out. 
Harris and Vickers (1985) set up a model of asymmetric firms 
and of process innovation to explore strategic consequences 
of asymmetries between firms. Their asymmetries were firms' 
valuation of the price of winning, firms discount rates, 
efficiency at making progress and their initial distances 
from the finishing line. Their findings were that the 
behaviour of the winner of the race is often exactly as if 
he were the only player, except in the first stage of the 
race. 
Reinganum (1985) introduces a model of sequential process 
innovation. Her finding was that the current incumbent firm 
has less incentive to innovate than his rivals, resulting in 
action-reaction. Vickers (1986) on the other hand, 
considers a model where firms not only take into account the 
immediate effects of the race, but also its indirect 
influences upon subsequent patent races. He shows that if 
the product market is competitive, e. g., Bertrand 
competition, there is an increase in the monopoly power of 
the incumbent firm whereas if it is not so competitive, 
e. g., Cournot competition, there will be action-reaction. 
More recently, Beath, Katsoulaces and Ulph (1987) found that 
if the R&D investment is again forprocess innovation and if 
the marketing stage is competitive (Bertrand competition), 
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persistent dominance of the incumbent firm is observed. On 
the other hand, if investment is on product innovation, then 
even under 'Bertrand competition, we may either find 
persistent dominance or action-reaction. The former is 
guaranteed if the new innovation introduced does not provide 
too great a gap compared to the ex ante quality level so 
that monopoly is not observed. 
Our concern, here is to examine the possibility of the 
follower overtaking the leader within a model where the 
follower has lower cost of production and R&D investment is 
on product innovation. We shall examine under both the 
Cournot and Bertrand competition for the marketing stage. 
The incentives for firms to compete to become either a 
leader or a follower will be their relative profit levels. 
The maximum possible level of innovation is not fixed but 
will be determined by the profit maximizing firm given a 
positive cost of innovation. 
In the following two chapters, as an extension to this 
subject, we shall examine firstly how such a race for market 
leadership may be affected by the introduction of various 
licencing rules and, secondly, the optimal investment into 
R&D and the timing of implementation of new innovations. 
10.1 First Stage Game given Cournot-conjectures in the 
Marketing stage 
The profit functions of firm 1 and firm 2 were given in (7- 
8) and (7-9) as follows: 
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[2Bai + (A-2B)a212 
71L = ------------------ - alai (10-1) 
[4a1-az]2 
[Dai]2 
t2F = ------------- - a2a2 
[4ai-a2 ]2 
(10-2) 
We have established already the reaction functions of firm 1 
and firm 2 in (7-17) and (7-22) respectively. 
10.1.1 The Choice between staying a Leader and becoming a Follower 
The profit function of firm 1, if it becomes the follower, 
may be obtained directly from the profit function of firm 2 
as shown in (7-9). The profit level of firm 1 is given as 
[acr+1>>ý 
rr. 1F -------------- - .i1 CX 1il lº- ) 
[3+4ri2 
(we define the quality level of firm 1 and firm 2 as ai' and 
az' respectively if a2 > al, 
function is given as 
ai' = ri*(ai')/Cri*(ai')+1] a2- 
(10-4) 
The corresponding reaction 
where r= a1'/[a2'-ai'] for a2' > ai' and ri*(ai') satisfies 
aia2 = 2A2(l+r)3/(3r+4)3, 
Likewise, if firm 2 decides to become the leader, it would 
face a profit function given as 
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[2Ga2' + (D-2G)ai'12 
(10-5) 
[4a2'-ai ']2 
where G=b- C2. 
The corresponding reaction function is given as follows: 
a2 = cr2*(a2 )+li/r2' ai' 
where r2*(a2') satisfies 
alai = 4A(Dr+2G)r2/(3r+4)3 (1C)-6) 
Analogous to the Cournot Nash equilibrium obtained in 
chapter 7, the equilibrium, given that market leadership 
changes, is shown in figure 10-1 as the point Z. The point 
Z' is the original Cournot Nash equilibrium. ri' 
and ri denote the reaction function of firm i before and 
after the change in the market leadership respectively. 
Note that D>A. Therefore, we obtain that firm .: '_ 
reaction function as a leader is equal to that of firm 1 as 
a leader while firm 1's reaction function as a follower is 
more shrunk towards the origin when compared to that of firm 
2 as a follower. The intuition is that as firm 1 has a 
higher production cost than firm 2 (given constant marginal 
and average cost), for each given value of its rival's 
quality level, it has to opt for a lower quality level to 
compensate the loss from the profit net of innovation cost 
by cutting down on its expenditure on innovation investment. 
Furthermore, this asymmetry in firm 2'ti reaction function is 
a sufficient condition for the slope of the line OZ' to be 
less steep than the inverse of the slope of OZ due to the 
concavity of ri'and r2. In other words, the. Cournot Nash 
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equilibrium after the change in leadership is attained where 
the quality difference is larger relative to that before the 
change. Therefore, in the long run, i. e., it may take some 
time for initial conditions to weaken, given a follower 
overtakes a leader with a lower cost of production we will 
observe a widening quality gap although the absolute values 
in both. firms will be smaller than in the case of no- 
overtaking. 
Compare the profit levels of firm 1 between Z and Z'. 
[aß*+7B]2 [A(r*+1)72 
nIL = Tr1£ _ --------- - 3lal* - ---------- + alai** (10-7) 
[3p*+4]2 [3r*+4]2 
where ß* = a2*/(ai*-az*) 
and firm 1 attains Z and Z' at (a l*, and (. al*, a, *) 
respectively. 
Since we established that al* > a2**, al* > az* and a2* > 
al**, we know that ß* > r*. We need to establish the sign 
of equation (10-7) in order to find a dominant strategy for 
firm 1. We write (10-7) as 
[r(3B-2A)4Aß+4(2B-A)l2 
---------------------- al(al* - ai**) (10-8) [(3r+4)(3ß+4)72 
where 3B - 2A =D and 2B -A=G. Both the first and the 
second term will be positive, thus leaving the sign 
indeterminate. We do know, however, that an increase in the 
value of B will lead to an increase of the first term of 
(10-8) while an increase in the value of A will lead to an 
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increase of the value of the first term only if 0< 2(r+2), 
which is indeterminate. 
In order to obtain the sufficient condition for rGiL > niF, 
we would require to solve a* and r* in terms of the cost 
parameters. What we do know however, is that as the cost of 
production and/or cost of innovation increases, it becomes 
less profitable for firm 1 to defend its leadership. Note 
that an increase in cl implies a fall in the value of A, B 
and an increase in the value of D. The Cournot Nash 
equilibrium will move towards the North-east direction as 
shown in figure 10-1 by the arrow starting from Z' as r2' 
will shift upwards while ri' is, indeterminate. This will 
lead firm 1 to a lower profit contour. 
Consider now the profit level of firm 2 at points Z and Z'. 
C(1+A)D]2 [Dr+2r]2 
U2F - U2L = ---------- - a2a2* - --------- + a2** 
(313+4)2 (3r+4)2 
As before, we rewrite (10-9) to establish the dominant 
strategy for firm 2 as follows: 
[2Drß+Dr+213(3G-2D)+4(2G-D)]2 
a2(a2**-a2*) - ----------------------------- (10-10) 
[(3r+4)(313+4)]2 
where 3G-2D. = A and 2G-D = B. As before in (10-8), the 
sign of (10-10) is indeterminate as both terms are positive, 
We now have a situation where an increase in values of A, B 
and D will lead to an increase of the second term in (10- 
10), The implication of this is that firm 2 will stay a 
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follower if the cost of innovation, i. e., a2 is high or the 
relative cost of production cl/c2 is smaller than a certain 
value below which firm 2 may venture to overtake the 
leadership. For a precise value, we need to solve for a* 
and r* in terms of cost parameters. 
We have established so far that the leader will defend its 
leadership if the cost of innovation is low and its cost of 
production is not too high relative to that of its follower. 
If, on the other hand, the cost of innovation increases to a 
very high level while the cost of production is fixed at a 
low level (or the cost of innovation is fixed at a low level 
and there is a sharp increase in the cost of production 
while that of its competitor remains unchanged), firm 1 will 
opt to become the follower reducing its quality level. This 
is because being a follower, firm 1 would not require. a high 
quality level, thus. Saving from the reduction in the level 
of investment into innovation. 
Analogous to firm 1, firm 2 will stay a follower if the cost 
of innovation is high while the relative cost of production 
is low. On the other hand, if the cost of production is 
very low, firm 2 may venture to overtake the leadership 
investing heavily in innovation which would now be possible 
from the savings obtained from the fall in the cost of 
production. 
Suppose firm 2 copies technology from firm 1 without paying 
a licence fee and without independent innovation. This 
would be denoted as az = 0. Then it pays firm 2 to become 
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the leader except that if it becomes a leader, its cost of 
innovation will be positive forcing it to become a follower 
again. Under such a case the follower may wish to approach 
the quality level of firm 1 very closely, but never actually 
take over until either a fall in firm 2's cost of innovation 
or a widening cost of production between the leader and the 
follower is observed. It could be that this is the reason 
why many electronics firms in Korea are following the 
quality levels of its rivals but, so far, no attempts have 
been made to overtake the leadership. 
10.1.2 A Numerical Example 
As before, we assign specific values fOr b, cl and c2 as 
follows to confirm our findings so far to include the 
curvatures of reaction functions as well as the values of 
each quality levels. 
b= 10 
ci =2 
C2 =1 
al = a2 =1 
This implies that 
A=7 
B=8 
D= 10 
2A2/27ai = 3.6 
2A2/64ai = 1.5 
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The result of a simulation deriving the reaction functions 
of both firms, given a change in leadership is obtained as 
follows: 
Firm 1 Firm 2 
ai a2 az a1 
0.1 1.6 0.1 0.0 
0.6 2.0 0.6 0.0 
1.1 2.3 1.1 0.1 
1.6 2.6 1.6 0.3 
2.1 2.8 2.1 0.5 
2.6 3.1 2.6 0.8 
3.1 3.4 3.1 1.2 
3.6 3.6 3.6 1.5 
4.1 1.9 
4.6 2.4 
5.1 3.0 
5.6 3.6 
6.1 4.3 
6.6 5.0 
7.1 5.9 
7.6 6.8 
8.1 7.8 
8.3 8.3 
These values are plotted in figure 10-2 and approximated 
into a smooth curve. The values of ri' and r2' were already 
obtained from the numerical example in chapter 7. The 
equilibrium values are as follows: 
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ai* 
az* = 3.6 
al** 0.6 
a2** = 1.9 
13* = 1.89 
r* _ 0.46 
This confirms our earlier findings that al* > a2**, al* > 
az**, az*> al** and o*> r*. The utility levels are given as 
follows: 
ttiL = 3.64 
n1F = 0.84 
U2F = 5.33 
UzL = 0.13 
Therefore, given b= 10, cl =2 and c2 = 1, we find that trIL 
>W and OF > ß2L, in other words, the dominant 
strategies for each firm would be to stay the leader for 
firm 1 and to be a follower for firm 2. 
10.2 Folk Theorem and the Incumbent firm 
Earlier in this chapter, we derived the result that for 71L 
> n1F and U2F > U2L to hold, we would require certain 
conditions on the level of cost parameters. We required 
that the values of D, G and A to be high for n1L > T1F and 
P, A and B to be low for U2F > U2L. For given values of b* 
and c2*, this implies that both firms will not attempt to 
change their market position as leader and follower as long 
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as there exists some value of cl* that satisfies both (10-8) 
and (10-10). However, for certain values of ci, we may have 
a situation where each firm would maximize its profit by 
becoming a follower. In other words, firm 1's profit 
maximizing strategy would be al' while that of firm 2 would 
be a2 (as shown in figure 10-3). We consider this problem 
under an infinitely repeated game. In particular, we shall 
describe this situation under Folk theorem. 
10.2.1 The Folk Theorem 
The Folk Theorem states that the profit of Nash equilibrium 
strategies, i. e., ais, in an infinitely repeated game are 
feasible, individually rational profits in an one-shot game 
providing that there is sufficiently little discounting of 
the future. The vector of profits, rr*(al*, a2*) _ [R1*(a1*, 
a2*), t2* (cx l*, a2 *) ] is feasible in an one shot game if it 
is a convex combination of pure strategy 2-tuples. The 
vector of profit n*(al*, a2*) is individually rational if it 
pareto dominates the minmax outcome ttimm(al, a2) for i=1, 
2. In other words, the minmax profit of a firm is the 
particular level below which its profit level can not be 
forced futher down by its rival. We note that (al*, al*) 
giving rise to n* are not restricted to be Nash equilibria 
for the one shot game, but generally are a larger set of 
outcomes. 
Under such a setting of a game, firms' responses to their 
rival's deviant behaviour in the repetitive game strategy is 
implicitly inbuilt. For example, if firm I deviate:, from 
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n*(a1*, a2*), firm 2 will react in the next stage such that 
nl*(al*, az*) becomes TLlmm(al, az) and will do so for ever. 
Given an infinite horizon and a discounting factor 
sufficiently small, such an one shot gain from deviation 
will be more than offset by their present discounted value 
of its future stream of profits at minmax level. 
One problem with this notion of equilibrium is that it is 
not a perfect equilibrium as observed by Rubinstein (1979), 
i. e., it may not be in firm 2's best interest to respond 
with the minmax strategy for ever. This implies that the 
minmax strategy may not prove to be credible. One way of 
restoring subgame perfection is if an incentive in the form 
of a small increment to their average profitability is given 
to the firm not free riding. A proof of this last statement 
is given in Fadenberg and Maskin 1986), 
10.2.2 Forced Leadership 
Having outlined briefly the Folk Theorem, let us now return 
to our model where we assumed to have a situation where each 
firm finds itself to be better off becoming a follower. 
In a one-shot game, the Nash equilibrium will be attained at 
the. origin as this is the only point where the reaction 
functions of both firms intersect. 
, 
This is because the 
reaction function of firm 1 is given as ri and that of firm 
2 as r2'. 
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In an infinitely repeated game, however, the profit vector 
n*(a1*, a2*) is one of the feasible and individually 
rational outcome. The reason being that any deviant 
behaviour by firm 1 other than ai, firm 2 will adopt the 
minmax strategy. For example, suppose that firm 1 chooses 
al" knowing that firm 2 will choose a2*. The equilibrium 
for this period will be obtained at point Z" still in figure 
10-3. As a punishment, firm 2 will choose a2" for the rest 
of the infinitely repeated game where a2" is the minmax 
level of az (at az", rri= minmax ni(ai, az)). This will 
force firm 1 to stay at al. 
A formal treatment of this game is given as follows: 
00, 
Firm 1: max 2 rinii(ai, a2) with respect to alla2 
i=0 
1.0 
Firm 2: max Z riU2i(a, - az) with respect to a2I al i=0 
where ailaj implies ai for each given value of aj and ri is 
the discount rate. 
One possible solution of these two maximization problem is 
given as a=(ai, a2). It is denoted as point Z' in figure 
10-3. Note that firm 2 has no incentive to diverge from 
this equilibrium as it is maximizing its profit at Z' while 
firm 1 could increase its profit by lowering its quality 
choice. Knowing that firm 2 always chooses a2, firm 1 could 
increase its profit if it were to diverge to al". It would 
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then be on its reaction function ri. Therefore, nl(ai, a2) 
< Ttl(al", a2"). 
Once firm 1 diverges, firm 2 will punish firm 1 by moving to 
a2" which is the firm 1's profit minimizing value given ai". 
We know that a2" must lie to the right of a2 because 
dniF dr 2A2(r+l) ai 
--- --- -- --------- -------- <0 
dr da2 (3r+4)3 (a2-al)2 
Therefore, the profit level for firm 1 will be ni(ai", a2") 
for the following periods. Note that for 
TU i(al' , cx2")-Ttl(a1 , a2) <s ri[rrli(a1, a2)-rtii(al ", a2")] i _0 
it is not optimal for firm 1 to diverge. 
10.2.3 A Credible Threat 
Suppose that the Government of NICs provide tax incentives 
as well as cheaper loans to encourage its firms producing 
commodities designated for export. The net effect of such 
provisions may be a lower cost of production (or firms in 
NICs). Firms in the industrialized countries may find that 
their cost of production is too high to compete against 
firms in NICs as incumbent firms and may find that to become 
a follower in terms of quality leadership may be more 
profitable. Since such a change in the market leadership 
implie, s higher innovation cost, firms in NICe" will find it 
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less profitable. From the Governments of NICs, lower profit 
implies loss of foreign exchange earnings. This may promote 
the Governments in NICs to draw up contingent plans to 
subsidize their firms if needs arise. The contingent plan 
may be a promise to its firms to subsidize even a larger 
amount to counteract with a minimax strategy in case the 
foreign firm decides to become a follower. Although this 
would incure greater financial burden on the Government of a 
NIC, it would still carry out such a plan due to the limited 
earnings of foreign reserves which it needs to import the 
raw materials in the first place. Such a plan would be 
sufficient to provide credibility to threats their firms may 
impose on foreign firms. The existence of such a credible 
threat will then be sufficient for the equilibrium Z' to be 
a sub game perfect equilibrium. 
10.3 First Stage Came given Bertrand Conjectures in the 
Marketing stage 
We shall consider the situation where a leader decides to 
opt out to become a follower, given Bertrand conjectures in 
the marketing stage. We first compare the profit levels of 
both firms in each case, where it is assumed that both firms 
engage in independent investment in innovation. 
The profit function of firm 1, if it stays a leader is given 
as follows: 
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f1ß3 - f2ß2 + f313 + f4 
n1L = ------------------------ - alai (10-11) 
(3(3+4)2 
where fl = (Cl - C2)2 
f2 = (Cl - C2)(4b - 5ci + c2) 
f3 = 4(b - cl)(b - 2ci + c2) 
f4 = 4(b - cl)2 
If it decides to become a follower, it would face a profit 
function given as 
flr3 - f5r2 + fsr + f7 71F = ------------------------ - alai (10-12) 
(3r+4)2 
where fs = (cl - cz)(2b + 3ci + 5c2) 
f6 = (b + c2 - 2ci)(b - 4ci + 3c2) 
f- _ (b + C2- 2ci)2 
The profit functions of firm 2, if it stage a follower, is 
given as 
91133 - 92ß` + g3ß + 94 
UZF = ------------------------ - a2a2 (10-13) 
(3ß+4)2 
where gi = (Cl - C2)2 
g2 = (cl - c2)(2b + 3ci - 5c2) 
g3 (b + cl - 2c2)(b + 3ci - 4c2) 
g4 = (b + cl - 2cz)2 
The profit function of firm 2, if it becomes a leader, is 
given as 
glr3 - g51'2 + ger + g7 
UzL = ------------------------ -'ILA (10-14) (3t+4)z 
where g2 = (ci - c2)(4h + o1 - 5cz) 
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gs = 4(b - c2)(b + ci - 2c2) 
g7 = 4(b - C2)2 
Given that firm 2 becomes the leader if firm 1 decides to 
become a follower, the Bertrand Nash equilibrium is attained 
at points Z as shown in figure 10-4. As before, Z' is the 
equilibrium given firm 1 is the follower and firm 2 the 
leader. 
We recollect that the values of al" and az" were obtained in 
chapter 8 as the values satisfying (8-31) and (8-32) 
respectively.. In other words, at al", the profit level of 
firm 1 is zero while at a2", the profit level of firm 2 is 
zero. Note that an increase in cz shifts the reaction 
function rz' downwards. This is because the value of 2g3-g4 
falls and az" falls as the value of c2 rises. Since firm 
1's cost of production is larger than that of firm 2, once 
firm 1 becomes a follower, the reaction function of firm 1 
will be lower and shorter compared to that of firm 2 as a 
follower. Depending on the relative difference in the cost 
of production, firm 1's reaction function as a follower may 
either be ri or ri". 
Consider the reaction function of firm 2. If cl falls, ai" 
will increase such that the reaction function of firm 1 
stretches out further along the 45° line. Since cz < cl, 
the reaction function of firm 2 as a leader will be larger 
and more stretched than that of firm 1 as a leader. 
Therefore, the reaction function of firm 2 as a leader will 
be rz. This then implies that the. relative quality level 
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difference will be greater once the leadership changes 
hands. In absolute terms, the quality level of firm 2 will 
have risen while that of firm 1 fell such that the inverse 
of the slope of the line OZ will be steeper than the slope 
of the line OZ'. 
If firm 1 as a follower faces a reaction function given as 
ri", then firm 2, by increasing its quality level slightly 
above a2**, can drive out firm 1 completely out of the 
market. Therefore, firm 1 has a greater incentive to stay a 
leader than under the Cournot conjectures in the marketing 
stage. The implication of this is that either a firm 1 has 
to innovate continuously such as to cover its higher cost of 
production and thereby stay a leader, or it will be forced 
out of the market. Below, we shall consider this explicitly 
and show that for cl > c2, the reaction function of firm 1 
as a follower will always be of type ri". 
10.4 Production Cost Differences and Market Participation 
given cl > e2. 
10.4.1 When al > a2 
Let us consider the case where al > a2 first. In order for 
firm 1 to earn a positive profit, it must guarantee itself 
both a positive market share and a positive mark up rate, 
i. e., Pic - cl >0 and qic > 0. Below, we derive conditions 
under various conjectures that satisfies these two 
conditions. 
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Under a Cournot conjectures assumption in the marketing 
stage, we know from equations (7-4) and (7-6) that these 
conditions require 
ß(b-2ci+c2)+2(b-cl) 
------------------- 
(3ß+4) 
which is satisfied if b> 2ci - c2 and b> cl or more 
precisely, this implies that the production cost of firm 1, 
ci, must satisfy the following: 
b(ß+2)+c2P 
cl < -------------- (10-16) 
2 (1+A) 
Likewise, under a Bertrand conjectures in the marketing 
stage, given the equation (8-3) and (8-11), we require 
ß(G2-c1)+2(b-c1 ) 
----------------- 
3f3+4) ( 
(10-17) 
and 
(cz-ci)I32+(2b-3ci+c2)13+2(b-ci) 
------------------------------ >q (10-18) 
(3f3+4) 
This implies that the production cost of firm 1 must satisfy 
the following inequality even though this may not 
necessarily be the case in reality: 
2b+c2ß 
ci < --------- (10-19) 
A+2 
We consider below all potential values of ci given b> cl > 
c2 for all values of 0 which will guarantee firm 1a 
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positive mark-up and market share. Under Cournot 
conjectures in the marketing stage, we obtain ci <b as 0--. > 
0 and cl < b/2 + l-4c2 as ß-; ý w. Therefore, for any given 
value of c2 < ci, firm 1 will stay in the market as long as 
cl <b for 3-, O and cl < b/2 + ßc2 for 13-co. 
Likewise, under the Bertrand conjectures in the marketing 
stage, we obtain cl< b as 13-7 5 and cl = c2 as ß-rco. This 
means that as the quality level of firm 2 approaches that of 
firm 1, the only way firm 1 can survive the marketing stage 
is if cl = c2. The possible values for cl under these 
various cases is illustrated in figure 10-5. 
10.4.2 When Q2 > al 
Consider now the case where firms may switch their market 
positions. Under such a case, Cournot conjectures in the 
marketing stage requires that 
(i+r)(b-201+02) 
--------------- >o (ar+4) (10-20) 
This implies that the production cost of firm 1 has to 
satisfy 
b+c2 
cl < ------- 
2 
(10-21) 
Under the case of the Bertrand conjectures, we require that 
(cz+2ci)r+(b+c2+2ci) 
-------------------- >0 
($r+4 ) 
(10-22) 
and 
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(c2-ci)r2+(b-3ci+2c2)r+(b-2ci+c2) 
--------------------------------- (10-23) 
(3r+4) 
This implies that 
b+(r+1)c2 
-G1 < ------------- 
2(r+l) 
(10-24) 
This is stating that there is no possible value of cl within 
the argument b> ci > cz that will enable firm 1 to 
participate in the market once it becomes the follower. The 
reason is that under the Bertrand competition in the 
marketing stage, the prices are lower than those under the 
Cournot competition. Therefore, a firm with a high cost can 
only survive if its quality is sufficiently high enough to 
compensate for the high price level that is forced to charge 
due to the high production cost. This does not necessarily 
imply that the price level of the firm with higher 
production cost is higher than the firm with a lower 
production cost, but that the quality difference can not be 
sufficiently compensated by a lower price level. 
To illustrate this point, consider the price level of firm 2 
as a leader is given as follows: 
(2c2+cl)r + 2(b+c2) 
p2L = --------------------- (10-25) 
(3r+4) 
The price level of firm 1 as a follower is given as 
(2ci-c2)r + (b+ci+c2) 
piF = ----------------------- 
(3r+4) 
(10-26) 
Then the difference in the price level p2L - g1F is given 
as, 
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3r2(c2-cl)+r(3b-7ci+3c2)+4(b-cl+c2) 
----------------------------------- (10-27) 
(3r+4) 
The sign of (10-27) is indeterminate. Given that b> (7ci- 
3c2)/3, (10-27) could even be positive. Therefore, even if 
the price level of the follower with higher production cost 
may be higher than that of a leader with a lower production 
cost, the cost conditions- derived above state: that it is 
not sufficient to compensate for the difference in the 
quality level. 
10.5 Conclusion 
We have examined the possibility that the market leadership 
may be challenged and found that under the Cournot 
conjectures assumption for the marketing stage, that it is 
more profitable for a firm with higher cost of production, 
to stay a leader, compensating its higher price level by 
providing a better quality product. Once the production 
cost reaches a very high level, it would benefit the leader 
to opt out to become a follower in which case it will be 
able to save from the lower expenditure in innovation 
investment. Once the market position changes, both firms 
will produce products at a lower quality while the new 
leader with a lower production cost will widen the relative 
quality difference such as to maximize its profit, which it 
can afford to do due to the lower cost of innovation. 
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We found that for given values of b and cz, the value of ci 
plays a crucial role in determining profit maximizing 
position, e. g., leader or follower, in the market. For some 
argument of ci, it is profitable for each firm to be a 
follower. Under such a situation, an one shot game will 
lead to zero innovation strategy of both firms as the origin 
is the only point both reaction functions intersect. Under 
an infinite repetition, a situation may arise where the 
original incumbent firm with higher production cost may be 
forced to stay a leader. Such an outcome requires credible 
threat which may be provided by the Government of NICs where 
they may provide incentives to their firms in thea form of 
drawn up continency plans, or in a more usual case where the 
Government is deeply involved in the management and 
financing of its strategically important industries that 
such plans are always implicitly there. 
Finally, we examined the same situation of market leadership 
challenge under a Bertrand conjectures assumption for the 
marketing stage. We found that unless the firm with higher 
production cost remains a leader offering a high product 
quality to consumers, it will be driven out of the market. 
The implicaiton of this for firm 1 is "Innovate or die" type 
survival unless its production cost is cut drastically such 
as to be able to compete in a Bertrand competition with firm 
2. The decisions of firm 1 to innovate or close down will 
depend crucially on its relative cost of production and 
innovation. This result contradicts with the findings of 
Beath et al (1987) where under product innovation and 
Bertrand conjectures, we may observe either a persistent 
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dominance or action-reaction, both of which does not conform 
with 'innovation or die' 
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11. Licencing vs Independent Innovation 
Suppose that free copying of technology is not possible. It 
would then be to both firms' advantage if only one firm 
would invest in innovation while sharing the cost as well as 
the benefit by means of a licence fee. The obvious 
restrictions would be that the leader would not sell its 
technology level at a price more than the follower's 
indepenent innovation cost to provide an incentive to engage 
in such a deal. 
From the follower's point of view, it may adopt either of 
two views: it may take its rivals profit level into 
consideration when determining optimal behaviour or it may 
not be concerned. Under the former case, it would not be 
satisfied with paying a licence fee that is just below the 
cost of independent innovation as it knows that firm 1, the 
leader, is gaining an extra additional profit, the licence 
fee. The actual magnitude would be determined by the 
bargaining power of both sides. It would, therefore, demand 
a share in the extra profit of firm 1 which would be 
expressed as paying a lower licence fee. Under the second 
view, it may continue to behave as before, regarding the 
licence fee as its cost of innovation. We assume that firm 
2 adopts the latter view and examine below how tinder such a 
condition, the licence fee may be determined. Such a fee- 
taking behaviour may be more appropriate in our model of a 
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one shot game while in a multi-period game, the bargaining 
outcome may be more relevant as firms' decisions will be 
based not only on this period's outcome but also on 
sequences of outcomes, partially determined by this period's 
decision. 
In this chapter, therfore, we allow the case where a 
follower (firm 2) may choose between paying a licence fee to 
the leader (firm 1) for the usage of some quality innovation 
or, as before, invest in its own innovation. Given such a 
situation, we look into the possibility of leap frogging of 
the follower. 
There are tiro types of licensing: ex ante and ex post 
licensing. The former offers the licensing advance right 
to the use of innovation from a specific R&D activity while 
the latter offers right to use an innovation of a specific 
technology. The ex ante licensee relies on the R&D activity 
of the licensor without its independent research activities 
while the ex post licensee carries out its own research 
except that the innovation of the licensor is superior to 
its own. 
A fundamentally different means of innovation diffusion 
arises via imitations or free copying. A study by 
Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner (1981) found in a study of 48 
products that roughly 60 percent of patent bearing 
innovations were successfully imitated avoiding patent 
infringement within a period of four year. 
203 
One of the concerns of the literatures on licensing has been 
the effects of licensing on the level of research 
activities. Tandon (1982) finds that licensing at the 
profit maximizing fee is equivalent to producing as a 
monopolist and therefore concludes that licensing does not 
affect R&D activity. Contrary to Tandon, Salant (1984) 
finds that expectations of returns from future licensee 
encourage greater research by high cost firms in a 
symmetrical oligopoly. Gallini (1984) and Gallini and Water 
(1985) argue that the importance of ex ante licensing lies 
in deterring entry and limiting independent research 
capabilities of rivals. Thus given enough asymmetry in 
firms, licensing is likely to have an impact on the 
underlying R&D decisions. 
We will, therefore, examine the effects of licensing by firm 
1 on the level of innovation on both firms under a Perfect 
Nash equilibrium where the second stage is a Cournot 
Marketing stage. 
We introduce three different types of licence fee firm 1 may 
adopt and examine their respective profitability for both 
firms as well as the corresponding market structure in terms 
of quality differences. By means of an example derived from 
simplifying the licencing rule, we then show how the market 
leadership may change under a licencing rule. 
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11.1 Licencing vs Independent Innovation 
We define the objective functions of both firms as below: 
Firm 1: Max ni = (pi-ci)gi - ki(ai) +x (11-1) 
Firm 2: Max U2 = (p2-c2)g2 - k2(a2) -x (11-2) 
As before, pi, qi and ki denote the price level, quantity 
level and the cost of innovation by firm i, and x denotes 
the licence fee. The three types of licencing fee we are to 
examine in this chapter is fundamentally a question as how 
to specify x while k2(a2) = 0. 
The utility levels of firm 1 and firm 2, if they were to 
engage in independent innovation is given as follows: 
[2Bal* + (A-2B)a2*]2 
Tut - -------------------- - aiai* (11-3) 
[4ai*-Gi2*]2 
[Dcxl*]2 
U2F - --------------- - a2cx2* (11-4) 
[4ai*-a2*12 
where firms attain the Cournot equilibrium Z at al* and a2* 
as shown in figure 11-1. The utility levels of firm 1 and 
firm 2, given firm 2 pays a licence fee to firm 1 is given 
as follows: 
[2Balo + (A-2B)a2o32 
n1N = -------------------- - alcuo + X(a2ola1o) (11-5) 
[4a1°-a2o32 
[Daio12 
U2N - -------------- - x(a20 , aIo) (11-6) [4a10-a20J2 
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where firms attain a Cournot Nash equilibrium at aio and alb 
and a2° is the amount firm 1 sells to firm 2 at a cost of 
x(a2°) given its own innovation level is ai°. Note that aiO 
need not be equal to ai* for i=1,2. 
11.2 Licencing Fee per Unit Sold 
Refer to equation (11-5) and (11-6). A licence fee per 
quantity sold implies that x is a function of q2. But we 
note that given the second stage game as a Cournot marketing 
game, q2 is defined as a function of al, a2 and other 
exogenous parameters of the market. To be more precise, qz 
is an increasing function of a2. Therefore, a licence fee 
designed to be a function of quantity sold is qualitatively 
equivalent to a fee designed to be a function of the level 
of quality. A little more complicated specification will 
enable even a quantitative equivalence between these two 
pricing mechanism. Therefore, we specify x as a function of 
a2, e. g., we parameterize x as a3a2, a limitation that 
constrains the equivalence. 
Under this specification, the reaction function of firm 2 is 
unchanged from that under independent innovation. Firm 1, 
however, will now face a new reaction function. It will be 
derived from the values of ai and a2 satisfying j3* where it 
is a solution to the marginal condition given as dni/dß = 
dki/d[3 - dk2/dß. It may be written as: 
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-4D[Aß+2B] [ala2-a3cxl ] 
----------- -- ------------- . (11-7) (3I3+4)3 p2 
By substituting al = [(1+ß)/G3]az , the right hand side of 
(11-7) may be written as 
-a3[l3(1-a)-al a3 
------------- where a= ---- 
A2 al 
Therefore, equation (11-7) is given as 
4D(Af3+2B)ß3 
ala2 = ------------------- 
( 
11-8) 
3ß+4)[13 (1-a)-a) 
The corresponding reaction function is shown in figure 11-2 
as ri' given al = 1. 
The reaction function is the 45, ° line for al e COº, S]. For 
al> S, the reaction function becomes. a curve converging to 
a line through the origin with a slope of 1/a3, For al ": S. 
firm 1 finds it more profitable to let az copy its latest 
technology at a price of a3 per quality level. The 
expenditure in innovation as well as the lower quantity sold 
by firm 1 due to the higher quality level of firm 2 is 
outweighed by its receipt of the licence fee from firm 2. 
For al > S, however, the situation is reversed and firm 1 
benefits more by increasing the quality difference and its 
sales volume than to be compensated by receiving the licence 
fee. Note that the point S is sensitive to the value of a3. 
For a3 = 1, i. e., firm 1 charges exactly the same amount as 
its cost of innovation, the reaction function will be the 
450 line for all positive argument of al. On the other as 
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hand, for as = 0, ri' collapses to the original reaction 
- function as obtained under independent innovation. 
The reaction function of firm 2 remains unchanged except 
that a2 is replaced by as. The former is an exogenous 
variable while the latter is a decision variable of firm 1. 
Without any loss of generality and to be consistent with 
earlier examples, we let a2 = ai =1 henceforth. 
The subgame perfect equilibrium under this licence fee is 
obtained as shown in figure 11-3 as point Z'. For Z' to be 
other than on the 450 line, as must be less than D/(2A+D), 
a condition derived from below: 
2D2 4AD 
---- > ---------- 
27a3 27(1-a3) 
(11-9) 
As is apparent from figure 11-3, the left term of (11-9) ip 
the point where r2' begins to diverge from the 450 line. In 
other words, for smaller values of as, firm 1 would want to 
obtain a positive quality difference to increase its market 
share as to compensate for the lower licence fee. Below, we 
want to derive the profit maximizing level of as for firm 1 
in order to determine whether at that level, this licensing 
fee per unit sold is a dominant strategy over inndependent 
innovation. Since solving a maximi2ation of this problem 
involves algebraic complications, we adopt the following 
route. Rather than solving for an optimal value of a3, we 
simply examine whether there exists any value of a3 that 
will render this licencing rule to be dominant. First, 
using numerical values, we examine for any value of an 
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larger than D/(2A+D) that will result in t "licensing fee 
per unit sold" to dominate "independent innovation". If 
not, we look for values of as less than D/(2A+D) and repeat 
the process. 
11.2.1 a3 > D/(2A+D) 
Let us now examine whether an increase in as will lead to an 
increase in firm 1's profit level. We know from equation 
(7-8) and (7-9) in chapter 7 that for ß co, the profit 
levels of both firms are given as: 
n1N = ni(a, a) - a(as) + aza(a3) (11-10) 
ON = U2(a, a) - aaa(as) (11-11± 
where ai = a2 = Q. 
Then dfr. i/das = (a3-1)da/daa + a(as) 
and dU2/da3 = -a(a3)-a3da/da3 
Since a(a3)=2D2/27a3 for ß co in our particular example, 
we have 
da/da3 2D2/27a32 <0 (11-12) 
Then substituting (11-12) into the first order condition 
gives 
dni/das = 2D2/27aa2 >0 
dti2/das =0 
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The reason that dU2/da3 =0 is because as the cost of buying 
the new innovation rises, the lower quality firm 2 will be 
buying from firm 1 such that it does not-affect the profit 
level of firm 2. It is obvious that firm 1 will impose as 
high a value of az as possible given the constraint that 
firm 2 is not worse off as when innovating independently. 
The problem of firm 1 may be denoted as 
Max ni(a, a) + a(a3)(a3-1) (11-13) 
a3 
subject to U2(a, a)-a3a(a3) > Uz(ai*. i az*) - a2* 
Using our numberical example in (10.1.2), we know that the 
maximization problem can not be solved as the constraint can 
never be satisfied. Given the numerical value, the left 
hand side yield 3.692, while the right hand side yields 
5.33. Therefore, firm 2 will not engage in such a 
licencsing rule and opt for independent innovation. For as 
> d/(2A+D), there is no value of as that will entail this 
licensing rule to be dominant over independent innovation. 
11.2.2 a3 < D/(2A+D) 
Having established that a3 can not be larger than D/(2A+D), 
we now examine whether for lower values of a3, firm 1 would 
still be able to make a larger profit than under independent 
innovation which would prove the dominance of this licensing 
rule. Given numerical values, we know that a3 must be less 
than 10/24 (i. e., D/(2A+D)). This implies that a2 must be 
weakly greater than 17.78 (i. e., 2D2/27a3 : a2). 
Therefore, given a2 = 17.78, the highest profit firm 2 can 
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guarantee itself is at al = a2 = 17.78. Note that firm 2 
requires a profit level of at least 5.33 which it could 
obtain from independent innovation. Therefore, a2 must be 
such that 
,_' U21(al*, a2*) U2N(al, a2) - a3a2 (11-14) 
In other words, a3 <_ 0.32. However, we began our analysis 
assuming that as< 10/24. Substituting a3 = 0.32 yields az = 
23 which would require an even smaller value of a3 than 
0.32. Therefore, firm 2 will not engage in such a deal with 
firm 1 for whatever value of a3. We conclude that the 
independent innovation is a dominant strategy. 
11.3 Licence Fee as a Lump Sum Cost 
If licence fee is charged as a lump sum cost, then the 
reaction function of the first stage of firm 1 does not 
change while that of firm 2 will become the 450 line. The 
reason for unchanged reaction function for firm 1 is 
plausible, namely that lump sum cost does not affect the 
marginal conditions. As for firm 2, for whatever amount of 
the licence fee, it knows that the closer the quality level 
to that of firm 1, the larger the profit level. Therefore, 
firm 2 will always choose the maximum quality level firm 1 
can offer. In that respect, firm 2 will always choose a2' 
al' as shown in figure 11-1. 
Firm 1, knowing the behaviour of firm 2, will charge a lump 
sum fixed fee of F where it is defined as 
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F= U2(ai' , a2')-[U2(al*, a2*) - a2*3 (11-15) 
As long as tti(al*, a2*) - al* is smaller than rr. i(ai" , a2') 
- ai' + F, firm 1 will offer its highest quality to firm 2. 
Note that a fixed lump 
strategy for both firms 
makes firm 2 as well off 
, firm 1 increases. Be14 
whether this licencing 
independent innovation. 
sum license fee may be a dominant 
than independent innovation if it 
as before while the profit level of 
)w, we examine in numerical values 
rule is a dominant strategy over 
We know that ai' = a2' = 8.3 and that the profit level of 
firm 2 under independent innovation is 5.33. Since 02(ai' 
a2') = 11.1, F is 5.78. Therefore, as long ass firm 1 
determines F equal or just less than 5.78, firm 2 will buy 
the technology from firm 1 than innovate it independently. 
Consider now firm 1. The profit level of firm 1 under 
independent innovation was 3.64. Under this particular 
licencing rule, its profit level will become 2.88, which is 
less than it could have attained under independent 
innovation. Therefore, firm 1 will not want to engage in 
such an agreeent. We conclude that independent innovation 
is still the dominant strategy. 
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11.4 Licencing Fee charged on Quality Difference 
Suppose now that firm 1 allows firm 2 to freely copy its 
products but specifies a licence fee in such a way that the 
closer the quality between the two firms, the higher the 
licence fee. Firm 1 may devise such a system as to 
guarantee its market leadership. By specifying the 
licensing fee in such a way as to make it more profitable 
for the follower to buy the technology paying a licence fee 
than to engage in an independent innovation, the leader can 
benefit by moderating its own development speed as well as 
by receiving a license fee from the follower. In fact, the 
IBM has imposed a similar deal on Korean electronics 
industries in 1988. 
Such a structure of a licence fee would be obtainable by 
: specifying x as x= a4ß. The marginal condition of firm 1 
derived from its objective function will be as- follows: 
4D(Aß+2B)ß2 
aia2 = -------------- - a4ß2 
(3ß+4)3 
(11-16) 
To be more precise, they become correspondence rather than 
functions. But we shall continue to call them functions in 
order to reduce complications. The corresponding reaction 
function is shown in figure 11-4 as ri". For each given 
level of az, there are two possible values of al. For 
example, for a given value of a2 as shown in figure 11-4, 
there are two possible values of al; ray and al. Firm 1 is 
indifferent between al and al. The reason is that at ai, 
firm 1 is enjoying a higher profit level given the larger 
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quality difference while receiving only a small amount from 
firm 2 as the licence fee. At al, however, firm 1 enjoys a 
lower profit level but receives a higher licence fee from 
firm 2 due to the smaller gap in the quality level. 
Another interesting observation is that the reaction 
function becomes more blown up as the value of as falls 
(shown in figure 11-4) and converges to the reaction 
function of firm 1 found under independent innovation. The 
intuition is clearly that as a4 increases (the licence fee 
per quality difference increaes), firm 1 finds that the 
licence fee quickly compensates for a lower quality level 
both in terms of that of firm 2 and in absolute level. 
Firm 2, on the other hand, faces a marginal condition 
derived from its objectve function given such a licensing 
rule is as followers: 
2D2 (1+13) 
-- = a4 (11-17) 
(4+313)3 
The reaction function of firm 2 will be a streight line 
passing through the origin with a slope of (1+ß")/13" where 
13" satisfies the condition given in (11-11). There is an 
negative relationship between a4 and j3 such that an increase 
in a4 will lead to a fall in 13. For as larger than some 
maximum value, say, 2,0 becomes negative. Therefore, a is 
the maximum level of a4 firm 1 can impose on firm 2. for 
values of a4 within the argument of 0< a4 < a,, the loci of 
possible Nash equilibria is denoted as the curve OL in 
figure 11-5. We note that ai' and a2' are the same values 
21S 
0 
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those shown in figure 11-1, obtained tinder independent 
innovation. 
Using our numerical values as before, we find that as the 
value of a4 increases, (i, e., travelling towards the origin 
on the curve OL), we find that the profit level of firm 1 
increases while that of firm 2 falls. Below is a table 
showing a few examples supporting this, where given our 
particular numerical values to the exogenous variables, 
3.125 happens to be the limiting value of a4. 
a4 f, cz2 Tr1 X12 
3.125 0000 
2.76 0.616 0.056 14.74 6.26 
1 3.23 1.76 8.48 7.13 
0.5 3.84 2.6 8.35 8.4 
0 8.3 8.3 5.4 11.1 
We find that, even for a4 close to 3.125, the profit level 
of firm 2 is higher than that under independent innovation. 
Firm 1 will therefore choose a value of a4 close to 3,125 at 
which U2 will be equal to 5.33. We conclude that this 
licencing rule is a dominant strategy for both firms as it 
increases both firms profit compared to other licensing 
rules. 
Out of the four different cases, three types of licencing 
rules and independent innovation, we found that a licencing 
fee designed such that it is a function of quality 
difference will yield both firms higher profit. The reason 
is that both firms are able to cut back the expenees in 
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innovation investment while keeping a certain quality 
difference. The resulting market structure will be such 
that products will be of a much lower quality than under the 
case of inndependent innovation. 
11.5 Licencing Fee and Leap Frogging 
So far, we have examined different licencing rules given 
that the quality level of firm 1 itself is determined 
simultaneously with the quality level of firm 2. Here, we 
examine a stackelberg equilibrium by simplifying our model 
used so far by assuming that firm 1 has already determined 
its quality level at the subgame perfect equilibrium level 
al* under independent innovation. Given this precommitted 
level, firm 2 will determine its quality level paying a 
licence fee. Firm 1's objective is to determine a licence 
fee, knowing the behaviour of firm 2, that will maximize its 
profit while not making firm 2 worse off. Given full 
information, firm 1 knows the objective function of firm 2, 
this is equivalent as firm 1 offering a package of a2*, at a 
fixed fee. A maximization problem of firm 1 can be set up 
as follows: 
Max ni(ai*, a2)+{U2(ai*, (-X2)-[U2(al*, a2*)-a2*]} (11-18) 
a2 
subject to a2 ? ao 
a2 5 ai* 
[2Bai*+(A-2B)az12 
where ni(ai*, cx2) - ------------------ - al* (4ai*-a2)2 
(Dai*)2 
U2(ai*, a2) 
(4ai*-a2)2 
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The fee is in fact the difference between the second and the 
third term of (11-19). The first order condition of (11-19) 
is given as: 
[2D2+8B(2A-3B)](al*)2+4(A-2B)(2A-3B)a2al* 
---------------------------------=-------- =0 (4a1*-a2 )3 
[8B(3B-2A)-2D2] 
Therefore az = ---------------- a'* 
(3B-2A)(2B-A) 
Given our numerical values as before, we obtain as = 44/9 
a1*. Since az ' cxl*, the solution to this particular 
maximization problem is ai = as = ai*. The profit level of 
firm 1 net of the licence fee is - 0.056 while the licence 
fee amounts to 5.78 leaving a total profit of 5.72 to firm 1 
while firm 2 is left with a profit level of 5.33. 
The analysis above was restricted to a2 <_ al*. However, for 
a high enough license fee, a follower may increase its 
prof it level by overtaking the leader given the quality 
level of the leader. Note that the subgame perfect 
equilibrium under the licencing rule described above is at 
point T in figure 11-6. However, firm 2 not only has the 
choice of independent innovation, but also of leap frogging, 
i. e., it may decide to choose a quality level of a2**. The 
profit levels of each firm at (aý*, a2**) are given as 
follows: 
[Aa2**]2 
7L1(a1*, a2**) - ----------------- - a1* 
(4a2*-cx1*)2 
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[2Ua2**+(D-2*g)ai*]2 
U2(al*, a2**) ------------------------ a2** 
(4a2*-a1*) 
where G=b- C2 as before. The implication of this 
possibility imposes an additional restriction on the 
maximiation problem of firm 1 as shown in (11-18). It is 
given as follows: 
U2(al*, a2) - kF ? U2(al*, a2**) (11-19) 
where 0k51 and F= U2(al*, a2)-[U2(al*, a2*)-a2*] 
In other words, the net profit level of firm 2 (after 
substracting the licence fee) must be greater than or equal 
to the profit level it would have obtained had it overtaken 
the leadership by independent innovation. 
The maximization problem may be restated as follows: 
Max ni(ai*, a2) + kF (11-20) 
s. t. U2(al*, az) - kF U2(al*, a2**) (11-21) 
a2 ? ao 
a2 al* 
The first order condition of (11-20) yields 
8B(3B-2A)-2kD2 
a2 = -------------- al* 
(3B-2A)(2B-A) 
Since we found earlier that even for k=1, that SB(3B-2A)- 
2kD2 > (3B-2A)(2B-A) for the numerical value, we used 60 
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far, this inequality holds for all values of kE [0,1]. 
Therefore, irrespective of the values of k, the solution of 
a2 is a2 = ai*. Given this, we need to find the value of k 
which will satisfy the constraint given in (11-21). 
The value of k is given as 
U2(a1*, a2**)-[U2(ai*, a2*)-a2*] 
k _< 1- -------------------------------- (11-22) UZ (a1*, (11*) 
Therefore, given our numerical values as before, (11-22) is 
given as 
6.25 - 5.33 
k _< 1- ----------- 11.11 
Therefore k50.917 
Since firm 1 obtains higher profit for larger values of k. 
the value of k will be determined at k=0.917. Therefore, 
firm 1 has to be content with a lower licence fee in order 
to prevent firm 2 to overtake its market leadership by 
independent innovation, which would leave firm 1 much worse 
off than when both firms engaged in independent innovation 
with firm 1 keeping its market leadership. 
11.6 Conclusion 
We have introduced three different types of licencing rules, 
namely a fee that is determined as a function of the 
quantity of final product sold by the buyer of the 
technology, a fixed fee and finally a fee that is a function 
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of the quality difference between the top quality of the 
market leader and the level of quality it is selling to the 
follower. We obtained the result that the dominant strategy 
among the three different licencing rule including 
independent innovation is the last of the three licencing 
rules. Having established a dominant strategy, we examined 
the possibility of leap frogging by simplifying our model 
slightly. Rather than assuming that the optimal level of 
firm 1 is determined simultaneously with the quality level 
of the follower given a specific licencing rule, we assumed 
that the leader's quality level to be determined first at 
the subgame perfect equilibrium level, and derived a licence 
fee that would increase firm 1's profit while leaving firm 2 
as well off as before. We found that firm 1 will sell its 
highest quality at hand, compensating its loss of profit 
from lower sales by the higher licence fee received from 
firm 2. On the other hand, allowing for the possibility of 
leap frogging of the follower, we found that firm 1 has to 
lower its licence fee while selling the same level of 
quality in order to prevent firm 2 from overtaking the 
market leadership which would leave firm 1 much worse off 
than independent innovation. 
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12. Optimal Timing of Innovation 
Our objective here is to show the competition for market 
leadership focusing our attention on the speed of innovation 
development and on the timing of innovation implementation 
when there is just 1 point of implementation. We show that 
these two aspects are determined by the efficiencies with 
which innovation development is carried out as well as the 
responsiveness of profit changes to innovation 
implementations. We then examine briefly the market 
leadership under a sequence of innovations. We again assume 
asymmetric market structure from the outset of the model. 
Innovation will be product innovation as before, but like 
Vickers (1985), the outcome of one sequence will determine 
the structure of the market of the next period. In other 
words, the market structure is determined endogenously by 
the maximizing behaviour of both firms in each period. 
Although we do not derive the market share of each firm 
explicitly, this is conveyed implicitly in the level of 
quality increment of each period, i. e., a widening quality 
difference implies an increase in the share of market by 
firm 1 and vise versa. The structure of the model we 
present here assures that each sequence is not as drastic as 
in Reinganum (1985) in that the incumbent firm will hold 
less than 100 of the market share. This is because we 
assume Cournot competition for the marketing stage. 
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12.1 The Speed of Innovation Development 
0tspp---)vo that the level of innovation da is a function of 
time and investment into R&D represented as da/dt=µ(k) where 
µ(. ) could be defined as the speed of innovation development 
and k to be the constant expenditure for each value of µ per 
unit of time, (see for example Brock, 1982). The level of 
innovation, therefore, is a linear function of time. More 
R&D activity per unit of time yield greater total 
expenditure and more substantial innovation. We assume that 
dµ/dk <1 and d2µ/dk <0 for positive values of k which has 
similarities with the specification of the Penrose Effect as 
shown in Takayama (1974). This implies that µ(. ) is a 
concave function with marginal increment of speed of 
innovation development strictly less than the average 
increment and decreasing with respect to k. Therefore, a 
firm attempting to speed up its innovation development will 
have to spend increasingly more to attain the same level of 
innovation development in a shorter time. Furthermore, we 
exclude cases of uncertainty arising from innovation 
successes or failures. We parameterize p as µ= kri, with r 
< 1, i=1,2. Note that ri > rj implies that firm i is 
more efficient in enhancing their technology than firm j for 
a given level of investment into R&D per unit of time. 
Refer to figure 11-1 where for a given value of µ*, k2 has 
to be larger than ki if ri > r2. 
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12.2 Single Period Equilibrium 
Suppose that firms engage in quality competition from t=0 to 
t=T*. We assume that only one implementation is carried out 
by each firm. We define Ti and T2 as the date of 
implementation of a new product by firm 1 and firm' 2 
respectively. The objective of firm 1 will be to maximize 
Vi(Ti, Tz) with respect to ki and Ti where Vi(Ti, Tz) is 
given as follows: 
Vi(Ti, T2) = ('Ti ni(0,0) dt + 1T2 ni(Ti, 0) dt Jo JT1 
+ JT* Tr1(Ti, T2) dt - C(T1) (12-1) 
T2 
ni(0,0) is the profit level of firm 1 prior to the 
introduction of new products by either firm. From chapter 
7, we know that for given values of ai and az and Cournot 
competition in the marketing stage, ni(0,0) is defined as 
[ß(b-2ci+c2) + 2(b-ci)12 
nl(0,0) _ -------------------------- 
(4+3f3)2 
ni(Ti, 0) represents the profit level of firm 1 ex post 
implementation of a new product at Ti by firm 1 while firm 2 
is still selling their old product. The increment of the 
quality level of the new product at Ti as against its 
predecessor, is given as kiriTi. At this stage, we introduce 
an additional assumption to simplify the analysis, namely 
that for da sufficiently small, we can use the linear 
approximations: 
ni(T1,0) = ni(0,0) + öllkirlT1 (12-2) 
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where 611 = dni(0,0)/dai = dni(0,0)/dß dß/dal 
dni(O, 0) -4[ß(b-2ci+c2)+2(b-ci)][b+ci-2c2] 
---ý- 
ß 
---- _ --------------------------------- (12-3) 
4+3 
and d13/dai =- az/(ai - az)2 
Therefore, the profit level ex post introduction of the new 
product is equal to the ex ante profit level plus changes in 
the level of profit due to the higher quality level of the 
new product. 
ni(Ti T2) represents the profit level of firm 1 after both 
firm 1 and firm 2 have implemented new quality levels at Ti 
and T2 respectively. Here again, we make the following 
assumption: 
n1(T1 T2) = n1(0,0) + 6i1kirlTi - 812k2r2T2 (12-4) 
where 512 = dni(O, Q)/dal = dni(O, Q)/dp dß/da2 <p 
and dp/da2 = al/(ai - a2)2 
Finally, the cost function C(Ti) is defined simply as 
C(Ti) = fTl k dt = kiTi 
Jo 
The problem 
Max Vi 
Ti, ki 
Then for Ti 
Vi(Ti, T2) 
firm 1 now faces is summarized below as: 
(Ti, T2) 
: T2 
Tini + (T2-Ti)(n1+o1iklr1T1) 
(T*-T2) (nl+6likjr1T1 -$12k2r2T2) - k1T1 (12-5) 
For Ti ? T2, we have 
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V1(Ti, T2) = T2ni + (Ti-T2)(ni+5i2kir2T2) 
+ (T*-T1) (Nl+812k2r2T2 -6iikir1T1) - k1Ti (12-6) 
We note that (12-5) and (12-6) are identical for the 
maximization problem with respect to ki and Ti. In other 
words, differentiating (12-5) with respect to ki yields the 
same result as when differentiating (12-6) with respect to 
ki as shown in (6-8). Likewise, differentiating (12-5) and 
(12-6) with respect to Ti yield same results as shown in 
(12-7) below. Therefore, the maximization function is not 
restricted to the specific inequality between Ti and T2. 
The first order condition for the objective function are 
given as follows: 
dV1/dT1=-2611kir1T1+T2611k1r1+T*$1k1r1-T26llklrl-kl=O 
kii-rl = 811(T* - 2T1) (12-7) 
dVi/dk1=ri(T2-T1)611T1k1rl-1+(T*-T2)611k1r1-1T1rl-T1=O 
kll-r1 = r3631(T* - Ti) (12-8) 
From (12-7) and (12-8) we obtain the reaction function of 
firm 1 as Ti' _ (1-ri)/(2-ri) T*, i. e., irrespective of the 
value of T2, firm 1 will always implement a new innovation 
at (1-ri)/(2-ri) T*. The quality level of the new 
innovation will be higher than its predecessor by k1rl(1- 
ri)/(2-ri) T* and the cost of this new product amounts to 
ki(1-ri)/(2-ri) T*. 
We assume that firm 2 faces the same structure in its 
objective function as firm 1 except for the values of 
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parameters, e. g., 622,621, k2 and r2. For they are in turn 
defined as follows: 
822 = dV2(O, 0)/da2 = dU2/dß dp/daz >0 
dU2 2(b+ci-2c2)2(1+ß) 
--- - -------------------- (12-9) 
d3 (4+3p)3 
and dA/da2 = ai/(al-a2)2 
Finally, 621 is defined as dV2/dai = dV2/dß d(3/dal < 0. Note 
that the differences in the utility levels as shown here 
were obtained from a Cournot Nash competition in the second 
stage of a two stage game where firm 1 had the first mover 
advantage in the market enabling it to target its products 
to the high income group whereas firm 2 had the advantage of 
a lower cost of production. To be more precise, firm 1 had 
to opt for the higher income group as it would have ended up 
in a worse position had it aimed at the lower income group 
under Cournot competition. Under Bertrand competition, it 
would have been driven out of the market altogether due to 
obtaining a negative mark up as shown in the previous 
chapter. 
The symmetry between the two firms with respect to the 
structure of the objective function, yields the reaction 
function of firm 2 as T2' = (1-r2)/(2-r2) T*. In other 
words, firm 2 will implement its new innovation at (1- 
r2)/(2-r2) T* at a cost of k2(1-r2)/(2-r2) T* irrespective 
of firm 1's time of implementation. The quality level of 
its new product will be higher than its initial product by 
k2r2(1-r2)/(2-rz) T*. 
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The reason that both firms' reaction functions are 
independent of their competitor's timing of implementation 
is because their respective profit function are independent 
to each other's timing of new product implementation. 
From (12-7) and Ti = (1-ri)/(2-ri) T*, we obtain the optimal 
value of ki (constant expenditure into R&D per unit of time) 
as follows: 
kil-rl = ribil(T* - Ti) 
Then k11-rl = ri6i1T*/(2-ri). 
Therefore ki = [(riöiiT*)/(2-ri)]1/(1-rl) 
The non cooperative Nash equilibrium of this single period 
competition is then given as 
Ti' _ (1-ri)/(2-ri) T* 
T2' _ (1-r2)/(2-r2) T* 
ki' _ [(riöiiT*)/(2-r1)]1/(l-ri) 
k2' = [(r2522T*)/(2-r2)]1/(1-r2) 
We note the followings: 
dTi'/dri =- 1/(2-ri)2 <0 
dTi'/dT* _ (1-ri)/(2-ri) >0 
In other words, as the efficiency of innovation development 
increases, firms will implement their innovation at an 
earlier date whereas when their planning horizon increases, 
they will innovate at a later date. 
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Furthermore, we have dki'/dri >0 because dlogki'/dri >0 
where 
dlogki' 1 riöiiT* 11 
------ - ------- log ------ + -------- + ------------ 
dri (1-ri)2 2-ri ri(1-ri) (1-ri)(2-ri) 
Therefore, not only do we observe an earlier date of 
implementation of a new product, the constant expenditure on 
innovation investment will be higher also. 
For Ti = T2, we require ri = r2 as shown in figure 12-2 and 
for T2 > Ti, we require ri > r2. Given Ti = T2 and ri = r2, 
we obtain ki ? k2 if Sii ? 522. But 
611 - 822 = (dni/dß ß- dU2/dß 13a1/a2)/(al-a2) (12-10) 
Note that (dni/dß( = (dtl2/dß( =0 for ß On the other 
hand, for 0<p< the sign of dni/dß - dU2/dß is 
indeterminate. Substitute (12-3) and (12-9) into equation 
(12-10) to obtain 
2A[13(2a2B-aiA)+(2a2C-alA)] 
511 - 822 = ----------------------------- 
(313+4) 
) 
3(al-a2)2 
where A=b+ c1 - 2c2 
B=b- 2c1 +c2 
C=b- ci 
As befere, we assume that b> 2ci -cz such that A, B, C>0. 
For each given value of a2, there will be a value of al such 
that (12-11) is equal to zero. This may be expressed as al 
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= g(a2). In other words, al = g(a2) satisfies Aa12 + 2aia2C 
+ 2(C-B)a22 =0 which in turn was derived from equating 
equation (12-11) to zero. Then for any combination of 
positive (ai, a2) above g(a2) function in (al, a2) space, 
would imply that (12-11) is negative and vice versa. 
Suppose that the initial condition of the game was such that 
(ai, a2) was in fact above the g(. ) function. Then we have 
a negative value for (12-11) and so an equal amount of 
increase in the quality level of both firms yields higher 
profits to firm 2 relative to firm 1. In other words, 522 > 
611. This implies ki < k2 for ri = r2. Firm 2 will invest 
more in innovation to speed up research even if the new 
innovation is implemented simultaneously with firm 1. The 
reason for this asymmetry in behaviour is due to the 
difference in the profit level changes in response to 
quality level changes. It is profitable for firm 2 to invest 
more rigorously in research as per unit return in investment 
is higher than that of firm 1. We shall define the initial 
condition where (a1, a2) lie above g(. ) as initial condition 
1 (IC1) and the reverse as initial condition 2 (IC2). We 
shall assume, henceforth, that IC1 applies. The reverse of 
the results we obtained under IC1 will be true for IC2. 
12.3 Level of Quality 
Each firm's quality level of their new product over the 
quality of their old products are given as ki'rl(1-ri)/(2- 
ri)T* and 1k2'r2(1-r2)/(2-r2)T* respectively. Substituting 
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ki's with the optimal values obtained above, the increments 
of quality levels may be written respectively as 
(ri6iiT*/2-rl)rl/(i-ri) (ri-1)/(ri-2)T* (12-12) 
and 
(rz822T*/2-r2)r2/(i-r2) (r2-1)/(r2-2)T* (12-13) 
For Ti = T2 we require that ri = r2, i. e., both firms are 
equally efficient in R&D. We note that the increment of the 
profit level of firm 2 with respect to quality improvement 
is larger than that of firm 1 under IC1, i. e., dni/day < 
dU2/da2. Therefore, for Ti = T2, the quality gap is 
narrowing. In order to keep the quality gap constant, we 
require that (12-12) be equal to (12-13). 
Since 622 > Sii, we require ri > r2 for constant quality 
gap. This implies Ti < T2. In other words, for firm 1 to 
overcome the disadvantage of smaller oii, firm 1 requires 
higher efficiency in R&D for each given level of 
expenditure. Given ri > r2, firm 1 will, using this 
advantage of higher efficiency in R&D, introduce the new 
product later than its follower at a lower constant 
expenditure in R&D. To be more precise, consider the 
following. Since the change in the quality level is defined 
as kl'rlTl' and k2'r2T2' for each firm, given kl'r1T1' _ 
k2'r2T2', it follows that ki'rl > k2'r2. Let ri' ad r2' be 
values satisfying ki' = k2' for each given values of öii and 
622 so that ri' - r2' > 0. For ri > ri' and r2 = r2', or ri 
= ri' and r2 < r2', we have a situation where firm 1 is 
spending less but for a longer period on R&D. In other 
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words, firm 1 is spending less money in R&D per unit of time 
but innovates later while firm 2, at a lower level of 
constant expenditure, innovates earlier attaining a constant 
quality gap with its leader. Therefore, under IC1, we 
require that ri > r2 which will, then lead to Ti < Tz to 
attain the constant quality gap. 
Suppose that the firm in Korea attains larger profit 
relative to a firm in an industrialized country given they 
increase their respective quality levels by the same amount. 
In order for firms in the industrialized country to attain a 
constant quality difference with the firm in Korea, it must 
be more efficient in its innovation develpment. Once this 
is attained, the firm in the industrialized country will 
introduce a new innovation earlier than the Korean firm 
which will introduce its new innovation at a later date 
keeping a constant quality difference. 
12.4 Level of Profit 
The profit level Vi(Ti, T2) as defined in (12-5) was derived 
from adding the net profit made during this single period by 
implementing new innovation on the ex ante profit level 
ni(0,0). Since we are interested in the net increment to 
profit in this period only, we define Wi(Ti, T2) as Vi(Ti, 
T2) - nlT*. Then Wi(Ti, T2) is given as 
W1(Ti, T2)=6ilkirlT1(T*-Ti)-612k2r2T2(T*-T2)-kiT1 (12-14) 
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To obtain the profit contours of firm 1 on Ti, Tz space, we 
differentiate Wi with respect to Ti and T2. 
dWi/dTi = 6ilklrl(T*-2T1) - ki =0 
Ti' _ T* -ki/28iikiri = (1-ri)/(2-ri) 
d2Wi/dT12 = -2611kirl < 0. Therefore, Ti' is the maximum. 
dWl/dT2 = -612k2r2(T* - 2Tz) =0 
T2' = T* 
d2Wi/dT22 = 2812k2r2 > 0. Therefore T2' is the minimum. 
To obtain the slope of the contours, we totally 
differentiate Wi to obtain 
dWi = dWi/dT1 dTi + dWi/dT2 dT2 =0 
dT2 t511klr1(T*-2T1)-kl 
Then ---- --------------------- (12-15) 
dTl 612k2r2(T*-2T2) 
Therefore, dT2/dTi is not defined at T2' and is infinite at 
Ti'. The profit level contours of firm 1 are shown in 
figure 12-3 where profit level increases as we move either 
up or down and the minimum is attained at Wo where T2' 
becomes a tangent to the profit contour. 
For firm 1 to have a zero net profit in this period, i. e., 
Wi(Ti, T2)=O, we require that the contours of Wi =0 which 
passes through the origin, must also intersect the reaction 
function Ti'. As shown in figure 12-4, the reaction function 
of firm 2 must be a tangent to the profit contour W=0. In 
order for this to be possible, a necessary condition is Ti < 
Tz or ri > rz confirming our earlier findings that under 
CIi, a necessary condition for both firms to attain equal 
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competitiveness was ri > r2. Similarily, the profit level 
of firm 2 may be defined as 
W2(Ti, T2)=6z2k2r2T2(T*-T2)-621kir1T1(T*-T1)-k2T2 (12-16) 
From the profit contours derived above, we find that there 
are other possible combinations of Ti and Tz that would 
yield higher profit to both firms. In fact, these points 
are represented by the as curve in figure 12-5. This curve 
must pass through the origin as at the origin, both firm's 
profit level are zero. Therefore, one of the potentially 
many cooperative equilibrium is the origin, i. e., neither 
firm invest in R&D. 
12.5 An increase in the cost of production 
Consider finally the effect of an increase in the cost of 
production or a shift towards profit maximization relative 
to revenue. We note that döil/dc2 >0 while d622/dc2 < 0. 
This means that g(. ) function must shift downwards. In other 
words, for each given level of a2, the minimum level of firm 
1 to sustain its competitiveness, i. e., keep a constant 
quality difference, in the market falls with respect to an 
increase in c2. The reason is that as c2 increases, the ex 
post increment to profit of firm 2 falls relative to the ex 
ante level. We obtained earlier that the relative 
increments to profits due to changes in the quality levels 
were one of the variables that determined the level of 
investment into R&D. Therefore, as firm 2 now faces a lower 
243 
Figure 12 -5 
Tý 
T2 
a T, 
CONTRACT CURVE UNDER COLLUSION 
244 
increment to profit due to a change in the quality level 
compared to before the increment in c2, it will invest less 
in R&D. This will lead firm 1 to invest less in R&D. 
An increase in the value of dii while a fall in the value of 
822 as a result of an increment in c2 implies that the 
market which was initially under IC1 may find itself in IC2. 
Under such a case, an increase in c2 must be accommodated by 
an increase in rz relative to ri if firm 2 is to sustain its 
competitiveness in the market with respect to the quality 
levels. 
We have shown so far, that the optimum timing of innovation 
adoption and the corresponding level of expenditure will 
depend crucially on the initial condition with respect to 
quality levels of firms as well as on the values of the 
exogenous variables. The initial condition is important as 
this will determine the changes in the profit level in 
response to changes in the quality. Once we assume that 
initial quality levels are such that the profit of firm 1 
increases by less than that of firm 2 with respect to an 
equal amount of an increase in each quality level, firm 2 
will close down on the quality gap and reduce the profit 
level of firm 1 accordingly, unless firm 1 has a more 
efficient research and development technique. The actual 
amount firm 1 spends on R&D will depend on the relative 
differences in the R&D efficiency. It will adopt the new 
product earlier than its rival given that it has more 
efficient R&D technique such as to assure a constant quality 
gap. If, on the other hand, firms could collude, they would 
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be able to obtain mutually higher profit level along the 
contract curve. Finally, an increase in the cost of 
production by firm 2 leads to a change in the initial 
conditions. The g(. ) function will shift downwards such 
that efficiency in R&D by firm 2' has to rise if it is to 
sustain its competitiveness with respect to its quality 
level. 
12.6 Multi-Period Competition 
Consider a situation where the single period game is played 
n times. Each period is-played over a certain fixed time 
span of T*. The objective function for firm 1 under such a 
supergame may be defined as follows: 
li(T1, T2) = Vi(T11, Ti2) + hVi(T21, T22) + h2V1(T3i, T32) 
+ ... + hn-1V1(Tnl, 
Tn2) (12-17) 
where 1-h is the discount rate and Tit represents the time 
of implementation of a new innovation by firm 1 in the 1th 
period. Since we have established earlier that Vl(Tii, Ti2) 
= Wi(Tii, Ti2) + nl(0,0)T*, we may rewrite (12-17) given h 
=1 as follows: 
WT1, T2) = nnl(O, O)T* + W1(T11, T12) + W1(T21, T22) 
+ W1(T31, T32) +... + W1(Tn1, Tn2) (12-18) 
246 
We assume that Perfect equilibrium to prevail. Thus the 
subgame perfect equilibrium for the nth period is obtained 
solving the following maximization problem: 
Max Wi(Tni, Tn2) subject to kni and Tni. 
where kni represents the constant expenditure on innovation 
in period n buy firm 1. The solutions, as already obtained 
under single period game, are given as follows: 
Tni' _ (1-ri)/(2-ri)T* 
kni' _ (riöiiT*/2-ri)1/(1-ri) 
for i=1,2. 
Substituting these values back to the net increment to 
profit in period n yields 
Wi(Ti, T2) = Siia A- 612 622b B (12-19) 
where A= (riT*Tnl')[(riT*/2-ri)2r1-1/1-ri(T*-Tni')] 
B= Tn2'[(r2T*/2-r2)2r2-i/1-r2(T*-Tn2')] 
a= 1/(1-ri) 
b= r2/(1-r2) 
The solution to n-ith period for all i= 1,2, ... , n-1 is 
identical to the nth period as long as we assume that dai = 
dal and 6j for i=1,2 and j=1,2 are time independent 
and döij/day = 0. In other words, as long as the profit 
increment to a change in the quality level is constant with 
respect to the absolute level of the quality level and time. 
On the other hand, if the quality level changes are not 
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independent to the absolute level of quality, i. e, dSii/dai 
> 0, the quality level increase of firm 1 in one particular 
period will be by more than its previous level. 
Since 611 is a function of al and. a2, given that dal = dal, 
döii/day >0 will result in a higher level of quality 
increment than its previous level. The same analysis also 
applies to firm 2. Therefore, if d622/da2 > 0, the increment 
of present period's level of quality will be higher than 
that of the previous period. This then implies that for 
döii/dai > d822/da2, the gap in the quality level will widen 
and vise versa. 
A more crucial implication of this is the profit level. 
From (12-19), we know that 
dW1 = a(611)a-1Adö11 - 622Bd512 - bö12622b-1Bd622 (12-20) 
Therefore, given 
aA5lia-1 döli > B622b[dö12+b)(6z2)-1d622] (12-21) 
we obtain the result that Vi(Tii, T12) < Vi(Tai1T22) without 
the discounting factor. If on the other hand the reverse is 
true, the profit level of firm 1 will be squeezed as quality 
level is increased at each period. If inequalities of both 
firm hold, then this implies that the market is expanding as 
both quality level are increased. If the inequality holds 
for firm 1 but not for firm 2, then the outcome of the 
supergame will create a favourable situation for firm 1 in 
that firm 1's profit level will increase in each period 
while firm 2's profit level will fall. The reverse also 
holds. 
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12.7 Conclusion 
We have considered the optimal timing of innovation 
implementation as well as the constant expenditure that will 
maximize firms profits. For a single implementation case, 
we found that the optimal timing of both firms that maximize 
their profit depended on their planning horizon and their 
respective efficiency in innovation development. An 
increase in the efficiency of innovation development will 
not only lead both firms to implementing their new 
innovation earlier but also higher constant expenditure on 
investment innovation. 
Under a particular case where firm 2's profit increment to a 
change in its profit level is larger than that of firm 1, we 
require that firm 1's efficiency in innovation development 
be greater than that of firm 2 if the difference is 
maintained, and thus, no change in the market structure. 
We then considered the case when there is an increase in the 
cost of production by firm 2. This will increase and lower 
the profit increments of firm 1 and firm 2 respectively to a 
change in quality increase. For firm 2 to compensate for 
the increase in its cost of production, it has to increase 
its efficiency in innovation development if it is to 
maintain its relative quality level with firm 1. 
Under a multi-period game, we find that the sub game perfect 
equilibrium is equal to the Nash equilibrium obtained under 
a single period game. The market structure will be 
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determined on how 6ijs change over time as al and a2 are 
increased in each period. The öiJs trajectories with 
respect to ai and a2 will then determine the market 
structure after n periods given that the efficiency in R&D 
stays constant over time. 
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13. Conclusion 
In the middle of 1988, the IBM in Korea has officially 
granted permission for the Korean electronics companies to 
freely copy their product (although limited to PCs), without 
prior consent, but to pay licence fee ex-post adoption. 
This move was the result of three basic circumstances in the 
market. First, the Korean computer companies are almost as 
advanced in producing personal computers as their rivals, 
but have been concentrating their efforts in diversifying 
the products such as to reach the ex treme ends o f the market 
whe reas the IBM has focused more on innovation. The result 
of this led naturally to the second reason that the IBM has 
the primary market consisting of large firms and 
institutions requiring ever more sophisticated and powerful 
computers. The Korean computer companies, however, lagging 
behind by only a month the IBM in terms of technology, took 
the secondary market the demand of which consists largely of 
private users requiring less powerful but cheaper computers 
and for more diversified purposes. Finally, the third 
reason was that the Korean computer companies copied the IBM 
products anyway without paying the licence fee. The 
monitoring cost involved being large, it is difficult for 
the IBM to prevent free copying of its products. 
This simple illustration of one aspect of the electronics 
market shows that the specification of the demand side of 
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our model was empirically consistent. Not only do we find 
that more expensive computers are made in the U. S. B. or in 
Japan and in many other fields of the electronics market to 
include video cameras and high quality stereo systems, but 
also that they attract the upper half of the market. 
The assumption of first mover advantage of firm 1, i. e., the 
incumbent firm, was trivial and is justified by its relative 
advantages in technology. We also assumed that consumers 
have perfect information about the quality of products and 
firms have perfect information about the demand side. 
Furthermore, the exchange rate was assumed to be constant 
which under the present regime of free floating is hard to 
find anywhere. In spite of these weaknesses in the 
specifications of the real world, we have derived the 
following results. 
A two-stage game under perfect equilibrium was considered 
first. As there is no empirical justification as to what 
variables firms choose (as under what principles firms' 
conjectures were determined) to maximize their objective 
functions, we analysed under two extreme forms of 
competition: Cournot and Bertrand. Under Cournot competiton, 
we find that the subgame perfect equilibrium in the second 
stage game of marketing is characterized by quantities 
produced by both firms below that found for under Bertrand 
competition. We find that, under Cournot competition, 
output of firm 1 fell as against a rise in firm 2's output 
as the quality gap is reduced. The price levels of both 
firms are lower under Bertrand competition than under 
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Cournot. Under Bertrand competition, however, there exists 
a lower limit to the quality level of firm 1 for each given 
value of the quality level of firm 2 if it is to stay in the 
market at all. This is caused by the price war between two 
firms such that unless firm 1 attains a certain minimum 
quality gap, firm 2 will push its price level down far 
enough that the difference in the quality level can no 
longer be compensated for by the difference in the price 
level. We showed that under Bertrand competition, that firm 
1 may be forced out of the market by negative mark-up rather 
than due to a complete loss of market share. The reason 
that firm 1 may not be forced out of the market under 
Cournot competiton even if there is no quality gap is 
because of the first-mover advantage where firm 1 behaves as 
a price discriminating monopolist charging a higher price 
(due to higher production cost) and taking the upper group 
of the market in the face of a downwards sloping demand 
curve, while firm 2, at a lower price, behaves also like a 
monopolist in the market left over by firm 1. In other 
words, in Cournot competition, both firms act as monopolists 
given their residual demand curves. 
For the first stage competition, we found under both Cournot 
and Bertrand competition for the marketing stage, that with 
zero cost of innovation and no upper and lower bounds on the 
level of quality, Nash-equilibrium did not exist. Since 
there is no cost of innovation, firm 2 will attempt to 
reduce the quality difference while firm 1 will attempt to 
push ahead leaving as wide a quality difference as possible. 
Imposing upper and lower bounds on the potential quality 
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levels yield the same result in both the Cournot and 
Bertrand competition for the marketing stage. Both firms 
will opt for the maximum potential quality levels. If the 
maximum quality levels are identical, then under Cournot 
competition, firm 1 will still stay in the market for the 
reason explained above while under Bertrand competition, it 
will be forced out of the market since firm 2 with its lower 
cost will push its price level down as far as to induce a 
negative mark up for firm 1. 
Under a positive and increasing cost of innovation with 
respect to the quality level, we find that under certain 
conditions on the values of the exogenous variables, 
equilibrium exists under both regimes. Each equilibrium is 
obtained such that neither firm can improve their profit 
given the equilibrium strategy of their rivals. The 
nonlinearity of their reaction function arise from the trade 
off between higher quality leading to higher profit and 
higher cost of innovation. One difference between the 
reaction function between Cournot and Bertrand competition 
is that the reaction function of firm 2 was concave and 
convex to the origin respectively. 
To analyse the consequences of wage rises or a shift in the 
emphasis within the objective function of firm 2 from 
revenue to profit maximization, we conduct a comparative 
static exercise where we assume an increase in the cost of 
production of firm 2 and a positive cost of innovation. 
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Under Cournot competiton, the reaction functions of the 
quality levels of both firms will shift towards the origin 
due to the following reason. As the cost of production 
rises, quantity supplied by firm 2 will fall. This fall in 
the market will be partly compensated by an increase in the 
quantity supplied by firm 1 who will charge a slightly 
higher price than before without any loss of market share 
due to its price increase. The extent of firm 1's price 
increase will be such that the relative price level of firm 
1 in relation to firm 2 will be lower than before. This 
marginal increase in competitiveness then enables firm 1 to 
lower its quality level as 'well, thus cutting the cost of 
innovation, so as to marginally increase its profit level. 
To sum up, an increase in the cost of firm 2 will lead to an 
decrease in firm 2's quantity supplied. Firm 1 will respond 
by increasing its quantity supplied accompanied by a 
combination of an increase in the price level and a fall in 
the quality level. 
Under Bertrand competition, firm 2 will increase its price 
level as to guarantee itself a positive mark up as a 
response to an increase in its production cost. The quantity 
it supplies will fall. The reaction function of the quality 
level of firm 1 will now shrink towards the 45° line 
implying a fall in the optimal quality level for each given 
quality level of firm 2. The reason is that under Bertrand 
competition, both firms are pricing their products at their 
marginal cost level. The quality levels are then 
determined such as to maximize profit. As the price level 
of firm 2 rises, firm 1 is now able- to afford a lower 
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quality level for each quantity supplied as higher marginal 
cost of production has meant a fall in the marginal profit 
level and thus a fall in the optimal quality level of firm 
2. Therefore, as in the case of Cournot competition, both 
quality level will fall. These results may be plausible in 
the sense that as the cost of production of firm 2 rises, az 
gets closer to that of firm 1, i. e., the degree of asymmetry 
is reduced. Therefore, the differences in the result of the 
competition must also be narrowed. 
In order to relax the assumption on firms' conjectures, 
restricted either to Bertrand or Cournot, we considered all 
other possible outcomes corresponding to different 
conjectures. This produce infinitely many equilibria 
including possibilities where firm 1 may be forced out of 
the market if both firms engage in a price war under a 
narrow quality gap. To reduce such a multiplicity of 
possible equilibria, we propose consistency in conjectures. 
We defined consistent conjecture to prevail if firm 1 
conjectures on firm 2's reaction function in response to 
changes in quantity supplied by firm 1 for each given values 
of quality difference, is in fact the actual reaction 
function of firm 2. Furthermore, it is attained at a point 
where it is not profitable for neither firm to deviate from 
this solution. We show that under such a restriction that 
the possible equilibria is reduced dramatically. For each 
given value of quality difference, we find that uniqueness 
of equilibrium prevails. Under an infinite regress of 
thought experiment by firms, such a consistent conjectures 
equilibrium is equal to a Cournot solution. Therefore, 
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given full information about market structure and values of 
exogenous variables as fixed, in the long run, we may 
observe a Cournot competition in the duopoly market 
consisting of rational profit maximizing firms. 
Finally, we considered the question of persistent dominance 
of the incumbent firm in such a market described so far. We 
found an interesting result that under the Cournot 
conjectures assumption for the marketing stage and certain 
cost condition, it is more profitable for firm 1 to stay a 
leader while it is more profitable for firm 2 to stay a 
follower. The intuition is that firm 1 with higher fixed 
cost of production has to compensate for its higher price 
level by providing better quality product. On the other 
hand, for some changes in the costs of production, both 
firms would find it more profitable to become followers. To 
be more precise, if the cost of production of firm 1 
increases such that the cost difference between both firms 
is further widened, firm 1 would benefit if it would change 
over to a follower, producing a lower quality product and 
thereby saving from cuts in its cost of innovation than to 
produce at even a higher quality level aiming at the 
remaining upper group consumers. Since it is profitable for 
firm 2 to stay also a follower, there will be a conflict of 
interest and the Nash equilibrium will be obtained where 
both quality levels will be zero. Under an infinitely 
repeated game, both firms will gain if firm 1 stays a leader 
while firm 2 remains a follower. Given that firm 2 has some 
credible threat to counteract any deviant behaviour of firm 
1, the incumbent firm will be forced to stay a leader. Such 
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a credible threat may be provided by the Government of a NIC 
drawing up a contingent plan for its firm. 
We introduced three different types of licensing rules into 
the general framework; a fee that is determined as a 
function of the quantity of final product sold by the buyer 
of the technology, a fixed fee and finally a fee that is a 
function of the quality difference between the top quality 
of the market leader and the level of quality it is selling 
to the follower. We concluded that the last of the three 
rules dominates others in terms of yielding highest profit 
to both firms. Having established a dominant strategy, we 
examined the possibility of leap frogging. We found that 
firm 1 will sell its highest quality at hand, compensating 
its loss of profit form lower sales by the higher license 
fee received form firm 2. To prevent, leap frogging, firm 1 
will have to lower its license fee selling the same quality 
level. 
Once we allow for free copying, we found that firm 2 will be 
able to maximize its profit by copying closely the more 
advanced products from firm 1 but never actually take over 
the leadership as this would incur innovation costs. 
Under Bertrand conjectures assumption for the marketing 
stage, we found that unless the firm with higher production 
cost remains a leader offering a higher product quality to 
consumers, it will be driven out of the market. The 
implication of this for firm 1 type survival is "Innovate or 
die". 
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Still under the same topic of persistent dominance and 
Cournot competiton for the marketing stage, we examined the 
optimal timing of new innovation implementation. We 
analysed how the market structure is affected by different 
times of adoption of higher quality products. We assume the 
level of innovation to be the product of expenditure and 
time, allowing a version of the Penrose effect to take 
place, such that higher expenditure leads to a fall in the 
marginal speed of increment of development. Uncertainty is 
again ruled out. We find that the result of this single 
period game to depend crucially on the initial values of 
both quality levels. There exists some level of quality gap 
at which changes in the profit levels of firm 2 as a 
response to changes in the quality levels will be lower than 
that for firm 1. Thus, under such an initial condition, we 
obtain that both firms will innovate at the same time while 
firm 2 spends more on R&D expenditure such as to keep a 
constant quality gap. If, on the other hand, firms face an 
initial condition such that the quality level of firm 2 is 
higher than the level just described above, the only way 
that firm 1 can stay competitive is to have a higher 
efficiency in R&D process or technique. An increase in firm 
Z's cost of production or a shift in the priorities towards 
profits, will lead to the same result as if firm 2 had a 
fall in the efficiency in the R&D technique. Therefore, 
this will lead to a loss of profit of firm 2 and a widening 
gap of quality difference. We then briefly examine the 
multiperiod supergame and find that given the exogenous 
variables being constant over time and the initial. 
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conditions such that the first period equilibrium is 
attained at which quality gap is kept constant, the same 
Nash-equilibrium is sustained throughout other repeated 
games. 
The results we derived in this part of the thesis have the 
following implications to a firm in Korea that i.: to embark 
on a competiton with firms in industrialized countries once 
any supportive action by its Government has been withdrawn 
and free copying becomes more difficult due to its image as 
firm in a newly emerging industrial country. 
The shift in the emphasis from dual objectives of revenue 
and profit towards a single objective of profit has the same 
qualitative effect to firms as an increase in the wage rate, 
i. e., increase in the cost of production. Once this 
increase in the cost of production is observed, both firms 
will lower their quality levels relative to that prior to 
the cost increase. We shall observe a general increase in 
the price level of both products. These two results are 
true under both the Cournot and Bertrand conjectures for the 
marketing stage. 
If firms are rational and full information is available 
freely, we may find that Cournot competition may prevail 
between the Korean firm and a firm in the industrialized 
country. 
Given the present asymmetry in the cost of production and 
quality difference , we will observe that the Korean firm 
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will remain a follower as long as the cost of production of 
its rival does not increase to such an extent that its rival 
decides to cut its expenditure on innovation and become a 
follower too. If this is the case, a credible threat by the 
Korean firm will enable its to maintain its status as a 
follower and force its rival to remain a leader. 
If the Korean firm's profit increment is more sensitive to 
quality improvements, the only way that the firm in the 
industrialized country can stay competitive is to have a 
higher efficiency in R&D technique. We will observe that 
the firm 2 will implement at a later date than its rival 
while maintaining a lower constant expenditure on innovation 
per unit of time. 
Finally, if we observe a Bertrand competition for the 
marketing stage, the only way that the firm in the 
industrialized country can remain in the market is to 
innovate or die. 
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Footnotes 
1. We define a duopoly to be symmetric if all exogenous 
variables within a model, to include both state and 
structural variables, are identical. 
2. Avinash Dixit (1984) has formalized this notion 
within a compact algebraic structure. 
3. A noncooperative competition occurs in the absence of 
any collusive agreement between firms. We may obtain a 
positive conjecture under cooperative behaviour or under 
a demand uncertainty as examined in Ireland & Hviid 
(1986) where each firm takes the decision of its rival as 
a signal (additional information to supplement the 
imperfect information) of the demand side. 
4. The usual assumptions of the cost and demand 
functions and the concavity of the profit function are 
assumed to apply. The usual assumptions are: 1) the cost 
function is defined and continuous with output x respect 
to and has a positive first derivatives while the second 
derivative is continuous 2) the demand function is 
defined and continuous for all output x? 0, it is closed 
and bounded given x? x? 0 (where . 
is some upper limit) 
and has a negative first derivative while we assume the 
second derivative is constant. (refer to J. W. 
Friedman(1977) P19-20 for a detailed exposition) 
5. This notion was first used by Stackelberg (1934), 
hence the name, who argued that in real world, there is 
usually one dominant firm in each industry. Other firms, 
which are relatively small, will have zero conjectures 
like in Cournot competition. The dominant firm, knowing 
its follower's strategy, maximizes with respect to its 
own output level as well as the known reaction of its 
followers. 
6. See Selten (1975) for extensive analysis on the 
notion of Perfect Equilibrium. Here, we use the 
definition as rephrased by Shaked and Sutton (1982). 
7. Edgeworth (1897), based on Bertrand's argument, 
carries it further and argues that a firm has incentive 
to undercut its rival's price level as long as it has 
unused capacity. The price war will stop only if they 
both have reached their full capacity production level. 
Their price level may be well below the marginal cost. 
Thus, one firm will set a higher price in the hope that 
its rival will follow. The rival would indeed follow, 
but not all the way, for by setting a price level just 
below its rival who has dared to put up the price level, 
it can undersell its rival. This will initiate another 
price war and the equilibrium will be somewhere between 
the initial price level corresponding to full capacity 
production level. 
8. Dominant strategy is defined as the strategy vector 
S* _ {s*i, s*2, .... , s*n} where n is the number of firms and si E S, a strategy set, such that it satisfies 
ni(S*) ? ni(S) where S= {si, s2, ... , sn} for all i. 
9. He himself refers to the models developed by 
Gabszewicz, Thisse (1979,1980), Gabszewicz at al (1980) 
and Shaked, Sutton (1982,1983). 
10. An oligopoly market where- firms take their rivals" 
supply levels as given. 
11. An oligopoly market where firms take their rivals' 
prices as independent of their own profit maximizing 
decisions. 
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Appendix B 
Comparative Static Results obtained under Bertrand Conjecture 
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Appendix C 
Numerical Values of Equilibrium under Bertrand and Cournot 
Conjectures 
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